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1 INTRODUCTION
Financial assets are contractual claims that derive value from the owner’s right to a
fraction of the issuer’s future wealth. In order for the owner to benefit from the pur-
chase of the asset, the issuer attempts to sustain or accumulate her financial wealth
to meet the claim’s nominal worth in the maturity. Although there may be social
benefits to the issuer’s effort, such benefits are irrelevant in the financial market
where potential buyers and sellers focus only on whether the issuer is financially
sound enough to honor the claim or not.
The market participants express their opinions of the asset in their bid and ask
quotes. A quote is a prospective market price at which a participant would transact,
and depends on her private valuation of the asset. As market participants observe
the competing quotes in the marketplace, they might revalue the asset and quote
differently, or just more competitively. Competition and dynamic revaluation en-
hance the reliability and validity, respectively, of the eventual equilibrium price as
a measure of the asset’s fundamental value.
Fundamental value depends heavily of the design of the financial claim inherent
in the asset. The remoteness and riskiness of the claim depresses the fundamental
value of the asset below its nominal worth. The riskiness, in turn, not only depends
on the terminal value of the claim under different trajectories of the issuer’s wealth,
but also on the probabilities of different trajectories. As information helps to assign
these probabilities, it plays a pivotal role in the valuation of claims with a terminal
value most contingent upon a realization of particular trajectories.
The dynamic interaction between information gathering, valuation, and quoting is
generally called price discovery. Price discovery is one of the central purposes
of financial markets and, in addition to its economic function, serves academic
purposes. By observing market quotes, a financial researcher familiar with the
structure of the asset and the workings of the marketplace can make unambiguous
predictions about the terminal value of the asset as well as infer the uncertainty
associated with these predictions. Likewise, if the exact nature of the asset itself
is unclear, the researcher can make an educated guess about its qualities and then
adjust this guess by comparing her projections of the asset value to actual quotes
under sufficiently divergent market circumstances. Overall, the price mechanism
based on bid and ask quotes enables experts to infer increasingly detailed market
perceptions by appending the theoretical structure for the inference.
Notwithstanding, the value of information embedded in market quotes is condi-
tional on the functioning of the market itself. If market entry is costly, uncompet-
itive quotes may drift far apart and no longer pin down the market consensus of
the asset value. Or, a market externality may arise that will distort the quotes, so
that the market price of the asset does not reflect its fundamental value. In such
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circumstances, the researcher’s predictions become unreliable or even invalid. For
this reason, the researcher must be able to recognize the potential externalities in
the market and assess its general ability to function before making any more so-
phisticated projections based on its informational output.
This thesis consist of four essays that focus on two particular features of the fi-
nancial system as described above. In the first two essays I attempt to identify the
pieces of information that alter market expectations of asset values, and then exam-
ine how exactly these expectations are altered in response to new information. For
these purposes, I use data on the prices of financial derivatives, which as contingent
claims tend to convey more information in their prices than assets having less con-
ditional payoffs. In the latter two essays I analyze the origin and effects of certain
externalities that arise in markets which differ by organization but are linked by
asset design. Specifically, I study intrinsically interconnected markets that do not
share the same properties with respect to size, transaction costs, or derivative assets.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 pro-
vides a general framework for asset pricing, and the three following sections extend
the framework to introduce the problems examined in the essays. Section 1.2 de-
scribes the relationship between asset prices and market expectations. Section 1.3
introduces the concept of market liquidity, demonstrates its effect on asset prices,
and describes the role of market coordination in explaining cross-sectional differ-
ences in liquidity. Section 1.4 illustrates how coordination, liquidity, and other mar-
ket externalities can arise as a result of asset design, market design, and institutions.
Section 2 summarizes the essays.
1.1 Asset pricing
Following Cochrane (2005), let the price of an arbitrary asset, p, be
p = E(mx) (1)
whereE(·) is the mathematical expectation operator,m is a stochastic discount fac-
tor, and x is the payoff of the asset. Ifm and x are both stochastic, their covariance
cov(m, x) = E(mx)−E(m)E(x) dictates the degree of nonlinearity in the pricing
equation. Rewriting Equation eq1 using the definition of covariance, one obtains:
p = E(m)E(x) + cov(m, x). (2)
The first component in Equation (2) is the asset’s price according to risk-neutral
valuation and the second component is a risk adjustment arising from the covariance
between x and the discount factor m. If the payoff x is constant and therefore
uncorrelated with the discount factor, one can solve for the price of one unit riskless
 Acta Wasaensia 3 
asset,
p = E(m), (3)
and the instantaneous continuously compounding risk-free rate,
r = ln(p). (4)
1.2 Market expectations
A time dimension is included in pricing Equation (1) and rewritten as
pt = Et(mTxT ), (5)
where subscript t denotes the time of valuation of the payoff received at T , t ≤ T .
Et(·) is the mathematical expectation conditional on the information setΩ available
on time t, Et(·) = E(·|Ωt). As new information arrives, the information set grows,
which may alter the conditioning of expectations and induce a change in the asset
price. More formally, assume an arrival of new relevant information It+1 on the
payoff of the asset, and, for brevity, unit discount factor. Then, ceteris paribus, the
resulting price change is
∆pt+1 = E(xT |Ωt, It+1)− E(xT |Ωt). (6)
In the essay titled “When Bernanke talks, the markets listen: the case of the first
FOMC press conference on monetary policy”, it is examined whether the Federal
Open Market Committee’s first press conference on monetary policy provided new
information (It+1) about the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance. If market
expectations about the future monetary policy are altered by the topics discussed
in press conference, it would induce changes in the values of assets with payoffs
depending on the future interest rates.
In addition to conditioning information, changes in the risk adjustment component
of Equation (2) change the price of the asset. Yet, in some cases the risk adjust-
ment factor can be ignored. A contingent claim is an asset whose payoffs can be
replicated with a portfolio of other assets. Therefore, the price of the claim must be
equal to the value of the replicating portfolio in order to preclude arbitrage. Since
arbitrage does not depend on risk attitudes, no risk adjustments are needed in the
pricing of contingent claims. Following the logic, the market expectations of the
contingent payoffs can be treated “as if” they are formed by risk-neutral investors.
The introduction of risk-neutral expectation operator EQt changes Equation (5) to
pt = Et(mT )E
Q
t (xT ). (7)
Assume that the asset in case is a call option ct incorporating a contingent claim
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paying the non-negative difference between ST , a continuous random value, and
K, the strike price. Then, the current risk-neutral value of the payoff is
ct = e
−r(T−t)EQt (ST −K)+, (8)
a product of a discount factor based on the risk-free rate and the expected payoff
of the option. If the option is publicly traded, the expectation operator summarizes
the market-based probabilities assigned to different outcomes of ST ,
ct = e
−r(T−t)
∫ ∞
K
(ST −K)fQt (ST )dST , (9)
where fQt (·) is the time-t probability density function used by the public to weight
the likelihood of different outcomes of ST . It has to be noted that f
Q
t (·) captures
the public expectations as if everyone were indifferent to risk, and thus may differ
from the actual probability density function as a function of risk aversion.
Breeden & Litzenberger (1978) show that one can extract risk-neutral market ex-
pectations from a continuum of option prices by taking the second partial derivative
of the option price in Equation (9) with respect to strike price K,
fQt (K) = e
−r(T−t)∂
2ct(K)
∂K2
, (10)
where fQt (K) is the probability of value K occurring in the future as implied by
the current option prices. The rationality of the option-implied market expectations
can be cross-validated by engineering a model for the evolution of the underlying
random variable.
In the essay titled “Forward-looking monetary policy rules and option-implied in-
terest rate expectations”, it is assumed that the underlying variable is the central
bank interest rate, which is set according to a monetary policy reaction function a`
la Taylor (1993). Therefore, a potential set of factors that shape the option market
expectations of the future interest rates are the input variables for the Taylor rule,
namely, the current interest rate, expected inflation, and the expected output gap:
fQt (ST ) = f
Q(ST |Ωt), (11)
where
Ωt  {it, Et(piT ), Et(xT )} , (12)
using the notation of the essay.
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1.3 Market liquidity
Market liquidity is a general term that summarizes how easily and cheaply an asset
can be turned into cash by selling to the market. Usually, liquidity is defined in
terms of a percent transaction cost C that has to be paid for an immediate trans-
action. As will be shown next, market liquidity can be modeled as a result of a
coordination game played by the market participants against a market maker. As a
result of the coordination game, similar assets end up having different liquidity and
price.
Begin with an economy having two agents who trade with probability λ in the next
period. If the agents trade, they choose either asset A or B and trade inside or out-
side the exchange facility. In the exchange, agents have to trade with a maker maker,
who charges the transaction cost for providing liquidity. Outside the exchange, the
agents trade with each other without any cost. A costless over-the-counter (OTC)
trade requires that the agents make opposite trades of the same asset at the same
time. Without coordination, the probability of trading OTC is:
prob(trade = OTC) = λ2 × prob(need = buy & sell)× prob(asset = A or B), (13)
where the first term on the right-hand side is the probability of both agents trading at
the same time, the second term is the probability of the agents being on the opposite
sides of the trade, and the third term is the probability of both agents trading the
same asset. As the probability of over-the-counter trading is arguably small, the
market maker is able to set a high transaction cost for both assets
CA,B = C
[
1− prob(trade = OTC)]. (14)
If, however, the agents coordinate on when to trade, the probability of finding a
counterpart in the over-the-counter market increases to
prob(trade = OTC|t) = prob(need = buy & sell)× prob(asset = A or B) (15)
and the market maker has to lower the transaction costs to
CA,B = C
[
1− prob(trade = OTC|t)]. (16)
If the agents further agree on trading asset A only, the probability of trading over-
the-counter becomes
prob(trade = OTC|t, i) = prob(need = buy & sell), (17)
so that the agents have to trade in the exchange only if they are both buyers or
sellers. Thus, when the agents agree on what and when to trade, the transaction
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cost for the primary trading vehicle A drops to
CA = C
[
1− prob(trade = OTC|t, i)], (18)
while the lack of over-the-counter trading opportunities for the secondary trading
vehicle B allows the market maker to charge a full transaction cost,
CB = C. (19)
The difference between the transaction costs of assets A and B that arises from the
agents’ coordination has a direct impact on the relative prices. Consider a simple
example in which both assets pay one unit at the maturity time T with certainty.
If the agents could coordinate their future trading in the way described above, how
much would they quote for the assets at time 0?
Asset A is more liquid than asset B, since coordination ensures that the transaction
cost for asset A is less than for asset B. If the agents factor in the future transaction
costs when they valuate the assets, the equilibrium price of the assets based on
periodic compounding r = er − 1 is given by
pi0 = p0
[
1− Ci(1 + r)−t] , (20)
where p0 = (1 + r)−T would be the price of a hypothetical liquid asset that would
bear no transaction costs, and time t is when the agents agree to trade, t < T−1. As
can be seen from Equation (20), the perfectly liquid asset would command a liquid-
ity premium over A and B, because their buyers would demand price concessions
to cover the future transaction costs.
In a similar fashion, the agents would also consider the transaction-cost differen-
tial between A and B when quoting for the assets. Substituting CA and CB from
Equations (18) and (19), respectively, into Equation (20) gives the relative liquidity
premium on asset A over the illiquid asset B:
pA0 − pB0
p0
=
prob(trade = OTC|t, i)× C
(1 + r)t
(21)
where the liquidity premium increases with the discounted transaction-cost advan-
tage of asset A over B.
Overall, the level of coordination achieved by the agents plays a major explanatory
factor in the transaction costs across assets. In the essay titled “Liquidity premia
in German government bonds”, it is shown that deliverability for a futures contract
serves as a mechanism of coordination in the bond market. Coordinated trading
lowers the transaction costs for deliverable bonds, which, in turn, has significant
effects on the bond prices in the form of liquidity premia.
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1.4 Futures market effect
In a market with frictions, the hedging practices by institutional investors have far-
reaching implications on the workings of the market. Assume that an agent is en-
dowed with a portfolio {A,B} and wants to reduce its size by selling either A or
B in the next period. Instead waiting and executing the trade later in the spot mar-
ket, the agent decides make an outright forward sale using a futures contract on the
portfolio. Let the futures contract to be settled by delivering asset A or B at time
1 against the current futures price F0. Then, the current equilibrium price of the
futures contract is the minimum of the forward prices of asset A,
FA0 = (1 + r)p
A
0 , (22)
and asset B
FB0 = (1 + r)p
B
0 + , (23)
where 0 is an exogenous pricing error arising from the design of the futures con-
tract. If 0 > 0, asset A is cheapest to deliver on the futures contract and F0 = FA0 .
This is an arbitrage-based relationship, in that if F0 > FA0 , other agents in the econ-
omy could sell a futures contract and commit to deliver forward, purchase asset A
at the forward price FA0 , and earn riskless arbitrage profit F0−FA0 at the settlement
of the contract. Likewise, if F0 < FA0 , arbitrageurs could buy a futures contract,
sell asset A short at the forward price FA0 , and make an arbitrage profit F
A
0 − F0 at
the futures settlement.
Futures arbitrage generates positive externalities for the owners of the cheapest-
to-deliver asset. First, arbitrage trading enhances the liquidity of the asset and
increases its value in the form of a liquidity premium. Second, if enough agents
engage in futures arbitrage that necessitates short-selling, Duffie (1996) shows that
the arbitrageurs may have to introduce a special rent R, R ≤ r, to induce ample
supply of cheapest-to-deliver assets lent to shorting market. The special rent in
the shorting market induces a premium on the cash price of the cheapest-to-deliver
asset. Applying the logarithmic transformation, the relative price premium is
ln pA0 − ln pB0 = r −R. (24)
Similar results hold if 0 < 0 and assetB becomes cheapest to deliver on the futures
contract. If 0 = 0, the futures traders are indifferent between delivering asset A
or B, and the effects of coordinated trading do not arise. Then, by the law of
substitution, 0 ≤ |FA0 − FB0 | ≤ |0| provides theoretical bounds for the combined
value of the externalities.
In the essay titled “The cheapest-to-deliver premium: theory and evidence”, an
equilibriummodel is derived to describe the technical underpinnings of the cheapest-
to-deliver premium in the context of bond and bond futures markets. The main cul-
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prit for the emergence of cash-market premia is the conversion factor method used
by the futures exchange to calculate bond delivery prices. Market circumstances
worsen the conversion factor bias and increase the theoretical upper bound for the
cash market premium on the cheapest-to-deliver bond. The linkage between the
theoretical upper bound and observed cash market premia is empirically verified.
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2 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS
2.1 Forward-looking monetary policy rules and option-
implied interest rate expectations
Central banks conduct monetary policy to maintain a stable monetary environment.
Under the inflation-targeting framework pursued by the major central banks, ad-
verse monetary effects are to be avoided by keeping the changes in the general
level of prices at a target rate. According to economic orthodoxy, the inflation tar-
get is best achieved through active interest rate policy. Specifically, a central bank
can change the interest rate at which its deals with the money market and initiate
a change in the market-clearing quantities of savings and borrowing. The desired
equilibrium effects may not arise instantly, and the central bank may have to keep
changing the policy rate until the market interest rate is at its target level.
The target interest rate level is now widely regarded to be set in accordance with
Taylor (1993) type interest-rate rules, which presume a systematic reaction function
of interest rate policy to the gaps between inflation and output and their respective
target levels. In the forward-looking Clarida et al. (1998) version of the rule, the
policy rate is partially adjusted towards the target interest rate, which, in turn, is
changed in response to information about prospective future inflation and other
economic factors which are expected to affect the future rate of inflation.
The purpose of this essay is to assess whether market participants view a forward-
looking policy rule as a guide to the path of future policy rates or, put differently,
whether the expectations formation process in financial derivatives markets is con-
sistent with Taylor-type rules. Market expectations are defined in terms of proba-
bility distributions of future interest rates, which are computed from cross sections
of interest rate option prices. Then, it is empirically examined if the month-to-
month movements in these option-implied distributions are related to changes in
expectations of the policy rule fundamentals.
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that the changes in interest rate ex-
pectations implied by option prices are consistent with the forward-looking policy
rule, which suggests market participants perceive the rule as a valid description
of the central bank’s future interest rate policy and react to its projections in a
systematic way. To validate the findings of this study in a more general setting,
future extensions of the proposed methodology should employ alternative policy
rule specifications as well as incorporate the effect of parameter uncertainty on the
policy rule projections.
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2.2 When Bernanke talks, the markets listen: the case of
the first FOMC press conference on monetary policy
A central bank effects economic activity and inflation by exercising its control over
the level of short-term interest rates and by influencing financial market expecta-
tions that determine the slope of the term structure. Managing market expectations
is, however, a challenging endeavor for the central bank. For example, a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock leading to an unexpected rise in the short-term inter-
est rates might be interpreted as a response to higher economic growth projections
or higher inflation expectations. The effect on the term structure of interest rates
is ambiguous, which undermines the significance of the expectational channel of
monetary policy transmission.
To better align market expectations with its own inclinations regarding future mon-
etary policy, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the United States’
Federal Reserve System recently changed the way it communicates about monetary
policy. In the new framework published in March 2011, the monetary policy state-
ment announced after every FOMC meeting is now four times per year followed
by a press briefing held by the Chair of the Committee. In the briefing, the Chair
gives a detailed statement of Committee’s monetary policy stance and presents its
latest economic projections, and then allows members of the media to ask clarifying
questions about monetary policy issues.
This essay examines the market adaptation to the Fed’s changed communication
policy. The research question builds upon the efficient market hypothesis: if the
information disseminated in the press briefing adds to the public comprehension of
the forces behind monetary policy decisions, asset prices would change in response
to such information to better reflect the new understanding of the conduct of mon-
etary policy. Whether or not the Fed’s changed communication policy adds market
information is tested by comparing the level of market activity before and during
the press briefing.1
High-frequency analysis of several different asset classes show that the press brief-
ing triggers price discovery in markets for both short- and long-lived assets. The
market responses are found to be deterministic and originate from questions and
answers pertaining to future monetary policy and state of the economy. Overall, the
findings of the study indicate that the Fed’s new communication framework serves
to achieve the clarification objective of monetary policy communication.
1Instead of using the level of market activity in the morning of the press briefing day, an alternative
basis of comparison would be the average level of market activity during the same hours of the
days without a press briefing.
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2.3 Liquidity premia in German government bonds
Variations in liquidity are one reason why yields on otherwise comparable govern-
ment securities differ. Although the liquidity of a bond can be measured in several
ways, the concept essentially captures to what extent the bond can be sold cheaply
and easily. Liquidity is thus valuable for market participants, and especially in
times of market stress, the most liquid bonds have tended to command a consider-
able price premium.
Previous studies of liquidity and liquidity premia in government bond markets,
based mainly on data from the U.S. Treasury market, have identified pronounced
liquidity differences across government securities. For instance, Amihud&Mendel-
son (1991) document that the most recently issued (“on-the-run”) Treasury bills
trade at higher prices than seasoned but otherwise similar securities, and attribute
the price premium to the better liquidity of in-the-run bills. However, the results
from the U.S. Treasury market cannot necessarily be generalized to the German
bond market, its euro counterpart. The two markets differ considerably with re-
spect to hedging practices; while dollar interest rate risk is commonly hedged by
short-selling the most recently issued (“on-the-run”) Treasury bond, the exposure
to euro interest rate risk is usually hedged by selling futures contracts on German
government bonds. As a result, the turnover in the German bond futures market is
many times larger than in the German cash bond market.
In this essay, it is argued that the difference in hedging practice cause trading to
be less concentrated on specific bonds in the German market, which, in turn, im-
plies that the differences in liquidity premia are considerably smaller. The empirical
results support this conjecture; in sharp contrast to the evidence from the U.S. Trea-
sury market, on-the-run status appears to have only a modest effect on the liquidity
and pricing of German government bonds once other factors have been controlled
for. However, the existence of a highly liquid German futures market leads to sig-
nificant liquidity spillovers to the German cash market. Specifically, bonds that are
deliverable into the futures contracts are both trading more liquidly and command-
ing a price premium. The futures market effect has intensified during the recent
financial crisis.
2.4 The cheapest-to-deliver premium: theory and
evidence
A bond futures contract is a commitment to take a future delivery of an eligible
bond at a predetermined delivery price. Because deliverable bond differ in cash
flow characteristics, a conversion factor is used to equate their delivery prices. In
12 Acta Wasaensia
theory, the conversion factor method makes the eligible bonds perfect substitutes
for the delivery and thereby eliminates any adverse delivery effects. In practice,
the conversion factor does not equate the delivery prices, but only mitigates the
price differences. A bond with certain cash flow characteristics will be cheapest to
deliver, and the open futures positions at the contract maturity will be settled by the
delivery of this particular bond.
This essay reports on a study of the effects of futures market delivery process on
the cheapest to deliver bond. The study concentrates on the German government
bond futures market, which overshadows the cash market in size and significance.
Following Krishnamurthy (2002), a “pairs” trading test involving short-selling in-
dicates that German cheapest-to-deliver bonds command a price premium, and, at
equilibrium, trade at a cheap financing rate in the repurchase market. In order to
investigate the issue analytically, a equilibrium model is developed. The model
postulates that the price premium is driven by the delivery discount, the amount
of deliveries in relation to the amount of outstanding bonds, and the cheapness of
financing rates. The reduced form of the model is empirically tested and validated.
 Acta Wasaensia 13 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Short‐term interest rates are mainly determined by the monetary policy of central
banks. Monetary policy, in turn, is now widely acknowledged to be guided by
Taylor (1993) type policy rules, which presume a systematic reaction function
of monetary policy to inflation and the output gap (see, e.g., Clarida, Gali, &
Gertler, 1998; Rudebusch & Svensson, 1999; Bernanke & Gertler, 2000;
Woodford, 2001; Nelson, 2003; Orphanides, 2003; Favero, 2006).1 Under
forward‐looking policy rules and the inflation‐targeting framework pursued by the
major central banks, official policy rates are adjusted in response to information
about prospective future inflation and other economic factors which may
potentially affect the future rate of inflation. Short‐term market rates, again, are
affected not only by current and prospective inflation and economic output, but
also by market participants’ expectations about future monetary policy. Given
that forward‐looking monetary policy operates under considerable uncertainty
about future inflation and the state of the economy, general economic
uncertainty may also be expected to have a significant effect on short‐term
market interest rates.
In this paper, we examine the association between option‐implied
interest rate distributions and macroeconomic expectations in the context of a
forward‐looking monetary policy rule.2 In particular, we use market data on the
three‐month sterling Libor futures options to extract probability distributions of
future short‐term interest rates, and attempt to relate the month‐to‐month
movements in these implied distributions to changes in inflation expectations, the
expected output gap, and perceived financial uncertainty. The purpose of this
exercise is to assesswhethermarket participants view the policy rule as a guide to the
path of future policy rates or, put differently, whether the expectations formation
process in financial derivatives markets is consistent with Taylor‐type rules. By
focusing on the dynamics of option‐implied interest rate distributions, this paper
offers new insights into the effects of presumed policy rules and macroeconomic
fundamentals on market expectations about future short‐term interest rates.
Expected probability distributions implied by option prices have received
considerable attention over the past decade. Central banks, in particular, are now
increasingly using option‐implied probability distributions to assess market
expectations of future interest and exchange rates for the purposes of formulating
1The original model of Taylor (1993), which was later dubbed “the Taylor rule”, is a linear model in which a
central bank’s target short‐term nominal interest rate is defined by the equilibrium real interest rate, current
inflation, and the deviations of current inflation and output from their target levels.
2It is important to note that our research setting does not require that the central bank would actually set the
policy rate on the basis of a forward‐looking reaction function, but rather presumes thatmarket participants view
the rule as a valid description of the central bank’s rate setting behavior. If market participants believe that the
central bank’s monetary policy is rule‐based, we should observe a systematic linkage between interest rate
expectations and forecasts about the fundamental variables used in the policy rule.
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monetary policy.3 A number of papers have recently used implied probability
distributions to examine the behavior of market expectations around macroeco-
nomic news announcements (e.g., Carlson, Craig, & Melick, 2005; Glatzer &
Scheicher, 2005; Vähämaa, Watzka, & Äijö, 2005; Beber & Brandt, 2006),
central bank actions (e.g., Bhar & Chiarella, 2000; Carlson et al., 2005; Galati,
Melick, & Micu, 2005; Vähämaa, 2005; Morel & Teletche, 2008; Gnabo &
Teletche, 2009; Vergote & Puigvert‐Gutiérrez, 2012), and other specific
events (e.g., Melick & Thomas, 1997; Söderlind, 2000; Coutant, Jondeau, &
Rockinger, 2001; Vincent‐Humphreys & Puigvert‐Gutiérrez, 2010).
Most closely related to our approach are the papers by Bhar and Chiarella
(2000), Carlson et al. (2005), Vähämaa (2005), Vähämaa et al. (2005), Beber
and Brandt (2006), and Vergote and Puigvert‐Gutiérrez (2012). Vähämaa
et al. (2005) and Beber and Brandt (2006) show that macroeconomic news
announcements related to inflation and unemployment cause significant short‐
term reactions in the distributional form of expected future bond yields, while
Bhar andChiarella (2000), Vähämaa (2005), and Vergote and Puigvert‐Gutiérrez
(2012) document systematic movements in the implied probability distributions
of short‐term interest rates and bond yields in response to policy statements
and changes in the monetary policy stance. Finally, Carlson et al. (2005) use
federal funds futures options to extract implied probability distributions of the
Federal Reserve’s target rate decisions, and assess the impact of inflation and
employment announcements and monetary policy communication on the market
expectations of future policy decisions. Their results indicate that option‐implied
market expectations of the future monetary policy stance are associated with
inflation and employment data releases in amanner consistentwith theTaylor rule.
This study extends the prior literature in twomain respects. First, in contrast
to Bhar and Chiarella (2000), Carlson et al. (2005), Vähämaa (2005), Vähämaa
et al. (2005), Beber and Brandt (2006), and Vergote and Puigvert‐Gutiérrez
(2012), who examine short‐run intradaily or daily reactions of interest rate
expectations around macroeconomic news announcements and monetary policy
events, we focus on month‐to‐month movements in option‐implied interest rate
distributions. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to
examine the longer‐run association between implied interest rate distributions
and macroeconomic fundamentals. It is well known that the way prices of
financial instruments adjust to changes in fundamentals is often exaggerated in
the short run by investor sentiment and other behavioral biases (Shiller, 1981;
Shleifer, 1990), and a long‐run analysis abstracting from these effects may
therefore be more informative about the actual relationship between prices and
3All major central banks have publicly acknowledged that option‐implied probability distributions are a valuable
source of information and provide a useful input to monetary policy decisions.
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fundamentals. Second, while recent studies have investigated the role of forward‐
lookingmonetary policy rules in analysts’ interest rate forecasts (see, e.g., Fendel,
Frenkel, & Rülke, 2011, 2013; Frenkel, Lis, & Rülke, 2011), we utilize option‐
implied probability distributions which provide a comprehensive market‐based view
of investors’ expectations regarding future interest rates.Within this framework, we
are able to examine the effects of policy rule fundamentals on the entire distribution
of interest rate expectations, and essentially, to assess whether market perceptions
are consistent with Taylor‐type rules.4 In general, this analysis provides new
information about the formation of short‐term interest rate expectations, and may
also have important implications for financial market practitioners and monetary
policy authorities alike. From the viewpoint of central banks, for instance, it is
important to consider to what extent the market expectations of future short‐term
rates are affected by the expectations regarding policy rule fundamentals.
Our empirical findings indicate that the interest rate expectations implied by
option prices are largely consistent with forward‐looking monetary policy rules.
In particular, the results show that month‐to‐month movements in the expected
level of the three‐month Libor rate are related to the expected output gap and
perceived financial uncertainty. The expected level of the Libor rate is also
substantially affected by shifts in the monetary policy stance. The results further
demonstrate that changes in the distributional form of interest rate expectations
are significantly influenced by the policy rule fundamentals. We find that the
dispersion of market expectations around the expected short‐term rate is
positively associated with expectations of a widening inflation gap. Moreover, the
dispersion of interest rate expectations appears to increase with increasing
financial uncertainty and with a widening disparity between the market and
policy rates. Asymmetries in interest rate expectations are found to be positively
related to the expected inflation and output gaps. Finally, our results indicate
that market participants attach higher probabilities for extreme movements in
short‐term interest rates in response to increasing expected inflation and output
gaps. Overall, we interpret these findings as evidence that market participants
form and revise their expectations regarding future movements in Libor rates, at
least partially, on the basis of Taylor‐type policy rules.
The remainder of the study is structured in the following manner. In the
second section, we formulate the relationship between macroeconomic expect-
ations that determine the central bank policy rate and its expected future path
that, in turn, defines interest rates in the money market. The methodology that is
used to extract interest rate expectations from option prices is presented in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data on macroeconomic expectations and
4In this regard, Carlson et al. (2005) report exploratory evidence that option‐implied probability distributions of
the Fed’s target rate decisions react to inflation and employment news announcements in a manner consistent
with the Taylor rule.
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presents our econometric setup. Section 5 reports the empirical findings on the
association between option‐implied interest rate distributions and macroeco-
nomic expectations. In Section 6, we assess the effects of the financial crisis on
the formation of option‐implied interest rate expectations. Finally, the last section
provides concluding remarks.
2. SHORT‐TERM INTEREST RATES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF FORWARD‐LOOKING MONETARY POLICY
Assume that the central bank implements monetary policy by intervening in the
money market in order to achieve the desired level for the short‐term interest rate, i�t .
The short rate is perceivedby themarket tobe adjusted in response tomacroeconomic
expectations á la a forward‐looking Taylor rule of Clarida et al. (1998):
i�t ¼ r þ p�t þ b½Etðptþn � p�t Þ� þ g½EtðxtþkÞ� þ j½ztþm�; ð1Þ
where r is the equilibrium real rate and ptþn and xtþk are n‐ and k‐period‐ahead
inflation rate and the output gap;Et(·) denotes the time t conditional expectation; an
asterisk (“*”) represents a target value; and ztþm is ameasure offinancial uncertainty,
which is assumed to influence interest‐rate setting independently of ptþn and xtþk.
In addition to the inflation and output gaps, which are routinely included
in reaction functions such as Equation (1), there are strong reasons to assume
that the central bank responds to financial uncertainty.5 Amongst other things,
excessive volatility in the asset markets may seriously hamper the exercise of
monetary policy and exacerbate economic downturns, as discussed in many
recent studies (see, among others, Bernanke & Gertler, 2000, 2001; Cecchetti,
Genberg, Lipsky, & Wadhwani, 2000; Mishkin & White, 2002; Rigobon &
Sack, 2003; Bean, 2004; Campbell, 2008; Mishkin, 2009). Perhaps the most
direct empirical evidence on the role of financial uncertainty inmonetary policy is
provided by Jovanovic and Zimmermann (2010), who use an augmented forward‐
looking Taylor rule similar to ours to establish a negative link between stock
market volatility and the policy rate.
With respect to Equation (1), we define pt � 100� logðPt=Pt�12Þ,
xt � 100� logðYt=Y�t Þ, and zt � VarðWtÞ0:5, where Pt is a price index, Yt is the
level of output, and Wt is a measure of financial wealth. Strong expectational
channels in Equation (1) establish that optimal monetary policy involves interest
rate smoothing, that is, adjusting interest rates only gradually in response to changes
in economic environment (Goodfriend, 1987; Woodford, 2003). To capture the
5In a survey by Roger and Sterne (1999) of the Centre for Central Banking Studies of the Bank of England, 24
out of 28 central bankers representing industrialized countries find asset price volatility either important or
relevant in the setting of monetary policy.
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tendency of central banks to smooth interest rate changes, we allow that the actual
policy rate it (henceforth, “instrument rate”) partially adjusts to the desired level i�t :
it ¼ rit�1 þ ð1� rÞi�t þ nt; ð2Þ
where the smoothing parameter r2 [0, 1] captures the extent of monetary policy
inertia and nt represents an exogenous i.i.d. policy shock. Equation (2) postulates
that each period the central bank adjusts the instrument rate it to eliminate a
fraction 1� r of the difference between i�t and it. Empirical applications of the
dynamic Taylor rule characterized by Equations (1) and (2) tend to find
r‐coefficients near to one, which is often interpreted as a sign of a rather
conservative response to contemporaneous macroeconomic disturbances.
The steering effect of a change in the instrument rate on the economy arises
from the central bank’s ability to manipulate market interest rates through its
monopoly over the monetary base. Thus, the demand for short‐term money
ultimately depends on the price at which the central bank is willing to supply it, or
it. Longer‐termmarket rates are then linked to the level of it through no‐arbitrage
relations. Formally, the ability of investors to substitute between different interest
rate instruments suggests that the yield to maturity Y ðtÞt on a t‐period spot market
investment is equal to the proceeds from an investment strategy of rolling over
one‐period central bank loans for the next t� 1 periods:
1þ YðtÞt ¼ Et
Yt�1
j¼0
1þ itþj
" #�t
: ð3Þ
Equation (3) describes the pure expectation hypothesis of the term
structure, which states that a t‐period gross market yield is the geometric
average of current and expected one‐period gross instrument rates. Thus,
Equations (1) through (3) indicate that macroeconomic expectations may affect
market rates through the expectations of the future short rate independently of
the current level and determinants of the short rate.
3. OPTION‐IMPLIED INTEREST RATE EXPECTATIONS
We next move to the issue of definition and measurement of interest rate
expectations. In this paper, we define “interest rate expectations” in terms of
probability distributions of future interest rates, which we compute from cross
sections of interest rate option prices using a procedure explained in the first
subsection. In the second subsection, we describe a method for calibrating
the resulting risk‐neutral expectations to actual “real‐world” outcomes. The third
subsection describes our option price data.
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3.1. Recovering Risk‐Neutral Interest Rate Expectations from
Option Prices
Options are inherently forward‐looking financial instruments, and thereby
provide a rich source of information about market participants’ expectations
regarding future price developments of the underlying instrument or asset.
In particular, since the price of an option depends on the probability of
the underlying asset price exceeding the strike price of the option, a set
of option prices with the same maturity but with different strike prices
can be used to extract the expected probability distribution of the underlying
asset price at the maturity of the option (see, Sherrick, Garcia, &
Tirupattur, 1996; Söderlind & Svensson, 1997; Jackwerth, 1999; Bliss &
Panigirtzoglou, 2002).
Formally, the price of an option equals the present value of its expected
terminal payoff. Let ct denote the time t value of a European call option with
a single expiration date T and a contractual terminal payoff function
maxðST � K; 0Þ, where ST and K are the settlement price of the underlying
asset and the strike price of the option, respectively. Assuming that the market
is arbitrage free, and following the risk‐neutral valuation principles of Harrison
and Kreps (1979), the time t value of the call option can be written as:
ct ¼ e�rtðT�tÞEQt ½maxðST � K; 0Þ�; ð4Þ
where e�rtðT�tÞ is a discount factor based on the risk‐free interest rate rt and
EQt ½maxðST � K; 0Þ� is the conditional expectation of the option payoff under the
risk‐neutral probability measure Q (to be distinguished from the physical, or
objective, measureP). Cox and Ross (1976) show that the time t value of the call
option can be equivalently expressed in terms of a risk‐neutral probability density
function (“PDF”) of the underlying asset price:
ct ¼ e�rtðT�tÞ
Z 1
�1
maxðST � K; 0ÞfQt ðSTÞ dST ; ð5Þ
where fQt ð�Þ denotes the time‐t risk‐neutral PDF of the underlying asset price at
the option maturity date T. Because the option price can be expressed as a
function of the probability distribution of the underlying asset price, a set of
option prices observable in the market can be used to extract this distribution.
The prior literature has proposed both parametric and nonparametric
methods for extracting the expected probability distribution from option prices
(for reviews, see Jackwerth, 1999; Bahra, 2002). The parametricmethods assume
a specific parametric form for the terminal underlying asset price distribution.
Perhaps the most commonly used parametric techniques are the lognormal‐
Monetary Policy Rules and Option‐Implied Expectations 7
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mixture model distributions proposed by Melick and Thomas (1997) and the
Gram–Charlier expansion model of Corrado and Su (1996). The nonparametric
methods, initiated by Shimko (1993), utilize some flexible function to fit
the observed option prices, and then apply the results derived by Breeden and
Litzenberger (1978) to extract the implied probability distribution. Campa,
Chang, and Reider (1998) show that different methodological approaches lead to
virtually similar implied distributions, while the findings reported in Bliss and
Panigirtzoglou (2002) and Andersson and Lomakka (2005) indicate that the
nonparametric smoothing methods may produce more accurate estimates of
implied probability distributions. Galati, Higgins, Humpage, and Melick (2007)
compare two alternative nonparametric smoothing methods and report that the
resulting implied distributions are essentially indistinguishable from each other.
We estimate the implied probability distributions of future short‐term interest
rates with the nonparametric volatility‐smoothing method proposed in Clews,
Panigirtzoglou, and Proudman (2000) and Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002).6 This
nonparametric method combines the approaches of Malz (1997) and Campa
et al. (1998) by using cubic splines to fit implied volatilities as a function of option
deltas. The starting point in the method is the Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)
result, which demonstrates that the second partial derivative of Equation (5) with
respect to the strike price of the option gives the discounted risk‐neutral PDF:
fQt ðKÞ ¼ ertðT�tÞ
@2cðK;T; tÞ
@K2
: ð6Þ
Unfortunately, Equation (6) as such is of limited use because only a discrete
set of option prices can be observed in the market. Thus, in order to extract the
implied probability distribution, the discrete option price observations must first
be transformed into a continuous pricing function. We begin the transformation
by applying the Black–Scholes option pricing model to convert the observed
option prices from the price/strike price space into the implied volatility/delta
space. Subsequently, we fit a cubic spline to the discrete implied volatilities as a
function of option deltas by solving the following minimization problem:
min
Q
XN
i¼1
vifs^ i � s^ i½gðdi;QÞ�g2 þ l
Z 1
�1
g00 ðdi;QÞ2 dd; ð7Þ
6This nonparametric technique is used by the Bank of England to estimate option‐implied distributions and has
become a standard technique for estimating implied distributions (see, e.g., Panigirtzoglou &
Skiadopoulos, 2004; Nikkinen & Vähämaa, 2010; Vincent‐Humphreys & Puigvert‐Gutiérrez, 2010; Kostakis,
Panigirtzoglou, & Skiadopoulos, 2011; de Vincent‐Humphreys & Noss, 2012; Vergote & Puigvert‐
Gutiérrez, 2012). A detailed description of the technique can be found in the appendices of Clews et al.
(2000) and Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002).
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where g(di, Q) is the cubic spline function, Q denotes the parameter matrix
of the cubic spline, s^ i and s^ i½gðdi;QÞ� are the actual and the spline‐fitted
implied volatilities (a hat refers to a model‐based estimate), di is the option delta
corresponding to implied volatility observation i, vi is the weighting parameter,
and l is the smoothing parameter. The fitted cubic smoothing spline provides a
continuous function of implied volatilities in terms of option deltas. By utilizing the
Black‐Scholes model for the second time, we then convert the continuous implied
volatility function from the implied volatility/delta space into the option price/strike
price space to obtain the continuous pricing function.With the continuous pricing
function, the Breeden–Litzenberger result given by Equation (6) can be applied to
calculate the expected probability distribution of the underlying asset.
One drawback of using raw option price data in estimating the implied
distributions is that option prices exhibit time decay, which differs across option
moneyness and type. Even if we knew the exact relationship between time to
expiration and price, or theta, stale price quotes near expiration would introduce an
unnecessary element of noise into the estimation. We circumvent the problem
of maturity dependence by constructing a time‐series of implied probability
distributions with a fixed time‐to‐maturity of three months. Following the approach
detailed in Clews et al. (2000) and Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2002), the fixed‐
horizon distributions are obtained by using a cubic spline function to interpolate
between the implied volatilities of optionswith four differentmaturities but with the
same delta. By repeating the interpolation for different values of delta, we obtain a
hypothetical implied volatility/delta space with three months to maturity for each
point in time. This set of implied volatilities against deltas is then used to estimate
constant‐maturity implied distributions with the procedure described above.
In order to track changes in the shape of the implied distribution of ST, we
compute the first four moments of the distribution at each point in time:
m1;t ¼ EQt ðSTÞ ¼
R1
0 STf
Q
t ðSTÞ dST
m2;t ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
EQt ðS2TÞ � m21;t
q
;
m3;t ¼ EQt
ST � m1;t
m2;t
� �3" #
;
m4;t ¼ EQt
ST � m1;t
m2;t
� �4" #
:
ð8Þ
We interpret the moments in the usual way: the implied mean m1,t gives the
time‐t risk‐neutral expected value of ST, and the implied volatility m2,t measures
the dispersion around its expected value; the implied skewness m3,t measures the
relative probabilities above and below the expected value, or asymmetry in
Monetary Policy Rules and Option‐Implied Expectations 9
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expectations; and the implied kurtosis m4,t captures the tail thickness of the
implied distribution, or the probability of extreme outcomes with respect to ST.
As discussed e.g. in Galati et al. (2007), the first and the third moment can be
used to make directional predictions of ST, whereas the second and the fourth
moment quantify the uncertainty around these predictions.
3.2. Transformation from Risk‐Neutral to “Real‐World” Expectations
So far, we have defined interest rate expectations in terms of option‐implied
distributions under the assumption of risk neutrality. It should be noted, however,
that the risk‐neutral expectations coincide with “true”market expectations only if
the premium for bearing market risk is zero. Otherwise, risk‐neutral probabilities
include information about marginal investor’s subjective assessment of
probabilities as well as her risk preferences:
risk� neutral probability ¼ subjective probability� risk aversion adjustment;
where subjective probabilities, on average, correspond to physical (or, objective)
probabilities if the marginal investor is rational. Risk aversion notwithstanding, it
is a common practice in the literature to use risk‐neutral distributions to infer
market expectations. This is partly because Girsanov’s theorem states that
moving from the risk‐neutral to the physical probability measure only changes the
location of the PDF and not its shape; and partly because the risk premium
contributing to the change in the location of the PDF is sometimes considered to
be small enough to be ignored.
While it may be argued that risk premia are relatively small in the money
market,7 the existence of possible premiamay in principle have some implications
for the interpretation of the information from risk‐neutral densities. In order to
assess the validity of risk‐neutral expectations in this respect, we employ the
empirical calibration method proposed by Fackler and King (1990).8
To state the problem formally, define FQt ð�Þ as time t risk‐neutral cumulative
distribution function (“CDF”) of the final settlement price ST. Once ST is
known, one can go backwards in time and compute UT � FQt ðSTÞ, the ex‐ante
risk‐neutral probability of ST occurring. The question whether the hypothesized
distribution FQt ð�Þ is the same as the true (physical) distribution FPt ð�Þ can
7At least, prior to the breakdown of the interbank market in 2008; using three‐month Euribor market data from
January 1983 toMarch 2002, Hördahl and Vestin (2005) find that the differences between the risk‐neutral and
objective three‐month‐ahead densities are negligible.
8An alternative approach is to scale the risk‐neutral probabilities with a pricing kernel. The kernel can be
calibrated to historical option prices based on an assumed utility function of a representative agent (e.g., Bliss &
Panigirtzoglou, 2004) or a time‐series model of the underlying asset (e.g., Rosenberg & Engle, 2002). Under
certain conditions regarding the dynamics of the asset, Ross (2011) shows that historical data is not necessarily
required for defining the kernel; current prices of options with different maturities suffice.
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be answered by comparing the empirical CDF of independent UT’s,
CðuÞ ¼ ProbðU � uÞ, with that of a uniform distribution: the sequence of
probability assessments is uniformly distributed if and only if the hypothesized
distribution is correct.9
To examine whether the risk‐neutral expectations are valid, one can qq‐plot
C(u) against UT’s on a unit square; the cumulative distribution function should
lie close to the diagonal. If, however, the risk‐neutral probability distributions
produce systematically biased predictions, C(u) bows away from the diagonal.
Then, one has to find a suitable calibration function C'(·) (a prime refers to
calibration) that maximizes the probability that UT’s are drawn from a uniform
distribution and that the risk‐neutral probabilities are correct. Specifying C'(·),
however, is not always straightforward. We follow Fackler and King (1990)
and use the cumulative function of the beta distribution B(a, b) to correct the
risk‐neutral PDF:
fPt ð�Þ ¼
FQt ð�Þa�1 1� FQt ð�Þ
h ib�1
Bða;bÞ f
Q
t ð�Þ; ð9Þ
where fPt ð�Þ corresponds to the PDF under the physical measure. Since the
“calibrated measure” is asymptotically equivalent to the “physical measure” and
vice versa, we use them interchangeably from now on, depending on whether the
context is empirical or theoretical. The beta function parameters {a, b} are
estimated using maximum likelihood (ML). Since the beta distribution nests
the uniform distribution as a special case (a¼b¼ 1, i.e., no calibration required),
a likelihood‐ratio test can be used to determine whether the original risk‐neutral
densities are correctly specified.
3.3. Option Price Data
The implied interest rate distributions used in the empirical analysis are extracted
from settlement prices of three‐month sterling Libor futures options that are
currently traded on the NYSE Liffe and formerly on the London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange. The option price data span the period
January 1993–July 2012. We use the data for years 1993–2007 in our main
analysis, and utilize the data on the subsequent period of severe market turmoil
to perform additional tests.
Better known as “short sterling” futures, the three‐month Libor futures
contract is based on the spot rate of interest paid on three‐month deposits
in the London interbank market. Because the Libor rate itself cannot be
9See Taylor (2005), pp. 455–456 for proof.
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purchased or sold, the short sterling futures are written on a notional asset
that equals 100 minus the Libor rate at the maturity of the contract (in
percentage points):
ST � 100� Y ð3ÞT :
Short sterling futures options are American options written on the short
sterling futures contracts. However, due to the mark‐to‐market procedures, the
short‐sterling futures options are actually priced as European‐style contracts.
The expiration months for the short sterling futures options are the three nearest
calendar months and the following seven months within the quarterly cycle of
March, June, September, and December. Both the short sterling futures and
futures options expire on the third Wednesday of the expiration month. In
general, the short sterling derivatives are widely used and highly liquid contracts,
and are therefore ideal for extracting implied probability distributions of expected
future interest rates. Figure 1 plots the trading volume and open interest for the
short sterling futures option market for the period 1993–2012. The mean
(median) daily trading volume during our sample period is 92800 (68900)
contracts, while the mean (median) open interest is approximately 2.66 (1.30)
million contracts. However, as can be noted from Figure 1, both measures have
FIGURE 1
Volume and open interest for Libor futures options for the period 1992–2012.
12 Sihvonen and Vähämaa
Journal of Futures Markets DOI: 10.1002/fut
 Acta Wasaensia 27 
increased consistently throughout the sample period and exhibited considerable
variation.
We impose three filters on the option price data to reduce noise in
the estimation procedure. First, options with less than five trading days to maturity
are eliminated from the sample in order to avoid expiration‐related abnormalities in
option prices. Second, only at‐the‐money (ATM) and out‐of‐the‐money (OTM)
options are used in the empirical analysis. In‐the‐money (ITM) options are
discarded because they are less liquid thanOTMandATMoptions, and because by
using both OTM call and put options it can be ensured that the complete strike
price spectrum is efficiently utilized in the estimation. Finally, we require that
the option prices are convex and monotonic functions of the corresponding strike
prices, and thereby satisfy the basic theoretical option price conditions.
Table I provides summary statistics for the first four moments of the option‐
implied PDFs for the period 1993–2007. Each monthly observation is based on a
cross‐section of the option prices on the 15th day of the month. The first row
suggests that the implied distributions are on average slightly right‐skewed and fat‐
tailed,with lots of variation around themean value of 5.60.A leptokurtic distribution
with a longer right tail implies expectations of higher future Libor rates that aremore
prone to large changes than would normally be assumed. All implied moments
exhibit considerable persistencewithfirst‐order autocorrelation coefficients ranging
from 0.51 to 0.97. However, the Wald and the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF)
tests indicate that only the implied mean process contains a unit root.
Figure 2A provides a graphical examination of correctness of the risk‐neutral
interest rate expectations. It plots C(u), the CDF of probability assessments
under the risk‐neutral measure, for fYð3ÞT g, a series of independent random draws
from the distribution of realized Libor rates at the futures contract expiry dates T,
TABLE I
Summary Statistics on Option‐Implied Moments
Mean Volatility Skewness Kurtosis
Mean 5.60 0.33 0.14 3.52
Median 5.60 0.31 0.09 3.40
Min 3.36 0.11 �0.81 2.94
Max 7.87 0.81 1.44 5.96
Std. Dev. 1.06 0.13 0.47 0.43
r(1) 0.98 0.85*** 0.73*** 0.51***
ADF �2.01 �3.50*** �3.76*** �7.72***
Note. This table provides summary statistics for the moments of risk‐neutral probability distributions implied by three‐month Libor
options. ADF and r(1) report the augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistic and the first‐order autocorrelation coefficient. The null
hypotheses for ADF and r(1) tests areH0 : X � Ið1Þ andH0 : r ¼ 1. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, based on MacKinnon (1996) and Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity‐ and autocorrelation‐consistent (HAC) standard
errors. The sample period is January 1993 through December 2007, for a total number of 180 monthly observations.
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T ¼ Tð1Þ;Tð2Þ;…;TðN=3Þ.10 If the risk‐neutral three‐month‐ahead predictions
correspond to the true distribution of final settlement values, C(u) should lie on
the diagonal.
Figure 2A indicates that the risk‐neutral PDFs generate a C(u)‐plot that
oscillates only slightly above and below the diagonal. This suggests that the risk‐
neutral probability assessments do not differ significantly from the actual
outcomes. Nevertheless, Figure 2B, which plots the ML‐estimated Beta
distribution used for calibrating the risk‐neutral PDFs, shows that the lowest
quantile of probability assessments under the risk‐neutral measure are too low
and need to be scaled upwards. Therefore, we compute a full set of calibrated
distributions using a beta function B(a, b) with MLE parameters {0.95, 0.92}.11
Figure 3A–D plot the time series of the first four risk‐neutral and calibrated
moments of the implied Libor distributions. Overall, it can be noted from the
figures that the differences between the risk‐neutral and calibrated moments
are negligible, especially until the onset of the financial crisis. The most notable
systematic difference can be observed between the second moments, where
FIGURE 2
A graphical examination of the time‐series validity of interest rate expectations under the risk‐neutral
measure (Figure 2A) and the Beta calibration function (Figure 2B). [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
10To ensure that the draws are random and independent, only one option‐based probability assessment is
considered per futures contract. With three‐month contracts, the size of the evaluated sample reduces from the
original N¼180 to N=3 ¼ 60.
11Both parameters are statistically indistinguishable from one.
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volatility under the physical measure is consistently above the risk‐neutral volatility,
which is to be expected given the shape adjustment implied by Figure 2B.
Putting aside the effects of risk neutrality, Figures 3A and B show that rapid
changes in the level seem to be associated with heightened level of uncertainty.
For instance, when faster‐than‐expected economic growth compelled the Bank of
FIGURE 3
The time series of the risk‐neutral and calibrated implied moments. The Figure plots the implied mean (A),
volatility (B), skewness (C), and kurtosis (D). The vertical line represents the end of the estimation sample.
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England to initiate a series of half percentage‐point interest rate hikes in 1994,
the implied volatility doubled irrespective of the probability measure. Analogous-
ly, consecutive interest rate reductions amid deteriorating economic outlooks in
the latter halves of 1998 and 2001 led to 100% and 80% jumps in the perceived
Libor volatility. Finally, the rapid decrease in the implied mean after the outbreak
of themarket turmoil is associated with unprecedented levels of implied volatility.
The implied skewness, plotted in Figure 3C, first increased in 1994 in
response to expectations of tightening monetary policy but did not reach its pre‐
crisis maximum value of 1.44 until early 1997, having remained elevated for two
years. Accordingly, the high of 1997 foreshadowed an episode of tightening
monetary policy that lasted until 1998, by which the participants in the Libor
market had reversed their expectations. Indeed, after a long decline through 1998
the implied skewness dropped below zero in the end of the year, for the first time
since late 1993. The negative period, however, did not last long as the market
participants quickly adjusted to increasing growth expectations stimulated by
rising equity prices in 1999. Following the implosion of the dot‐com bubble in
2000, the implied skewness fluctuated close to zero until the beginning of the
financial crisis in 2008 when it rose to unprecedented levels.
The times series plot of the implied kurtosis in Figure 3D resembles that
of the implied skewness. Amid economic and financial turmoil, the implied
probability of extreme movements in interest rates peaks in 1994 and again in
1996, followed by a long period of invariance until times of market turbulence in
2008 when it peaked 10‐fold over the sample mean.
4. ECONOMETRIC SETUP
Having established the link between short‐term interest rates and macroeco-
nomic expectations in the second section, and defined the measure of interest
rate expectations in the third, we next describe our data on macroeconomic
expectations from the United Kingdom and then present the econometric
specification that we adopt in our empirical analysis.
4.1. Macroeconomic Data
We use monthly macroeconomic survey data to measure real‐time expectations
about the policy rule fundamentals.12 For this purpose, we utilize two data
12Alternatively, one can assume rational expectations and use actual ex‐post values, or generate market
expectations endogenously by a term structure model. However, both alternatives are inferior to survey‐based
expectations; the former approach has been criticized for being unrealistic with respect to data availability and
quality, and the latter for producing less accurate forecasts. See Orphanides (2001) and Ang, Bekaert, and Wei
(2007) for further details.
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sources, HM Treasury (Her Majesty’s Treasury) and Consensus Economics,
which both poll a substantial number of financial and economic institutions each
month for their views on the evolution of principal macroeconomic variables over
the current and the next year. The HM Treasury surveys are based on a slightly
larger and more diverse survey pool, and hence, we use these data as the primary
measure of macroeconomic expectations. However, because the HM Treasury
surveys are available only from 1999 onwards, we augment our expectations data
with Consensus Economics surveys for years 1993–1998.13 Previously, survey‐
based macroeconomic forecasts have been used in the context of Taylor rules, for
exapmle, by Fendel et al. (2011, 2013) and Frenkel et al. (2011).
The expected inflation gap Etðptþn � p�Þ in Equation (1) is computed using
the mean of the respondents’ expected year‐on‐year growth rate of the
harmonized index of consumer prices.14 To obtain a continuous, fixed‐horizon
forecast series, we merge the current and the next‐year point forecasts by
weighting them together with respect to the number of months remaining in the
current year:
Etðptþ12Þ ¼ 12�mðtÞ12 Et ptþ12�mðtÞ
 þmðtÞ
12
Et ptþ24�mðtÞ
 
; ð10Þ
where m(t) gives the number of month t in the current year.
The output gap xt in Equation (1) measures the difference between actual
output and potential output at full employment. A positive output gap implies
overheating of the economy and thus inflationary pressures, whereas a negative
gap leads to opposite implications. In the seminal paper of Taylor (1993), the
output gap was measured by the deviation of real quarterly gross domestic
product (GDP) from its linear trend; in a forward‐looking context, however, the
expected deviation ought to be used. For this we construct a time series of the
expected output gap as follows: first, we decompose a time series of quarterly real
GDP from UK National Statistics (the “ABMI” series) into trend and cycle
components using the Hodrick–Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of
1,600, and calculate the expected 12‐month‐ahead potential GDP using the
trend component. Then, we use the real GDP series again together with survey
data on the 12‐month‐ahead real GDP growth rate, and calculate the expected
13The HM Treasury forecasts are based on a heterogenous survey pool of around 30–40 respondents including
e.g. the Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, International Monetary Fund, and the
OECD. Surveying both profit and non‐profit organizations is expected to balance the element of subjectivity in
each other’s expressed views.
14Retail price index excludingmortgages, RPIX, before June 2003. Prior to June 1995, p�t is considered to be the
midpoint of the inflation‐target range of 1–4%. After that, p�t is 2.5% until December 2003, when it was lowered
to 2%.
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real GDP. With estimates of the expected real and potential GDP in hand, we
compute the expected output gap as their log ratio (in percentage terms).
An important nuance of the assumed interest rate rule given by Equation (1)
is that the variation in financial wealth is allowed to influence the conduct of
monetary policy. Thus, we implicitly assume thatmarket participants perceive the
central bank to adjust the policy rate not only in response to inflation and output
gaps but also in response to financial uncertainty. Excessive financial uncertainty
may lead to a vicious cycle of valuation and macroeconomic uncertainty and
initiate an adverse feedback loop often referred to as the “financial accelerator”.15
The financial accelerator mechanism harms the monetary transmission system,
and leads to a contraction in the supply of credit as information asymmetry
between lenders and borrowers increases. Sharp declines in credit raises the
possibility of severe reduction in economic activity, thus inflation, and may
therefore influence the appropriate stance of monetary policy. It should be noted
that the presumed policy rule does not dictate that the Bank of England would
actually react to financial uncertainty, although financial shocks appear to have
large effects on output and employment (Bloom, 2009) and recent empirical
findings suggest that central banksmay respond to such uncertainty (Jovanovic &
Zimmermann, 2010).
Given that most of the variation in financial wealth is generated by
fluctuations in stock market capitalization (Lettau & Ludvigson, 2004), we use
the (log of) implied volatility of three‐month FTSE 100 stock index options as a
forward‐looking proxy for financial uncertainty:
EtðztþmÞ ¼ Et VarðW; tþmÞ0:5
h i
� log s^FTSE;tþ3:
The implied stock market volatility is sufficiently versatile variable to capture the
uncertainty regarding firms’ operating environment and the expected cash flows,
the risk of financial distress, as well as investors’ risk appetite. Furthermore,
Adrian and Shin (2008) show that the implied stockmarket volatility is associated
with financial intermediates’ ability to provide credit due to the adverse impact of
financial uncertainty on their balance sheets.
Finally, we use the official Bank of England rate as a proxy for the instrument
rate it in order to quantify the monetary policy stance. The time series for the
official rate is obtained from the Bank of England (the “IUDBEDR” series). All
macroeconomic data span from January 1993 to July 2012.
Table II reports summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables for the
period 1993–2007. The first row of the Table shows that inflation expectations
15For background on the financial acceleratormechanism, see Bernanke andGertler (1989), Bernanke,Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1996), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
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have averaged about ten basis points above the target, but Figure 4A implies that
the gap is mainly driven by high inflation expectations in the 1990s. After the
establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee in 1997, however, inflation
expectations converged towards the target until the beginning of the financial
crisis.
The expected output gap in Figure 4B, with a range of 3% points, has
fluctuated much more than the inflation gap during 1993–2007. This is largely
due to the overly pessimistic output expectations in 1998 that were not matched
by corresponding downward revisions in inflation expectations. As can be seen
from Figures 4A and B, both the expected inflation and output gaps deepened
drastically in 2008 in response to deteriorating economic sentiment.
The level of implied FTSE 100 volatility in Figure 4C seems to be inversely
related to the instrument rate it in Figure 4D. For example, the deepening
financial crisis towards the end of the 1990s is concurrent with downward‐revised
output expectations and reductions in the instrument rate; to a lesser extent, a
similar chain of events occurred after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. In
contrast, increased market uncertainty induced by the looming war against Iraq
in mid‐2002 did not prompt an instant change in the instrument rate, supposedly
because it was not expected to have adverse medium‐term effects on the real
economy. Finally, it can be noted that the unprecedented increase in the implied
FTSE volatility in the Autumn 2008 was followed by exceptionally rapid decrease
of the instrument rate from 5.00% to 0.50%.
4.2. Econometric Model
Under the assumption of the pure expectations hypothesis given by Equation (3),
the three‐month forward rate (essentially, the interest rate underlying the Libor
TABLE II
Summary Statistics on Macroeconomic Variables
Et (ptþ12)�p* Et (xtþ12) s^FTSE,tþ3 it
Mean 0.10 0.13 0.18 5.37
Median 0.00 0.09 0.16 5.50
Min �0.52 �1.60 0.08 3.50
Max 1.00 1.25 0.38 7.50
Std. Dev. 0.38 0.55 0.06 0.99
r(1) 0.97 0.97 0.87*** 0.98
ADF �2.20 �3.48*** �3.42** �2.08
Note. This table provides summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables entering Equations (1) and (2). ADF and r(1) report the
augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistic and the first‐order autocorrelation coefficient. The null hypotheses for ADF and r(1) tests are
H0 : X � Ið1Þ andH0 : r ¼ 1. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, based onMacKinnon (1996) and
HAC standard errors. The sample period is January 1993 through December 2007, for a total number of 180 monthly observations.
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options) can be written as a ratio of six‐ and three‐month spot rates:16
Et 1þ Y ð3Þtþ3
h i
¼ Et 1þ Y
ð6Þ
t
1þ Y ð3Þt
" #1
3
¼ Et ð1þ itÞð1þ itþ1Þ…ð1þ itþ5Þð1þ itÞð1þ itþ1Þð1þ itþ2Þ
� �1
3
;
FIGURE 4
The time series of the policy rule fundamentals. The Figure plots the expected inflation gap (A), the expected
output gap (B), the expected stock market volatility (C), and the Bank of England interest rate (D).
The vertical line represents the end of the estimation sample.
16Longstaff (2000) finds that the pure form of the expectations hypothesis (no risk premia) is a valid description
of the short end of the term structure.
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which, by taking logarithms and using the x� log(1þ x) approximation, can be
written in the following continuous compounding form:
Et y
ð3Þ
tþ3
h i
¼ 1
3
Et itþ3 þ itþ4 þ itþ5½ �: ð11Þ
From the history‐dependence of future instrument rates as implied by
Equation (2), it follows that the current instrument rate it has substantial
explanatory power for the market interest rates with maturities beyond one
period. Combining the partial adjustment Equation (2) with (11) yields:
Et y
ð3Þ
tþ3
h i
¼ 1
3
X5
j¼1
rjit þ 13
X5
j¼1
ð1� r6�jÞr�tþj þ
1
3
X2
j¼1
r3�jr�tþj: ð12Þ
On the assumption that the current desired policy rate i�t is a sufficient
statistic for near‐future desired rates fEtði�tþ1Þ…Etði�tþ5Þg, Equation (12)
collapses to:17
Et y
ð3Þ
tþ3
h i
¼ Lit þ ð1�LÞi�t ; ð13Þ
where L ¼ ð1=3Þðr3 þ r4 þ r5Þ. We substitute Et½yð3Þtþ3� based on the pure
expectation hypothesis with its risk‐neutral counterpart EQt ½yð3Þtþ3�, and i�t with
the interest rate rule given by Equation (1), to adopt the following linear‐form
econometric model to empirically examine the relationship between the option‐
implied interest rate distributions and the macroeconomic expectations:18
Dmt ¼ A þ BðDXtÞ þCðmt�1Þ þDðXt�1Þ þ et; ð14Þ
where mt is a 4� 1 vector of moments of option‐implied distributions defined in
Equation (8), Xt is a 1� 4 vector of explanatory variables:
Xt ¼ Etðptþ12Þ � p�t Etðxtþ12Þ log s^FTSE;tþ3 it
� �
;
17Given the highly persistent nature of the variables entering interest rate rule (1), and remembering that the
average macroeconomic forecasts Etþ12(·) are computed from point forecasts spanning the horizon tþ1 to
tþ24 (with average horizons tþ6 and tþ18), there is not too much generality lost in making this assumption.
We do, however, conduct overidentification and unbiasedness tests based on GMM forecast errors to assess the
validity of the assumption. In the results not presented here for brevity, the Hansen (1982) T� J‐test based on
publicly available set of macroeconomic information and aWald test on forecast‐error averages both support our
original assumption.
18The pure expectation hypothesis described in (3) is roughly the same as risk neutrality; risk‐neutral
arbitrageurs will adjust their positions along the yield curve until the expected one‐period returns are equal on all
maturities. For further discussion, see Cochrane (2005, pp. 355–356).
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or, respectively, the expected inflation gap, the expected output gap, FTSE 100
implied volatility, and the official Bank of England interest rate, and D is the first‐
difference operator. For higher‐order moments, two minor modifications to the
baseline model are made to facilitate its economic interpretation. First, jXtj is
used instead of Xt for the non‐directional second and fourth moments. Second,
the last explanatory variable it is replaced by m1,t� it for the moments beyond the
first. We refer to this difference between the expected Libor rate and the current
BoE instrument rate as the expected interest rate gap. This gap controls for
currently anticipated shifts in the monetary policy stance.
As implied by Equation (14), we follow a general‐to‐specific modeling
approach in that both the immediate and total effects of Xt on mt are considered.
The resulting four single equation error‐correction representations are estimated
individually using ordinary least squares. {A,…,D} are 4� 1 parameter vectors,
where A includes the constant terms, and C�1 measures the delay from
immediate (B) to total (�D/C) effects of Xt on mt. In the case C¼0, the total
effects, if any, take eternity to realize and are thus irrelevant.
In order to assess howmuch a change in the probabilitymeasure fromQ toP
alters the estimated relationships, Equation (14) is re‐estimated using moments
from the calibrated PDFs as the dependent variables.
5. INTEREST RATE EXPECTATIONS AND THE MONETARY
POLICY RULE
Table III presents the regression results on the association between option‐
implied risk‐neutral Libor expectations and the forward‐looking monetary policy
rule for the period 1993–2007. The second column of the table reports the
estimates for the implied mean of the future Libor rate. The estimated model
seems to fit the impliedmean relatively well, as the adjustedR2 of the regression is
0.41, and the F‐statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level. Regarding the
immediate effects, Table III shows that the changes in the expected inflation gap
induce only a modest and statistically insignificant revision of market expect-
ations about future Libor. While several explanations can be adduced to explain
this result, perhaps the most important factor is the Bank of England’s ability to
anchor inflation expectations especially during the latter part of the sample
period.19 The estimated coefficient for the expected output gap is positive and
statistically highly significant. The magnitude of the coefficient, 0.49, suggests
that the average immediate effect of a 1% point change in the expected output gap
is associated with approximately a half percentage point change in the implied
mean.
19We thank Larry D. Wall of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for pointing this out.
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Consistent with central bank intentions to counter the adverse real effects of
financial uncertainty, we find that perceived uncertainty regarding future stock
prices is strongly negatively related to the implied short‐term rate with an estimate
of �0.20. This suggests that increased financial uncertainty is associated with
market expectations of cuts in the instrument rate. Given that we have used the
log transformation on the FTSE volatility, the estimated coefficient implies that
the expected mean of Libor rate should decrease approximately by 20 basis points
if the FTSE volatility increases twofold over its average level. Table III further
shows that the estimated immediate response of the implied Libor rate to the
instrument rate is positive and statistically highly significant. The estimated
coefficient of 0.80 is qualitatively similar, albeit slightly lower than the value of
0.92 predicted by the model (Equation 13 with input value r¼ 0.98), and
suggests that a 100 basis point hike in the BoE policy rate is associated with a 80
basis point increase in the implied Libor rate.
Turning the focus from the immediate effects to total effects, it can be noted
from Table III that the adjustment process of the implied mean to the Taylor‐rule
fundamentals is not completely immediate. In particular, the coefficient for the
lagged level of the implied mean suggests the adjustment process may last for
TABLE III
Implied Risk‐Neutral Moments and Policy Rule Variables
DMean DVolatility DSkewness DKurtosis
Immediate effects (B)
DEt (inflation gap) �0.06 (0.16) 0.12*** (0.04) 0.30 (0.19) 0.91** (0.41)
DEt (output gap) 0.49*** (0.13) 0.02 (0.04) 0.26 (0.20) 0.24 (0.28)
DEt (FTSE volatility) �0.20** (0.09) 0.13*** (0.03) 0.18 (0.12) 0.06 (0.15)
DBoE interest rate 0.80*** (0.10) 0.14*** (0.03) 0.08 (0.13) �0.20 (0.25)
Effect delay (C�1)
Level of dep. variablet�1 7.66*** (2.80) 4.55*** (0.67) 1.96*** (0.42) 1.58*** (0.24)
Total effects (�D/C)
Et�1 (inflation gap) 0.05 (0.41) 0.32*** (0.09) 0.22* (0.12) 0.18 (0.23)
Et�1 (output gap) 0.51** (0.23) �0.03 (0.05) 0.31*** (0.11) 0.46** (0.22)
Et�1 (FTSE volatility) 0.06 (0.37) 0.16*** (0.05) 0.20 (0.15) �0.24* (0.13)
BoE ratet�1 0.80** (0.41) 0.07 (0.06) 0.28* (0.15) �0.01 (0.18)
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.36 0.23 0.32
F 15.05*** 12.10*** 7.01*** 10.46***
DW 2.03 2.28 2.17 2.06
Q(12) 12.89 18.42 13.18 5.61
Note. This table reports the estimates from time‐series regressions of risk‐neutral moments on the policy rule fundamentals: the
expected inflation gap, the expected output gap, the FTSE 100 implied volatility, the Bank of England instrument rate. In the regressions
for the higher‐order moments, the instrument rate is replaced with the interest rate gap, defined as the difference between the implied
Libor rate and the instrument rate.D is the first‐difference operator. HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. DW is the Durbin–Watson statistic and Q(12) the Ljung–Box test
statistic for serial correlation up to order 12. The sample period is January 1993 through December 2007, for a total number of 180
monthly observations.
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over seven months. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients for the total effects
indicate that the adjustments in the implied mean are rather small beyond the
immediate effects. The total‐effect coefficients are positive and significant for
the expected output gap and the instrument rate, while being almost equal in size
to the coefficients for the immediate effects. Hence, the effects of the expected
output gap and instrument rate on the expected Libor rate appear permanent,
and mostly immediate. Interestingly, our estimate for the total effect of the
expected output gap (0.52) is very similar to Nelson (2003), who estimates an
effect of 0.47. The total‐effect coefficient for the FTSE volatility is statistically
insignificant, suggesting that the effect of financial uncertainty on the expected
Libor rate is immediate but transient. Overall, the estimates for the implied mean
indicate that market participants rationally revise their interest rate expectations
in response to changes in economic outlook.
The regression results for the implied Libor volatility are reported in the third
column of Table III. As can be noted from the table, the dispersion of interest rate
expectations is strongly influenced by the policy rule variables. The adjusted R2
of the regression specification is 0.36, and again, the statistically significant
F‐statistic implies a good fit of the model. The estimates for the immediate effects
in Table III indicate that a widening gap between expected inflation and the
inflation target heightens the uncertainty regarding the future short‐term rate.
More specifically, the estimates suggest that a 1% point increase in the absolute
expected inflation gap corresponds to about twelve basis point immediate
increase in the implied Libor volatility. The coefficient estimate for the perceived
stock market uncertainty is also positive and highly significant, and thus suggests
that increasing financial uncertainty tends to diffuse into the Libor market.
The coefficient for the logarithmic first difference in the FTSE volatility implies
a 0.75 unit effect in the implied Libor volatility in response to a unit shock in
the FTSE volatility. In general, this finding is consistent with flexible inflation
targeting, which enables the central bank to adapt complementary short‐run
monetary policy objectives, like, for instance, financial stability as suggested by
Bernanke and Gertler (2000). Finally, the estimated immediate effect for the
absolute expected interest rate gap is positive and statistically highly significant,
thereby suggesting that any anticipated shift in the monetary policy stance
increases the uncertainty regarding the future Libor rate.
The estimates in Table III demonstrate that the policy rule fundamentals
affect the expected volatility of the Libor rate also after the immediate effects. In
particular, the estimated impact of the absolute expected inflation gap increases
from the immediate effect of 0.12 to the total effect of 0.32 within a four and half
month adjustment period. The magnitude of the total‐effect coefficient indicates
that a one standard deviation shock in the absolute expected inflation gap leads to
a 12% point increase in the expected Libor volatility. Furthermore, the total‐effect
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coefficient for the FTSE volatility is positive and significant, albeit onlymarginally
larger than the immediate‐effect coefficient. This suggests that the effect of
financial uncertainty on the implied Libor volatility is permanent but mostly
driven by the immediate adjustment. Interestingly, the total‐effect coefficient for
the absolute expected interest rate gap appears insignificant, and thereby reflects
the transience of the adjustment.
The estimation results for the higher‐order moments of the risk‐neutral
Libor distributions are reported in the fourth and fifth columns of Table III.
As can be seen from Table III, the estimated models for the implied skewness
and kurtosis are well specified with adjusted R2s of 0.23 and 0.32, respectively.
The estimates show that there are no statistically significant immediate effects
from the policy rule fundamentals to asymmetries in the Libor expectations.
Nonetheless, our estimates suggest that option‐implied asymmetries are affected
by the expected inflation, output, and interest rate gaps within a period of
about two months. The positive and statistically significant coefficients for
these three variables demonstrate that implied interest rate expectations become
more positively skewed or less negatively skewed in response to more optimistic
economic outlook. That is, market participants seem to attach higher probabi-
lities for increasing Libor rates (i.e., more restrictive future monetary policy) in
response to expectations of an expansionary economy. The estimated total‐effect
coefficients indicate that a 1% point increase in any of the expected policy‐rule
gaps leads to approximately 0.25 unit increases in the implied skewness.
As can be noted from the estimates in the fifth column of Table III, the
implied kurtosis is positively associated with the absolute expected inflation gap.
The immediate‐effect coefficient of the inflation gap implies that a percentage
point widening of the gap increases implied kurtosis by 0.91 units. Thus, our
findings indicate that market participants attach higher likelihood to future
extreme movements in short‐term interest rates with increasing deviation of
expected inflation from the target. Regarding the total effects, our estimates
indicate that the implied kurtosis is affected by the absolute expected output gap
and FTSE volatility. Somewhat counterintuitively, the weakly significant
coefficient for the FTSE volatility is negative, suggesting a lower likelihood for
extreme interest rate movements amidst times of elevated financial uncertainty.
Overall, the results in Table III demonstrate that changes in the
distributional form of Libor expectations are strongly associated with changes
in the expected inflation and output gaps and financial uncertainty. This suggests
that financial market participants perceive the monetary policy rule as a valid
description of the central bank’s rate‐setting behavior and react to its projections
in a systematic way. These findings are broadly consistent with Carlson et al.
(2005) and thereby provide evidence that market participants form and revise
their interest rate expectations in a manner described by Taylor‐type policy rules.
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Table IV reports the estimation results for the calibrated, or “real‐world,”
probability densities. In general, it should be noted that the regression results for
the risk‐neutral and calibrated interest rate distributions are strikingly similar.
This suggests that the role of the risk premium in the short end of the term
structure is almost negligible. The adjusted R2s of the regressions are almost
identical, and the signs and magnitudes of the statistically significant coefficient
estimates are remarkably consistent across the regressions. The only, and rather
marginal, differences across the regression estimates are found in the total effects
of the policy rule fundamentals on the directional moments. In particular,
the estimated impact of the instrument rate on the implied mean becomes
statistically less significant, and the effect of the expected inflation (output) gap
on the implied skewness becomes more (less) significant under the calibrated
probability distributions. Overall, Table IV provides further evidence on the
importance of policy rule fundamentals in guiding the market expectations of
future interest rates.
We acknowledge that the estimates reported in Tables III and IV may be
biased if inflation and output gap expectations are simultaneously determined
with the implied interest rate expectations. Indeed, it is conceivable that
TABLE IV
Calibrated Moments and Policy Rule Variables
DMean DVolatility DSkewness DKurtosis
Immediate effects (B)
DEt (inflation gap) 0.06 (0.16) 0.13*** (0.04) 0.31 (0.19) 0.87** (0.40)
DEt (output gap) 0.49*** (0.12) 0.02 (0.04) 0.25 (0.20) 0.24 (0.27)
DEt (FTSE volatility) 0.21** (0.09) 0.14*** (0.03) 0.17 (0.12) 0.07 (0.15)
DBoE interest rate 0.80*** (0.10) 0.15*** (0.04) 0.09 (0.13) 0.19 (0.24)
Effect delay (C1)
Level of dep. variablet1 7.82*** (2.93) 4.54*** (0.67) 1.90*** (0.41) 1.64*** (0.26)
Total effects (D/C)
Et1 (inflation gap) 0.04 (0.41) 0.33*** (0.09) 0.23** (0.12) 0.20 (0.24)
Et1 (output gap) 0.52** (0.23) 0.02 (0.05) 0.30** (0.11) 0.47** (0.23)
Et1 (FTSE volatility) 0.04 (0.37) 0.17*** (0.05) 0.20 (0.14) 0.26* (0.14)
BoE ratet1 0.80* (0.42) 0.07 (0.07) 0.28* (0.15) 0.01 (0.19)
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.37 0.24 0.31
F 15.05*** 12.65*** 7.29*** 9.86***
DW 2.03 2.31 2.17 2.06
Q(12) 12.24 20.02** 13.67 8.00
Note. This table reports the estimates from time‐series regressions of calibrated moments on the policy rule fundamentals: the
expected inflation gap, the expected output gap, the FTSE 100 implied volatility, the Bank of England instrument rate. In the regressions
for the higher‐order moments, the instrument rate is replaced with the interest rate gap, defined as the difference between the implied
Libor rate and the instrument rate.D is the first‐difference operator. HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. DW is the Durbin–Watson statistic and Q(12) the Ljung‐Box test
statistic for serial correlation up to order 12. The sample period is January 1993 through December 2007, for a total number of 180
monthly observations.
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macroeconomic expectations and expected future interest rates are jointly
determined in a complex system inwhichmarket participants are assessing future
central bank policies and the monetary policy authorities, in turn, are assessing
the evolution of the economy as well as the market reactions to central bank
policies. In such a system, endogeneity is endemic and difficult to address
empirically.20 Nonetheless, we argue that the OLS estimates in Tables III and IV
are of interest as the coefficients demonstrate that market participants adjust
their beliefs in accordance with the forward‐looking monetary policy rule.
6. INTEREST RATE EXPECTATIONS, MONETARY POLICY RULE, AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
We next examine whether and how the recent financial crisis affected the
association between option‐implied interest rate expectations and the policy rule
fundamentals. It is important to note that the standard Taylor‐type policy rules
fail to account for the zero‐bound of nominal interest rates that materialized
during the crisis, and furthermore, that the period of severe financial turmoil was
characterized by unconventional monetary policy tools and actions. In a recent
study, Martin and Milas (2013) document a breakdown of the Taylor rule after
the onset of the financial crisis. Hence, we re‐estimate the regressions reported in
Table III using a sample covering the period from January 2008 to July 2012.
Moreover, we also perform a dynamic forecasting exercise of the implied PDFs for
the crisis period using the pre‐crisis parameter estimates from Table III.
Table V reports the coefficient estimates for the crisis period. Overall, it can
be noted from the table that the importance of the expected inflation and output
gaps in explaining changes in implied distributions has decreased during the
crisis. Specifically, none of the estimated total‐effect coefficients in Table V
are statistically significant, and the significant immediate effects are relatively
small in magnitude. The estimates of the specification with the implied mean as
the dependent variable demonstrate that the instrument rate has become the
dominant factor for explainingmarket participants’ trajectories of the future level
of the Libor rate. The increased importance of the instrument rate is most likely
related to the constraint imposed by the zero bound and concurrent central bank
communication related to the continuation of exceptionally loose monetary
policy. Nevertheless, our estimates also indicate that the expected inflation and
output gaps have immediate positive effects on the implied mean.
The estimation results for the implied Libor volatility are reported in the
third column of Table V. As can be seen from the table, the estimated coefficients
for the expected inflation and output gaps appear insignificant, and the only
20We thank an anonymous referee for making this observation.
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statistically significant policy rule variable is the FTSE volatility. This suggests
that general financial uncertainty drives the dispersion of the Libor expectations
amidst the crisis. Finally, the low and statistically insignificant F‐values for the
estimated models of the implied skewness and kurtosis imply that changes in the
higher‐order moments cannot be explained by the policy rule fundamentals.
Overall, these findings are broadly consistent with Martin andMilas (2013), and
indicate that the importance of the standard Taylor rule variables in explaining
market participants’ interest rate expectations was sharply reduced during the
financial crisis.
Figure 5 plots the actual level and the dynamic forecast of the implied mean
of the Libor rate as well as the BoE instrument rate. Specifically, we have used
the pre‐crisis parameter estimates from Table III with real‐time policy rule
fundamentals to construct one‐month‐ahead forecasts of the implied mean for
the period 2008–2012. The solid vertical line in the figure represents the end of
the estimation sample and the beginning of the forecast sample. Figure 5
demonstrates that the predicted implied mean plummets from about 5.50% near
to 1.00% during 2008, whereas the actual implied mean increases 50 basis
points in the first half of 2008 and then drops sharply near to the instrument rate
TABLE V
The Impact of the Financial Crisis
DMean DVolatility DSkewness DKurtosis
Immediate effects (B)
DEt (inflation gap) 0.27*** (0.09) 0.01 (0.03) 0.45 (0.50) 3.34 (2.99)
DEt (output gap) 0.19** (0.09) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.39) 1.27 (2.60)
DEt (FTSE volatility) 0.08 (0.19) 0.32*** (0.10) 0.51 (0.86) 4.81 (8.58)
DBoE interest rate 1.20*** (0.25) 0.07 (0.05) 0.11 (0.27) 1.10 (3.27)
Effect delay (C1)
Level of dep. variablet1 1.99*** (0.46) 1.99*** (0.47) 5.36** (2.39) 2.19*** (0.56)
Total effects (D/C)
Et1 (inflation gap) 0.05 (0.14) 0.04 (0.03) 1.45 (1.86) 2.74 (4.30)
Et1 (output gap) 0.13 (0.10) 0.02 (0.02) 0.19 (0.98) 1.36 (1.70)
Et1 (FTSE volatility) 0.22 (0.49) 0.51*** (0.15) 2.75 (2.99) 9.71 (8.94)
BoE ratet1 1.03*** (0.24) 0.05 (0.07) 0.32 (2.52) 11.44** (4.69)
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.43 0.00 0.17
F 11.77*** 5.57*** 0.85 2.25*
DW 1.62 1.78 2.44 2.27
Q(12) 14.66 6.54 13.92 13.56
Note. This table reports the estimates from time‐series regressions of risk‐neutral moments on the policy rule fundamentals: the
expected inflation gap, the expected output gap, the FTSE 100 implied volatility, the Bank of England instrument rate. In the regressions
for the higher‐order moments, the instrument rate is replaced with the interest rate gap, defined as the difference between the implied
Libor rate and the instrument rate.D is the first‐difference operator. HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. DW is the Durbin–Watson statistic and Q(12) the Ljung–Box test
statistic for serial correlation up to order 12. The sample period is January 2008 through July 2012, for a total number of 55 monthly
observations.
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level of 0.75%. It is important to notice that the dynamic forecast bluntly violates
the zero bound of nominal interest rates for a prolonged period from January 2009
onwards. To further demonstrate the breakdown of the policy rule in explaining
interest rate expectations, we plot the actual risk‐neutral and forecasted densities
for March 2009 in Figure 6. As can be seen from the figure, the actual and
forecasted densities resemble reversed counterparts of each other in shape and
deviate substantially in location. The actual risk‐neutral density has a lower
bound at 0%, while the forecasted density is unbounded and assigns considerable
amount of probability mass for negative interest rates.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Over the past decade, central banks and investors have increasingly utilized
option prices to extract information about financial market expectations and
conditions. All major central banks, for instance, have now publicly acknowl-
edged that option‐implied probability distributions are a valuable source of
information and provide a useful input to monetary policy decisions. Thus far,
FIGURE 5
Dynamic forecast of the implied mean for the period 2008–2012. The vertical line represents the end of the
estimation sample.
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however, the informational content of option‐implied distributions has hinged
upon theoretical assumptions about the link between option prices and
macroeconomic fundamentals. In this paper, we aim to empirically establish
this link in the context of a forward‐looking Taylor rule. Specifically, we postulate
that market participants view the monetary policy rule as a guide to the path of
future policy rates and price interest rate options in accordance with the policy
rule fundamentals.
The purpose of this study is to examine the association between option‐implied
interest rate distributions and expectations regarding the policy rule fundamentals.
In particular, we use market prices of three‐month sterling Libor futures options to
extract the expected probability distribution of future interest rates, and attempt to
relate the month‐to‐month movements in these implied distributions to changes
in survey‐based expectations of the policy rule fundamentals. Through this exercise,
we want to assess whether the expectations formation process in financial
derivatives markets is consistent with Taylor‐type monetary policy rules.
The empirical findings reported in this study indicate that the interest rate
expectations implied by option prices are largely consistent with the policy rule
FIGURE 6
A comparison of the actual and forecasted risk‐neutral densities in March 2009.
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fundamentals. In particular, the results show that movements in the expected
level of the three‐month Libor rate are related to the expected output gap
and perceived financial uncertainty. The expected level is also substantially
affected by shifts in the monetary policy stance. The results further suggest that
changes in the distributional form of interest rate expectations are strongly
influenced by the policy rule fundamentals. We find that the dispersion of market
expectations around the expected Libor rate increases with increasing deviation
of expected inflation from the target level, and also with increasing financial
uncertainty. Moreover, the dispersion of interest rate expectations appears
to increase with a widening disparity between the market and policy rates.
Asymmetries in interest rate expectations are found to be positively related to
the expected inflation and output gaps, indicating that the market perceived
probabilities of sharp upwardmovements in interest rates increase with improved
economic outlook. Finally, our results suggest that market participants attach
higher probabilities for extreme movements in short‐term interest rates in
response to increasing expected inflation and output gaps.
Overall, our empirical findings demonstrate that financial market partic-
ipants perceive the monetary policy rule as a valid description of the central
bank’s rate‐setting behavior and react to its projections in a systematic way.More
specifically, our results suggest that market participants form and revise their
expectations regarding the future movements in Libor rates, at least partially,
in a manner described by Taylor‐type policy rules. These results are broadly
consistent with the recent empirical studies on survey‐based interest rate
forecasts and thereby provide further support for the view that the private
sector’s interest rate expectations are formed in accordance with policy
rule fundamentals. We believe that our findings may have important implications
for financial market practitioners and monetary policy authorities. From the
viewpoint of central banks, for instance, the documented linkage between option‐
implied interest rate distributions and policy rule fundamentals offers a further
validation for the use of option‐implied information as a tool for monetary policy
assessments, decisions, and communication purposes.
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When Bernanke Talks, the Markets Listen: The
Case of the First FOMC Press Conference on
Monetary Policy
Abstract
This note examines minute-by-minute reactions of the US interest rate and
stock markets to the first Federal Open Market Committee press conference
on monetary policy. Volatility and volume effects during the press conference
are shown to be less pronounced but more lasting than those observed imme-
diately after the release of the monetary policy statement. Market responses
during the press conference are found to be deterministic and originate from
questions and answers pertaining to future monetary policy and the state of
the economy. These findings are in line with the clarification objective of the
Fed’s new communication framework.
JEL classification: E44, E52, E58, G14
Keywords: monetary policy, Federal Reserve, futures markets, press confer-
ence, communication
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1 INTRODUCTION
In April 2011, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the United States’
Federal Reserve System (Fed) introduced a new strategy for monetary policy com-
munication. An essential feature in the new strategy is a press conference that
is held four times per year to provide additional context for the monetary policy
statement. The press conference comprises two elements: first, the chairman of the
FOMC delivers a detailed statement of the Committee’s monetary policy stance and
presents the latest economic projections. Then, the members of the media are al-
lowed to ask clarifying questions about monetary policy. According to the Federal
Reserve, the new strategy is adopted in order to enhance the clarity and timeliness
of monetary policy communication, since communication has become an increas-
ingly important aspect of monetary policy (see Blinder et al., 2008, for a review).
In financial markets, better communication by the central bank tends to resolve un-
certainty about future monetary policy actions and improve the process of price
discovery.
Using a wide set of intraday financial data, this note aims to provide the first piece
of evidence on the form of market adaptation to the FOMC’s changed communica-
tion. Specifically, the way market participants respond to the new communication
strategy is inferred from intraday patterns in money, bond, and stock index fu-
tures markets. Two avenues of research are explored. First, the press conference
that aims to explain the FOMC’s monetary policy stance is held approximately
two hours after the release of the monetary policy statement. The time lapse gives
potentially enough time to find a new market equilibrium on the basis of the state-
ment, which makes the press conference seem pointless if the statement already
delivers all the relevant information about the policy stance. Thus, the extent to
which the FOMC’s press conference initiates new price discovery processes can be
viewed as a measure of effectiveness of the new communication tool. Second, the
press conference is broadcasted live, which makes the chairman’s words subject to a
real-time rhetorical analysis by the market participants. The participants may draw
different price implications from the bits of information forwarded by the chairman,
which would induce trading and possible price revisions. Therefore, mapping the
topics discussed in the press conference onto synchronous transaction data would
allow to identify the exact issues in the press conference that are perceived to be the
most relevant from the market viewpoint.
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2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The Fed scheduled the implementation of the new communication strategy for the
FOMC meeting in April 2011. The publication of the new strategy received con-
siderable media attention; investment banks, for example, circulated speculations
about the content of the forthcoming press conference that were later reported in
the financial press. The uniqueness, investor awareness, and media coverage of the
event put it into a special context that guides the design of the empirical analysis.
The analysis focuses on one particular day, April 27th 2011, when the FOMC exe-
cuted its new communication strategy for the first time. The monetary policy state-
ment (released at 12:30 PM EST) and live footage of the press conference (held at
2:15 PM) were obtained from the Federal Reserve’s Web site.1 Traded volume and
prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Globex system were collected at
one-minute frequency for the whole maturity spectrum of three-month Eurodollar,
ten-year Treasury note, and S&P 500 E-mini futures contracts. These data span
from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM, capturing the most active trading period of the day with
a total of 480 observations per contract.
The market responses to the FOMC communication are gauged by price volatility
and trading volume, which both are highly sensitive to the arrival of new informa-
tion. The intraday volatility in a specific futures market at minute t, Vt, is measured
by the absolute one-minute change in the log of volume-weighted average price
(VWAP), {p¯}:
Vt = 100× |p¯t − p¯t−1|,
where
p¯t = log
(∑
i
pi,tqi,tQ
−1
t
)
.
In a similar fashion, aggregate trading volume in specific market, Qt, is the total
of individual contract i volume in that market, qi,t. Aggregated series are used in
an effort to reduce the effects of microstructure noise, and to better capture the
market-wide responses to new information. For illustrative purposes, a video of the
intraday evolution of volatilities, volumes, and cumulative returns is available on
Youtube Web site.2
In the European context, Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2009) find that the market re-
sponses to the press conference by the European Central Bank (ECB) are related
1www.federalreserve.gov.
2www.youtube.com/watch?v=weVoRSUZkhA.
54 Acta Wasaensia
to the novelty of the preceding policy statement. For this reason, it is necessary to
evaluate the information content of the FOMC statement released on the day of the
press conference, before turning to the empirical findings. As expected, the state-
ment noted no change in monetary policy: the FOMC announced to keep its target
range for the federal funds rate at the minimum level, and to complete the second
round of quantitative easing (QE2) as scheduled. Although the FOMC downgraded
slightly its general assessment of the economy, the overall impact of the statement
on asset prices was mildly positive.
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3 RESULTS
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the intraday evolution of trading volume and price volatil-
ities. In each frame, the box in the upper-left corner shows the market average and
standard deviation, and the thicker line represents a five-minute moving average.
Focusing first on volatilities on the left, all markets experience a jump after the
monetary policy statement is released at 12:30 PM. Immediately after the release,
volatilities are 8 to 12 times the market average but fall in half within few min-
utes. Volatilities remain elevated for another 30 to 45 minutes, depending on the
interest-rate sensitivity of the market. The post-release decay of volatilities seem
to be consistent with the speed of information revelation rule proposed by Vives
(1995), which postulates that market participants trade on their private information
so that market prices converge to their new equilibrium levels as an inverse square-
root function of trading rounds. For example, the Vives:1995 rule implies that three
(thirty) minutes of trading on new information reduces volatility by 50 (82) percent,
which roughly corresponds to the patterns observed here.
Volatilities rise again after the beginning of the press conference at 2:15 PM, but
this time they rise differently: sudden peaks are absent, and volatilities just shift up
to a higher regime and remain there approximately until the end of the conference.
Trading volume seem to follow a similar intraday pattern, peaking at 12:30 AM
and then remaining above the market average for 30 to 45 minutes. In addition,
volume seems to rise after 2:15 PM as do volatilities, although this increase is
indistinguishable for the E-mini market after taking the normal U-shaped intraday
pattern into account. Positive correlation between volatility and volume is a well-
established empirical finding after public news events and is often associated with a
noisy rational expectation environment, where investors trade informatively on the
basis of their own interpretations of the news as well as past prices (eg. He &Wang,
1995).
Table 1 confirms the findings of the graphical analysis. It presents the results of
regressing the logs of volatilities and volumes on intraday dummy variables. Each
dummy variable represents a phase in the FOMC communication process: the re-
lease period (“RLSE”) extends from 12:30 PM to 1:00 PM, the intermediate period
(“INTERM”) from 1:00 to 2:14 PM, the press conference period (“PRESS”) from
2:15 to 3:12 PM, and the post-conference period (“POST”) from 3:13 to 5:00 PM.
The morning period from 9:00 AM to 12:30 PM is set as a baseline level. With
this specification, a regression coefficient can be interpreted as a mean percentage
change in the dependent variable relative to its level in the morning.
The coefficients in Table 1 indicate that volatility and volume levels increase after
the release of the policy statement and during the press conference, subsequently
returning to the baseline levels or below. This finding is statistically verified by
using a Wald test for the null hypothesis that a sum of a set of coefficients is zero.
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Figure 2. Ten-year treasury note futures
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Figure 3. S&P 500 E-mini futures
The Wald statistics on the bottom line show that the sum of RLSE and PRESS
coefficients are in fact well above zero (positive effect on volatility and volume),
whereas INTERM and POST are zero or below (no or negative effect on volatility
and volume).
The F -statistics indicate that the strongest intraday effects are seen in the Eurodollar
market, where the statement and the conference increase volatility, respectively, by
63 and 10 percent, and volume by 115 and 61 percent. The volatility effects are at
least partly attenuated by high volatility in the morning, and may be better measured
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Table 1. Volatility and volume regressions on intraday dummy variables.
log Variable RLSE INTERM PRESS POST F -stat
(N ) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) DW
Eurodollar Vt 0.63 -0.29 0.10 -0.77 13.87
(478) (2.78) (-2.06) (0.56) (-4.54) 1.83
Eurodollar Qt 1.15 -0.25 0.61 -0.89 24.06
(479) (4.82) (-1.23) (3.19) (-3.22) 1.36
T-note Vt 1.59 0.66 1.04 -0.13 7.31
(453) (4.63) (2.49) (4.35) (0.51) 1.91
T-note Qt 1.06 0.03 0.57 -1.33 26.13
(478) (4.12) (0.19) (2.83) (-3.75) 1.64
E-mini Vt 1.23 -0.12 1.03 0.37 1.66
(405) (1.88) (-0.22) (2.03) (0.88) 2.09
E-mini Qt 0.39 -0.46 0.23 0.64 15.61
(405) (1.66) (-3.15) (1.74) (2.87) 1.48
Wald
∑
i βi = 0 6.87 0.39 4.38 -3.62
[18.37] [0.19] [23.09] [6.48]
Note: constant terms included but not tabulated. HAC standard errors.
by changes in the coefficients; expressed this way, the Eurodollar volatility increase
by 92 and 87 percent during the statement and the conference, respectively.
The effects of FOMC communication are equally significant in T-note and E-mini
markets; both show strong variation in volatility and volume levels according to
information flow from the Fed. Indeed, the FOMC statement and the press confer-
ence at least double the volatility in both markets, with positive but milder effects
in volumes as well.
To put these results in context, Andersson (2010) provides a benchmark in his com-
parison of volatility responses to monetary policy statement under the Fed’s for-
mer one-stage communication framework and the two-stage framework currently
followed by the ECB. Compared to the results of Andersson (2010), volatility re-
sponses to the policy statement are now milder in the T-note and E-mini markets
than those experienced under the Fed’s old framework. In addition, in their pattern
and magnitude, the T-note and E-mini volatilities seem like a hybrid of European
stock and bond market responses to a statement with a policy change, and US mar-
ket responses without one. Specifically, an ECB policy statement is much less
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informative than the Fed’s, and opposite to a Fed statement, only a change in policy
rates induces a market reaction. But when it does, the volatility pattern is similar to
that observed in the Figures 2a and 3a.
Ehrmann & Fratzscher (2009) study of the volatility and volume effects of ECB
communication in the Euribor futures market enables a similar comparison as re-
gards the Eurodollar market. Again, a comparison of the results shows that, with
equally peaking volatilities and surging volumes, the two markets remind each
other in their responses to policy statements and press conferences. Ehrmann &
Fratzscher (2009) identified the market response to the latter event as a product of
“clarification” of ECB’s monetary policy stance. They hypothesize that the press
conference either confirms, reinforces, or causes re-evaluation of the initial market
reaction, and show that market turns are indeed more likely during press confer-
ences, especially if the information content of the policy statement is low.
Thus, a logical next step is to find out whether the FOMC’s first press conference on
its monetary policy served a similar clarification role. Some tentative evidence on
this matter can be inferred from first-order autocorrelations: Ehrmann & Fratzscher
(2009) note that once new information arrives, earlier price changes are either con-
firmed (no autocorrelation), reinforced (positive autocorrelation), or reconsidered
(negative autocorrelation).
As can be seen from Figure 4, autocorrelations before and at the time of the policy
release are negative across asset class, indicating a partial reversal of earlier price
changes and hence the market’s difficulty in finding new equilibrium prices. Then,
some time after the release, return autocorrelations shift up towards zero and prices
behave more like a random walk. But once the press conference starts, autocorre-
lations diverge: the instrument having the smallest duration, namely the Eurodollar
contract, exhibits a small increase in the level of autocorrelation. On the other hand,
the E-mini contract (having the largest duration) dips to -0.35 in first-order autocor-
relation, indicating quite strong re-evaluation of past price changes. The T-note
contract with intermediate duration exhibits, accordingly, a level of autocorrela-
tion in between of the two extremes. After the press conference, autocorrelations
converge towards zero again.
The key observation in the autocorrelation analysis is the divergent price-process
behavior during the press conference. Supposedly, the observed divergence is not
random but reflects different asset-class sensitivities to good and bad news about
the economy. In order to investigate this possibility, a closer look is taken on
the price and volume reactions to different topics discussed in the press confer-
ence. Whether or not the chairman’s discourse on economic issues cause price
adjustments is identified by the variation in the product of minute-by-minute price
changes and volumes.
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Figure 4. First-order autocorrelations of one-minute VWAP returns during differ-
ent steps of FOMC’s communication process. Note: boldfaced abbre-
viations denote statistical significance at the five percent level, based on
HAC standard errors. Rectangles are for illustrative purposes.
Should any particular content in Chairman Bernanke’s answers strike some market
participant as unexpected or important, one would expect him or her to trade on that
piece of information, resulting in an increase in traded volume. To the extent that
the participant trades at the margin, increased volume is accompanied by a change
in price. Negatively correlated order flow between interest-rate and equity index
futures would further affirm the deterministic behavior of the market participants;
one would expect to see negative returns for interest-rate futures in response to
news indicative of faster economic growth, higher inflation, and future interest-rate
hikes, and opposite effects on stock (index) futures insofar as increased cash-flow
expectations dominate the discount rate effect.
Figure 5a, 5b, and 5c present the results for each market. In each Figure, the sub-
jects discussed in the press conference are listed in chronological order on the y-
axis, plotted against the mean response in the order-flow proxy (x-axis, scaled by
dollar tick size). Looking at the market responses, there is a clear negative reaction
at the very beginning of the press conference. This peculiar and particularly strong
reaction is not driven by new information from Chairman Bernanke’s talk since he
was not yet speaking, but may reflect the excitement caused by the novel situation.
Other strong responses are seen during Chairman Bernanke’s answers about the
timing of the next interest-rate hike (“MP”) and the growth prospects of the US
economy (“ECON”), the latter attracting the most attention in the E-mini markets.
Another regularity in the market responses is the support for the hypothesized neg-
ative correlation between asset classes. For example, studentized responses to
Bernanke’s answer about the Fed’s future interest-rate hike are -3.51, -1.70, and
2.58 for the Eurodollar, T-note, and the E-mini contracts, respectively. Seemingly,
higher perceived likelihood of interest-rate hikes triggered trading that lowered
bond prices and increased expected equity prices as a signal of economic recovery.
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Figure 5. The press conference by topic: VWAP change times volume. Note:
START = beginning of the press conference; IS = introductory state-
ment; ECON = economic outlook; MP = monetary policy; USD = US
Dollar; OIL = oil price; EMP = unemployment; IE = inflation expec-
tations; QE2 = second round of quantitative easing; REC = economic
recovery; FP = fiscal policy; JPN = economic impact of the Fukushima
disaster; PRESS = first press conference; ROLE = Fed’s role in economic
recovery. Stars represent period means in thousands of US dollars and
whiskers their 95 percent confidence intervals based on HAC standard
errors.
The contrary responses actually reflect the general pattern during the press con-
ference: once the initial reaction (“START”) is excluded, the interest-rate/equity
correlation of studentized order flow is negative for both the Eurodollar (-0.16) and
the T-note market (-0.54).
 Acta Wasaensia 61 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this note is to analyze the market adaptation to the FOMC’s new
two-stage strategy for communicating monetary policy decisions. In the first stage,
the policy statement is released; in the second, the chairman of the Committee
provides background information and interacts with the members of the financial
press.
A case study focusing on the day of the first two-stage announcement yields in-
teresting insights concerning the market adaptation to the new framework. The
findings indicate that both the release of the policy statement and the press con-
ference are important market events but differ in dynamics. Whereas the market
response to the former is more short-lived and extreme, the press conference in-
troduces longevity in the adjustment process by stimulating new waves of price
discovery after any further clarification of the monetary-policy stance. The chair-
man’s answers pertaining to future monetary policy and economic growth prospects
seem to especially trigger simultaneous but opposite reactions in bond and equity
futures prices, which is to be expected when discount-rate and cash-flow expecta-
tions conflict.
In the light of these findings, it seems that the press conference meets the FOMC’s
objective for enhanced clarity and timeliness of monetary policy communication.
Moreover, the enhanced clarity works both ways; the central bank can now find out
which particular topics draw the most attention in financial markets.
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Abstract
There is strong evidence that on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities trade much
more liquidly and at significantly higher prices than their off-the-run counterparts.
We examine if the same phenomenon is present in the German government bond
market whose market structure differ markedly from that of the U.S. Treasury
market. In sharp contrast to the U.S. evidence, we find that on-the-run status
has only a negligible effect on the liquidity and pricing once other factors have
been controlled for. Instead, the highly liquid German bond futures market, whose
turnover is many times larger than in the cash market, leads to significant liquidity
spillovers. Specifically, we find that bonds which are deliverable into futures con-
tracts are both trading more liquidly and commanding a significant price premium,
and that this effect became more pronounced during the recent financial crisis.
Keywords: Government bond, liquidity, liquidity premium, futures market
JEL Classification: E43, G12, H63
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Non-technical summary 
Variations in liquidity are one reason why yields on otherwise comparable 
government securities differ. Although the liquidity of a bond can be measured in 
several ways, the concept essentially captures to what extent the bond can be sold 
cheaply and easily. Liquidity is thus valuable for market participants, and especially 
in times of market stress, the most liquid bonds have tended to command a 
considerable price premium. 
Liquidity can have important implications for bond yields and the term structure of 
interest rates.  Previous studies of liquidity and liquidity premia in government bond 
markets, based mainly on data from the U.S. Treasury market, have identified 
pronounced liquidity differences across government securities. In particular, the most 
recently issued securities in a given maturity bracket, the so-called on-the-run issues, 
have been found to trade much more actively and liquidly than their more seasoned 
counterparts. It has also been found that these differences in liquidity between on-the-
run and off-the-run securities have important implications for bond pricing.  
To contribute to a better understanding of the underlying determinants of liquidity and 
liquidity premia, this paper reports on a study of the German government bond 
market. Such a study is useful particularly because the German and U.S. markets for 
trading interest rate risk differ considerably. In particular, in contrast to the U.S. 
market, turnover in the German bond futures market is many times larger than in the 
German cash bond market. We argue that this difference causes trading to be less 
concentrated on specific bonds in the German market, which, in turn, helps explain 
why differences in liquidity premia are considerably smaller. 
Our empirical results clearly suggest that the existence of a highly liquid German 
futures market leads to significant liquidity spillovers to the German cash market. 
Specifically, we find that bonds which are deliverable into the futures contracts are 
both trading more liquidly and commanding a price premium. Moreover, we show 
that this effect has intensified during the recent financial crisis. In sharp contrast to the 
evidence from the U.S. Treasury market, on-the-run status appears to have only a 
modest effect on the liquidity and pricing of German government bonds once other 
factors have been controlled for. 
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1 Introduction
Previous studies of liquidity and liquidity premia in government bond markets, based
predominantly on data from the U.S. Treasury market, have identified pronounced
liquidity differences across government securities. In particular, the most recently issued
securities in a given maturity bracket, the so-called on-the-run issues, have been found
to trade much more actively and liquidly than their more seasoned counterparts. This
pattern is usually referred to as the ‘on-the-run liquidity phenomenon’. It has also been
found that these differences in liquidity between on-the-run and off-the-run securities
have important implications for bond pricing, and that - particularly in times of market
stress - the on-the-run securities command a significant price premium. For example,
the yield discount on the on-the-run ten-year U.S. Treasury note relative to older issues
with similar remaining maturity reached over 50 basis points in the autumn of 2008.
With a view to better understand the underlying causes of liquidity and liquidity
premia, an examination of the German government bond market can potentially provide
new insights. Specifically, the market structures of the U.S. and German government
bond markets differ considerably; most notably with regard to the relative sizes of
cash and futures markets. Table 1 compares U.S. and German trading volumes in
government securities (excluding bills) and corresponding futures contracts. Whereas
trading volumes in the German cash bond market is dwarfed by the activity in US
Treasury market, the trading volumes in the two futures markets are of the same order
of magnitude. This has important implications: whereas benchmark status and on-
the-run status are synonymous in the U.S. Treasury market, in the German market,
the benchmark status is de facto shared between a number of bonds, namely those
bonds which are deliverable into the nearest-to-expiry futures contracts. Figures 1a
and 1b show an example of how these differences affect trading volumes throughout the
lives of selected ten-year bonds maturing around 2010. The U.S. ‘on-the-run liquidity
phenomenon’ is clearly reflected in the sharp drop-off in traded volumes after the on-
the-run period (top panel). For the German bonds (middle panel), however, the initial
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decline is much less pronounced, and there is a strong resurgence of trading as the
bonds become deliverable again for the five-year futures and (albeit to a lesser extent)
for the two-year futures.
Table 1: German and US markets for government securities and related futures (2008)
Amount outstanding Total volume 2008 Relative size of
(EURa billion) (EUR billion) futures market
Cash market Futures in %
Germany 879 5961 58715 985%
United States 2302 81426 45748 56%
Sources: Eurex, Bundesrepublik Deutschland Finanzagentur,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Chicago Board of Trade and the US Treasury Department.
aUS dollar amounts were converted using the average exchange rate of 2008, 1.4711 USD per EUR.
In this paper, we ask whether the extremely large German futures market (relatively
to the cash market) gives rise to significant liquidity spillovers to the cash bond market.
In particular, we examine whether deliverable bonds systematically enjoy enhanced
liquidity (as measured by higher trading volumes, higher quoted depths and/or tighter
bid-ask spreads). Moreover, we investigate whether such liquidity effects are reflected
in the prices of German government bonds. There are two main reasons for expecting
spillover effects. First, deliverable bonds are easier to hedge using futures contracts, and
thus more attractive for dealers (and other market participants with short horizons)
to hold. Second, trading of deliverable bonds is directly supported by the strategies of
arbitrageurs and speculative investors targeting the bond-future basis.
Our empirical results demonstrate that deliverability into futures contracts - rather
than on-the-run status - is the key driver of liquidity and liquidity premia in the German
market once other relevant factors have been controlled for. The sizes of the liquidity
premia in the German market are found to be much smaller than those previously
reported for U.S. on-the-run securities. This is consistent with the more ambiguous
70 Acta Wasaensia
8
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1081
August 2009
(a) United States
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US 6.50% 2010
US 6.00% 2009
(b) Germany
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GER 5.25% 2010
GER 5.25% 2011
GER 5.38% 2010
(c) France
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FR 4.00% 2009
FR 5.50% 2010
FR 5.50% 2010
Figure 1: Monthly averages of daily trading volumes (EUR billion, on y-axes) as a
function of time-to-maturity (years, on x-axis) for nine 10-year governments bonds. On-
the-run and deliverability periods are shaded in darker and lighter colors, respectively.
Source: ICMA.
notion of benchmark status in the German market, which diffuses short-horizon trading
over a larger set of bonds. We find that the positive effect of deliverability has intensified
during the recent financial crisis, probably reflecting that the ability to hedge positions
has become even more important amid unusually high volatility.
Our contributions relative to the existing literature on liquidity premia in govern-
ment bond markets are fourfold. First, we pay closer attention to a key feature of
German government bonds, namely their deliverability into extremely liquid futures
contracts such as the Euro-Bund future. We find that this feature, which has been
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largely neglected in most previous studies on euro area bond market liquidity, is key to
explaining relative pricing along and vis-a`-vis the German yield curve. Our emphasis
on market structure also helps explaining the remarkable differences in liquidity premia
found between the U.S. Treasury market and other government bond markets.
Second, in contrast to most previous studies conducted on euro area data, which
typically have aimed at explaining levels of and variations in sovereign spreads, we take
a single-issuer perspective and focus on Germany, the bellwether market for euro-area
bond yields. This approach permits a richer cross-sectional analysis, simultaneously
considering liquidity and liquidity premia for all outstanding bonds, and allows us to
separately identify the effects of deliverability, on-the-run status and other liquidity
determinants. Such identification could not have been achieved with the typical ap-
proach of comparing, say, ten-year benchmark yields across countries. As a control, we
replicate our results with French bonds, which are issued in amounts similar to those
of German bonds, but cannot be delivered into futures contracts.
Third, our empirical analysis is based on a very rich data set obtained from a Eu-
ropean electronic limit-order market, MTS, containing high quality intra-day measures
of liquidity (such as quoted depth and bid-ask spreads) for virtually all outstanding
German and French bonds (among other issuers). Our data set covers both the periods
before and after the onset of the financial crisis in mid-2007, which allows us to assess
whether the determinants of liquidity and liquidity premia changed across these very
different market regimes. We use the high-frequency quote data to form robust mea-
sures of market liquidity, which are superior to the ’snapshot measures’ from a specific
time of the day often used in the existing literature on euro area bond market liquidity.
Fourth, since premia related to deliverability contort the German yield curve in
subtle ways, which cannot be captured with standard methods (such as the extended
Nelson-Siegel specification), we use a flexible approach to yield curve estimation. By
allowing for multiple (inverse) humps, our spline-based approach can accommodate the
peculiar features of the German yield curve arising from the identified liquidity spillovers
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from the futures market. Figure 2 preempts the results of our curve estimation analysis.
The stars and the circles represent observed spot yields on French and German bonds on
a single day in 2008, plotted against their remaining maturity. The figure clearly reveals
pronounced inverse humps along the German term structure, which in time-to-maturity
terms coincide with the baskets of deliverable bonds for the futures contracts.1
1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
3.4%
3.6%
3.8%
4.0%
4.2%
Delivery [Ger]
Fitted [Fr]
Fitted [Ger]
Spot [Fr]
Spot [Ger]
On−the−Run [Ger]
Figure 2: Actual and fitted spot rates for French and German bonds on 11 April 2008
(although plotted, the on-the-run securities are not included in the curve estimation).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the economics of the on-the-run phenomenon, including a brief literature review. The
third section presents our data set, and the fourth section examines the determinants of
liquidity in the German government bond market. Section 5 examines to what extent
liquidity and deliverability is priced. A final section concludes.
1The spot rates are bootstrapped from actual market yields according to the no-arbitrage principle.
The dashed and the solid line represent the estimated curves for France and Germany, respectively,
and as can be seen from the figure, the flexibility of the spline becomes important in capturing the
relatively complex shapes of the two term structures. For comparison, we estimated the zero-coupon
curves with another popular method, the extended Nelson-Siegel model. Its functional form however
turned out to be too restrictive for the yiled curves experienced after August 2007.
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2 The economics of the on-the-run liquidity phenomenon
The empirical observation that bond trading and liquidity concentrate on few issues is
not necessarily surprising. First of all, it is unnecessary to hold (or short) the entire
market portfolio, since a suitable combination of short-, medium-, and long-term bonds
captures almost all the variation in the level and shape of the yield curve [Litterman
and Scheinkman (1991); Bliss (1997)].2 ,3 Once trading in certain maturities becomes
customary, positive externalities will tend to reinforce it [Pagano (1989)].
The short-, medium-, and long-term bonds that are the most sensitive to yield
curve risk within their maturity segment tend to become benchmark bonds [Yuan
(2005); Dunne, Moore, and Portes (2007)]. Since benchmark bonds tend to be more
liquid [Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991); Higo (1999)] and therefore trade at lower yields
[Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993)], issuers make efforts to ensure that their bond issues
will obtain benchmark status. For example, major sovereign issuers now auction bonds
in accordance with an issuance calendar published in advance. This (shorter-term) pre-
dictability and transparency of issuance schedules contribute to reduced idiosyncratic
price variation in the secondary market by alleviating supply uncertainty. Moreover,
concentration of issuance on a few key maturities allows for larger issue sizes, which
reduce the price impact of large trades. Related, Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) find
that idiosyncratic price variation tends to increase with bond age (often referred to as
‘seasonedness’). According to a commonly held view, the relative scarcity of seasoned
bonds increases the price impact of trading. For this reason, the most recently is-
sued bond usually becomes the benchmark, and the ‘benchmark liquidity phenomenon’
becomes indistinguishable from the ‘on-the-run liquidity phenomenon’. In the litera-
ture, researchers commonly use the latter term to describe the positive liquidity effects
(partially) caused by the former. From a theoretical point of view this is mislead-
2This is also supported by the sovereign issuance strategies. For example, most new debt issued by
the G-10 countries has 2-, 5-, or 10-year maturities.
3Hedging or replication of the market return based on three key maturities is common in passive
bond portfolio management, see Dynkin, Gould, Hyman, and Konstantinovsky (2006)].
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ing because the two phenomena have different origins: benchmark bonds are traded by
those who wish to gain or hedge yield curve risk with minimal exposure to idiosyncratic
risk, and on-the-run bonds by those who rebalance their portfolios after government
auctions [Pasquariello and Vega (2009)] or prefer securities trading near par [Eom,
Subrahmanyam, and Uno (1998); Elton and Green (1998)].
Although conceptually distinct, the benchmark and on-the-run liquidity effects are
mutually reinforcing because increased liquidity arising from scale is beneficial to all
traders. Uninformed trading in the market for on-the-run bonds, like hedging or portfo-
lio rebalancing, attracts informed traders who minimize the price impact of their trades
by pooling with the uninformed [Kyle (1985); Chowdhry and Nanda (1991)]. Informed
trading fosters price discovery and improves the hedging effectiveness of the on-the-run
bonds, which, as a consequence, become benchmarks of their maturity segments.
Intermediaries such as market makers are able to offset their exposure to yield curve
risk by short-selling benchmark bonds. Subsequently, however, hedgers have to borrow
benchmark bonds from those who own them to cover the short positions in the cash
market.4 To achieve this, hedgers use the repurchase market where they search for bond
lenders and bargain over the terms of bond loans. In the repurchase market, hedgers’
uninformed demand for benchmark bonds induces bond lenders to increase their supply
which, in turn, makes benchmark bonds easier to locate and reduces search costs [Duffie,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2007)]. Vayanos andWeill (2008) show that this virtuous circle
arises because short-sellers are contractually bound to a particular bond, which is the
one that they initially sold short and eventually will have to buy back and deliver
in the repurchase contract. Because of this delivery constraint, market participants
typically find it optimal to short the same security as everyone else, i.e. the benchmark
bond. As shown by Duffie (1996), superior repurchase-market availability of benchmark
bonds increases their value as collateral, leading to an counterintuitive outcome that
active short-selling may in fact inflate cash prices. Yet the very same phenomenon
4Fisher (2002) provides a description of the use of repo markets for bond inventory management.
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that causes distortions in benchmark prices, namely their repo-market availability, also
facilitates price discovery. This is because informed investors’ ability to implement their
pessimistic beliefs via shorting benchmarks is key to efficient price discovery process
[Diamond and Verrecchia (1987); Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007); Boehmer, Jones,
and Zhang (2008)] that, ultimately, warrants the retention of the benchmark status
itself. Figure 3 illustrates this market coordination process that ultimately leads to the
superior liquidity of benchmark on-the-run Treasuries.
Figure 3: On-the-run effect in the cash market for U.S. Treasury securities.
As discussed above, a well-functioning repurchase market is key to cash market
liquidity. On the supply side, market makers are able to lend out bonds and thereby
leverage their capital, hold larger inventories, and provide more depth to the market.
On the demand side, a large and dispersed investor base that ensures active trading
and high liquidity is sustainable only if investors, who want to hedge or speculate
with bonds that they do not already own, can take part in the market. For example,
hedgers who sell and buy back benchmark bonds on a continuous basis increase the
trading volume in the cash market, but are only able to do so using reverse repurchase
contracts.
However, due to the multiplicity of markets and market participants involved in
creating and maintaining liquidity, it is conceivable that multiple equilibria may occur,
some of which may be characterized by low liquidity. Persistent pricing anomalies
Strong
on-the-run
effect
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or market frictions reduce the usefulness of a benchmark for hedging or speculative
purposes. For example, frictions in the repurchase market may force market makers
to deleverage and cut back their liquidity provision in the cash market for including
benchmark bonds. Also, cash market frictions may cause an inflationary spiral of
shorting costs whereby investors gradually refrain from short-selling due to its trading
intensive nature, and migrate to futures or swap market to create short positions.5
Consequently, the decline in short selling in response to high shorting costs reduces
cash market liquidity and shifts the locus of price discovery towards alternative markets.
Brandt, Kavajecz, and Underwood (2007) as well as Mizrach and Neely (2008) provide
recent empirical evidence from the U.S. Treasury market.
2.1 The German government bond market
Mainly as a consequence of its relative novelty, the euro-denominated sovereign bond
market is still considerably more fragmented than the U.S. Treasury market. This
fragmentation remains an impediment for the liquidity and informational efficiency of
the European market, as order flow is dispersed over a large number of heterogeneous
securities and markets. Consequently, positive externalities that arise when traders
come together in space and time, namely better liquidity and/or price discovery, are
not realized to the same extent as in the homogeneous U.S. Treasury market. The
absence of ‘spontaneous’ liquidity described above leads to need for more ‘artificial’
liquidity providers in the form of market makers.
Notwithstanding the considerable widening of sovereign spreads in the course of
the financial crisis, euro-area yields have converged dramatically relative to the pre-
EMU period. This has created the conditions and the demand for common benchmark
securities that accurately reflect the term structure of risk-free euro interest rates. Given
that the benchmark status is gained through competition rather than being conferred,
5Establishing and maintaining a short position requires more trading than a long position because
repurchase contracts are usually very short-term.
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the multiplicity of sovereign issuers and the growth of euro-denominated swap market
ensure that this implicit definition of benchmark bonds is ongoing in the euro area.
In practice, 10-year German government bonds have retained their benchmark status
within the euro area, owing to their relative liquidity and credit quality.6 However,
decentralized trading infrastructure in addition to a less well-established repurchase
market increase the costs of taking and reversing short-term positions in the German
cash market, which is why the bulk of trading and a major share of price discovery take
place in the futures market [Bundesbank (2007); Upper and Werner (2007)] .7 As a
consequence, the benchmark status of German government securities may be attributed
to both cash and futures markets: the futures contracts are the main instruments for
hedging and speculating on euro area interest rates, while the cash instruments are
primarily used for asset allocation purposes. This market organization contrasts with
that of the U.S. Treasury market, where cash instruments, i.e. the benchmark on-the-
run bonds, are used uniformly for pricing, positioning, and hedging.
In a futures-driven cash market, bonds that are deliverable for futures contracts
may challenge the benchmark status of the on-the-run securities. This has been shown
to be the case in the Japanese government bond (JGB) market, where the market’s
view of long-term yields is first reflected in the prices of JGB futures [Singleton (1996);
Miyanoya, Inoue, and Higo (1999)], and then through arbitrage in the price of key
deliverable bond and the rest of the JGBs [Shigemi, Kato, Soejima, and Shimizu (2001)].
Consistent with the arbitrage argument, Shigemi et al. report that the on-the-run and
the key deliverable bond are the most actively traded JGBs in the cash market. In
addition, Singleton (2004) finds that the key deliverable JGB has the highest sensitivity
to changes in the term structure of all off-the-run JGBs, which corresponds to the
6Yields on French government BTANs and OATs are occasionally used as reference rates in the
intermediate maturities.
7Bid-ask spreads in the EUREX futures market are approximately five to ten times smaller than in
the MTS cash market. For comparison, the spreads in the cash and futures market for U.S. Treasuries
are approximately equal.
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argument by Yuan (2005) that benchmark status depends on securities’ sensitivity to
systematic risk. On the other hand, Singleton’s results from the futures-driven JGB
market contradicts those from the cash-driven U.S. Treasury market, where Brandt
and Kavajecz (2004) find that the sensitivity to market risk declines monotonically in
bond seasonedness.
Given the extremely large and liquid futures market for German government se-
curities, one would expect that the relation between the cash and the futures market
resembles that of the Japanese market rather than the U.S. Treasury market. As an
initial assessment of this conjecture, we estimate the market sensitivities of German on-
and off-the-run bonds as a crude measure of benchmark characteristics, and compare
these sensitivities to those reported by Brandt and Kavajecz (2004). The bond-specific
sensitivity is measured by the amount of yield variation explained by the three first
principal components estimated from the term structure of German bonds. The re-
sults shown in Table 2 indicate that the German off-the-run bonds, which typically are
the key deliverable bonds, reflect to changes in the term structure more precisely than
on-the-run bonds. The exact opposite holds for the U.S. Treasury market, where the
on-the-run bonds are most sensitive to yield curve risk. Overall, the results in Table 2
and the previous studies on the JGB market suggest that the on-the-run bonds would
share the benchmark status with deliverable bonds in the German cash market.
What does the predominance of futures trading in the German market imply for the
emergence of liquidity differences between bonds? The more diffuse benchmark status
(shared among the bonds in the deliverable basket) contrasts with the unambiguous
benchmark status of the on-the-run treasuries, and would suggest that liquidity dif-
ferentials in the futures-driven German bond market ceteris paribus should be smaller
than in U.S. market. Results of Witherspoon (1993) point to a certain threshold level
in the informativeness of cash markets relative to futures markets, above which the
benchmark status of on-the-run securities (and the liquidity effects thereof) is sup-
ported. If the futures market is too dominant with respect to price discovery, it tends
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Table 2: The explanatory power of the first three principal components.
This table presents the percentages of yield variation explained by the three first principal
components extracted from the correlation matrix of daily changes in German term structure.
The sample includes observations on on- and off-the-run bonds in 2-, 5-, and 10-year maturities
for the period January 2006-September 2008. The results for U.S. Treasury securities are from
Brandt and Kavajecz (2004).
Adjusted R2
Maturity Germany United States
2-year
On-the-run 96.91% 99.57%
Off-the-run 97.27% 99.14%
5-year
On-the-run 96.65% 99.44%
Off-the-run 97.77% 99.15%
10-year
On-the-run 98.08% 99.28%
Off-the-run 98.36% 98.72%
to hamper the cash market liquidity due to substitution, but may otherwise enhance
the liquidity and price discovery of deliverable bonds through cross-market arbitrage
[Holden (1995)].8
Indirect evidence of cross-market arbitrage can be seen in the Figure 1 in the Intro-
duction. This figure plots average daily trading volumes for 10-year bonds issued by
the United States, Germany and France. The periods during which the bonds are on-
the-run and deliverable for futures contracts are shaded with darker color. Maturities
where bonds are deliverable, but no longer on-the-run are shaded in a lighter color. As
opposed to 10-year U.S. Treasuries in Figure 1a and French OATs in Figure 1c, German
Bunds in Figure 1b continue to be actively traded well after the six month on-the-run
period and the volume of trading remains high for another year until the bonds are
no longer deliverable for the 10-year futures contract. Indeed, the trading activity of
8Cross-market arbitrage had grown so popular that in 2003 Eurex launched “basis instruments” for
German government bond market, which involve opposite positions in futures and cash markets.
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off-the-run Bunds in Figure 1b appears to be governed by deliverability; trading seems
to be less active through the periods of non-deliverability, only to become more intense
again as seasoned Bunds again become deliverable.
A similar volume pattern does not obtain for U.S. Treasury securities, despite the
fact that they are deliverable for the 10-year futures contract traded at the Chicago
Board of Trade. A possible explanation is that the simultaneous price discovery in
cash and futures markets weakens the cross-market lead-lag effect and thereby makes
arbitrage less profitable and trading less worthwhile. Also, the delivery basket for the
U.S. 10-year futures contains considerable more securities than in the German case,
making arbitrage-based trading less observable in individual securities.
To sum up, costly frictions in the cash market for German government bonds would
suggest a diversion of order flow away from the cash instruments and towards futures
contracts. Low transaction costs and the ease of taking short positions in the futures
market attracts both uninformed as well as informed traders. For this reason, German
futures contracts dominate price discovery in euro interest rates over cash bonds.
This is a key difference from the U.S. Treasury market, where trading in the on-the-
run bonds and futures contracts are complementary with regard to price discovery. As
much an outcome as a cause, the on-the-run U.S. Treasuries are liquid relative to off-the-
run securities and actively traded for hedging and speculative purposes. In the absence
of such trading, such as for German on-the-run bonds, one would expect the liquidity
differentials between on- and off-the-run bonds to be much less pronounced. Indeed,
turnover and the related positive liquidity effects may be even greater for German
off-the-run bonds, since they are typically the cheapest-to-deliver into the two-, five-,
and ten-year futures contracts and therefore subject to cross-market arbitrage trading.
Figure 4 illustrates this particular relationship between the German cash and futures
markets.
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Figure 4: The combined cash and futures market effect in the German market.
3 Data
As is the case with most government bond markets, the secondary market for German
government bonds is predominantly an over-the-counter market. Trading takes place
mostly between dealers, either using traditional voice brokers and bilateral negotia-
tion, or increasingly through electronic platforms. The source of our data on bond
prices, quoted depth and quoted bid-ask spreads is MTS, the largest electronic trading
venue for German government bonds, see Bundesbank (2007). MTS is a system of
quote-driven platforms with designated market makers who compete for other market
participants’ order flow. Market makers supply liquidity for the bonds assigned to them
by providing two-way proposals of a minimum size for at least five hours a day.
Our sample extends from January 2006 through September 2008. This period is
particularly suitable for analysing government bond market liquidity as it covers both
the tranquil period before mid-2007 as well as the turbulent period following the onset
of the financial crisis.
Overall, our data include approximately ten million quotes and sixty thousand
trades on bonds issued by the Federal Republic of Germany. The quote records include
three best bid and offer quotes with the associated quote sizes at tick-by-tick frequency.
Since quotes on MTS are binding unless withdrawn, the quote records allow us to
obtain reliable estimates of the transaction costs that the market participants face as
Futures
market
effect
Delivery
Basis trading
Weak
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well as the size of the inventory that is available for immediate trade.9 The transaction
records include prices and quantities with an indicator variable of the direction of
the trade (buy or sell). Every quote and trade entry in our records is identified by
an individual security identification number (ISIN) and a time stamp recorded to the
nearest millisecond. Bond issue sizes are provided by the German Finance Agency.
Despite its significant role in electronic trading, the MTS transactions constitute
only a small fraction of the overall trading volume in German government bonds. For
that reason, we supplement our MTS data with trading volume information provided by
International Capital Market Association (ICMA) through Datastream. Analogous to
GovPX in United States, ICMA collects and disseminates data on transactions made by
its members in the over-the-counter markets. Approximately 400 financial institutions,
including the largest dealers in German government bond market, report their trades
to ICMA. The sample for traded volumes covers the period January 2002 through
February 2009.
Following the findings of previous research, and reflecting the firm-quote nature of
our data, we use traded volumes, quoted depths and quoted bid-ask spreads as our
measures of liquidity. The quoted spread is defined as the difference between best ask
and bid price and is measured in percent of the midpoint price. The bid-ask spread
alone, however, does not provide any information about the amounts available for
trading at a given time. We therefore also include market depth as a complementary
measure of liquidity. Market depth is proxied by the average volume available for
trading at the best three bid and offer prices.10 Both quoted depths and spreads,
which are observed at the intra-day frequency, are collapsed into representative daily
9To mitigate concerns that quotes are actually not firm, we compare transaction prices to standing
quotes. We find that two thirds of the transactions in our sample are made exactly at the quoted
prices. For the remaining third of the trades, the differences between quoted prices and transaction
prices were small.
10Since MTS allows large transactions to be executed as iceberg orders, i.e. partially outside the
order book, the market may be actually deeper than the cumulative depth indicates. We do not have
data on the iceberg orders, but MTS reports that their share of all orders is less than two percent.
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values by taking the median. This is an effective way of removing outliers, which is a
serious problem when using end-of-day (or ‘snapshot’) quotes.
4 Determinants of liquidity in the German bond market
The aim of this section is to empirically assess whether liquidity differences across Ger-
man government bonds are explicable in terms of deliverability into futures contracts.
For this purpose, we consider four different liquidity measures: traded volumes, quoted
depths, quoted bid-ask spreads and the ‘liquidity index’ proposed by Bollen and Whaley
(1998). By constructing an (unbalanced) panel consisting of time-series observations
(on liquidity measures and potential liquidity determinants) for a large cross-section
of bonds, we can separately identify the impact on liquidity of deliverability and ‘on-
the-run’ status. With respect to the impact of deliverability, we distinguish between
‘cheapest-to-deliver’ (CTD) bonds, and bonds which are merely deliverable.11 We con-
trol for multiple other factors which have previously been found to determine liquidity.
The set of control variables includes time to maturity, seasonedness (i.e. bond age) and
issue size. Since our main interest is in the cross-sectional variation in liquidity between
bonds with different characteristics, we also include time dummies. Time dummies help
us overcome the potentially important short-coming that the MTS data reflect activity
on electronic trading platforms and not the entire market. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that in addition to the general decline in liquidity after July 2007, the market share
of electronic platforms have declined.12 By including time dummies, we minimize the
impact of any trend in market share on our results.
To be more confident that any deliverability-related liquidity effects we may de-
11Owing to the construction of the so-called conversion factors, during our entire sample, the CTD
bonds are consistently the outstanding bond with shortest remaining time to maturity of the bonds in
the delivery basket.
12As volatility rose precipitously after mid-2007, market participants apparently became increasingly
reluctant to supply liquidity to each other in the form of tradeable buy or sell quotes in limit-order
markets.
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tect are genuine, we conduct identical analyzes for a control country lacking a futures
market. For this purpose we use France, as the French government bond market is
comparable to the German market in terms of credit rating, currency and amounts
outstanding in the individual bonds. In the following, we analyze the determinants of
traded volumes, quoted depths, quoted bid-ask spreads and the liquidity index.
4.1 Determinants of traded volumes
To assess the determinants of traded volumes, we regress log average daily volume
on time dummies (for each month), deliverability dummies, cheapest-to-deliver dum-
mies, on-the-run dummies, time to maturity (measured in years), seasonedness (also
measured in years) and log issue size.
The deliverability dummies reflect the EUREX criteria determining whether a par-
ticular bond is eligible for delivery into the 2, 5 and 10-year German bond futures.
Eligible bonds for these three contracts have remaining maturity in the ranges 1.75-2.25
years, 4.5-5.5 years and 8.5-10.5 years, respectively. This gives rise to three deliverabil-
ity dummies.13 Note that (the compounded value of) the coefficients on these dummies
can be interpreted as the percentage increase in trading volume for bonds belonging to
the particular maturity bracket (relative to bonds in any of the undeliverable maturity
brackets). We also include specific cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) dummies (one for each
of the 2, 5 and 10-year futures contracts) taking the value one when a given bond is
CTD into the next-to-expire futures contract, and zero otherwise.14
The remaining estimated coefficients also have interesting interpretations. The
coefficient on the on-the-run dummies gauge the impact on trading volumes related to
13A newly issued 10-year bond will first be deliverable into the 10-year futures and then experience
a time period where it is not deliverable (from 8.5 to 5.5 years remaining maturity) before it again
becomes deliverable into the 5-year futures, and so on. For maturities below 1.75 years, the bond will
never again become deliverable.
14We use the implied repo rate method to identify the cheapest-to-deliver bonds for each date and
futures contract.
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a bond being the most recently issued bond of a given original maturity. As mentioned
above, studies on U.S. Treasuries typically find very large on-the-run effects on liquidity.
The coefficient on the seasonedness variable can be interpreted as the annual percentage
decay in trading volume as the bond ages. One would expect that trading volume (and
other liquidity measures) decline as a bond ages, because an increasingly large fraction
of the issued amount ends up in buy-and-hold portfolios. By controlling for other
liquidity determinants in a panel setting (in particular deliverability and on-the-run
effects, and developments in overall market liquidity as captured by the time dummies),
we can identify the pace of such decay. Finally, the coefficient on the (log) issue size
provides the elasticity of trading volumes with respect to issued amounts.15
Table 3 displays the results for the determinants of trading volumes for German
bonds, and as a control, for French bonds. We first consider the results for Germany.
Lines 2-4 of the table show that the impact of deliverability in all cases have the ex-
pected positive sign, and the coefficients are all highly statistically significant. The
estimated effects of deliverability are economically important, as the estimated coeffi-
cients between 0.54 and 1.05 correspond to increases in trading volumes between 72%
and 186%.16 The next three lines in the table reveal that a bond tends to experi-
ence an additional boost in trading volumes when it is the cheapest-to-deliver bond.
The (compounded) increases in trading volume for CTD bonds (relative to comparable
non-deliverable bonds) are 148%, 253% and 229% for the 2, 5 and 10-year maturities.17
On the other hand, on-the-run status per se has a somewhat smaller effect, increase
trading by around 100%. Although the on-the-run effect on volumes is positive and
highly statistically significant, it is smaller than the effects related to being cheapest-to-
15Lacking a time series of real-time outstanding amounts, we use outstanding amounts at the end of
our sample. This of course ignores changes over time due to tap issues. Therefore we may overstate
somewhat the outstanding amounts in some cases, and thus underestimate the true coefficient.
16The compounded effects are obtained as the exponential of the relevant estimated coefficients minus
one.
17In this case, the compounded effects are obtained as the exponential of the sum of the relevant
estimated coefficients (e.g. 2-year deliverability and 2-year CTD) minus one.
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Table 3: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French bonds
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jan. 2002 through Feb. 2009 (T=86).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -13.12 (-2.62)*** -13.64 (-2.40)**
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.54 (8.27)*** 0.38 (5.08)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.67 (8.75)*** 0.33 (3.67)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.05 (7.99)*** 0.51 (5.73)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.37 (2.78)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.59 (7.45)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.14 (1.19)
On-the-run status 0.69 (4.88)*** 0.59 (5.96)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.08 (-4.54)*** -0.12 (-7.19)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.02 (-1.79)* 0.01 (1.22)
Log issue size 1.42 (6.64)*** 1.38 (5.79)***
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 02-Feb 09 Jan 02-Feb 09
Number of months 86 86
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 4427 3024
Adjusted-R2 0.73 0.64
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deliver. This comparatively modest on-the-run effect contrasts with the overwhelming
effect seen in studies using U.S. Treasury data. The decay related to bond aging (sea-
sonedness) is estimated to be around 8% per year. This implies, for example, that an
old 30-year with eight years remaining maturity would attract less than a fifth of the
trading volume of a two-year-old 10-year bond with same remaining maturity and issue
size. Finally, we find the elasticity of trading volumes with respect to the amount issued
to be higher than one. This may reflect that not only are large issues traded more, the
resulting enhanced liquidity (in terms of depth and expected transaction costs) may
also feed back positively on trading in the bond.
The two rightmost columns of Table 3 display the comparable results for French
government bonds. A first thing to note is that all significant coefficients have the
same sign as in the German case. Also, all the coefficients of the control variables
have very similar magnitudes. There are, however, notable differences in the relative
size of the coefficients on the deliverability and on-the-run dummies. In particular, the
dummies for the three maturity brackets considered (corresponding to ‘deliverability’ in
the German case) have coefficients which are below that of the on-the-run dummy. This
considerably smaller ‘deliverability’ effect for French bonds probably reflects the absence
of a liquid futures market for French government bonds. It should be noted, though,
that even these hypothetically ‘deliverable’ French bonds tend to trade significantly
more than their ‘non-deliverable’ counterparts. A possible explanation is that French
bonds which match the maturity requirements for the German futures also can be
quite accurately hedged with positions in these futures. Moreover, higher cash-market
liquidity for German bonds would make cross-country spread trades cheaper to execute.
Therefore, both direct and indirect liquidity spillovers from the German futures market
into the French cash bond market are conceivable.
Tables 13-14 in Appendix A show the results when the data set is split in pre-crisis
and crisis samples. While the main results remain unchanged, it is notable that the
‘deliverability’ effect French bonds declined in the crisis sample. This may reflect that
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the ability to hedge French bonds with German futures was hampered by the dramatic
increase in the level and variability of the French-German yield spread. Thus liquidity
spillovers to ‘deliverable’ French bonds may well have declined.
As a robustness check, Table 12 (also in Appendix A) displays the corresponding
results for the full-sample panel regressions, but without time dummies. The estimated
coefficients remain virtually unchanged and the 85 dummies add relative little to the
overall explanatory power of the model. This clearly suggests that the inclusion of time
dummies does not drive the results.
4.2 Determinants of quoted depths
Table 4 shows the results of similar panel regressions, but now using quoted debts as
the dependent variable. For the pre-crisis sample (the two leftmost columns), quoted
depths can be broadly explained by time-to-maturity, seasonedness and log issue size.
However, even in this tranquil period, there is evidence that deliverability increases
quoted depths. The effects are however smaller than for traded volumes.
In the crisis sample (from July 2007 to September 2008), the importance of deliv-
erability become more pronounced.18 The amount available for immediate trading at
firm quotes was thus significantly higher for deliverable bonds. This holds for all three
futures contracts considered (2, 5 and 10 years). Interestingly, the status as ’cheapest-
to-deliver’ does not appear to add extra depth in this period. This suggests that it is
the ability to hedge a given bond with a futures contract which matters for liquidity,
rather than the prospects of actual delivery. It is also noteworthy that during the crisis,
on-the-run status became insignificant for German bonds. Overall, the coefficients for
the remaining controls are quite comparable over the sub-samples: seasonedness and
time-to-maturity have the expected signs and are always highly significant. This is in
line with the inventory view, where bonds with a long time to maturity (and thus the
18This is formally confirmed by a joint exclusion test (F-test) for sub-period dummies interacted with
deliverability variables, carried out in regression for the entire sample.
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high interest rate risk) are less liquid, as are bond which are ‘old’ (because the have in-
creasingly ended up in ‘buy-and-hold’ portfolios). As expected, issue size is important
for depth, although much less so than it was for volumes.
For the control country, France (see Table 15 in Appendix A), in the pre-crisis
sample, ‘deliverability’ had a positive effect on depth, but again less than for Germany.
The ‘on-the-run’ status was again found to be quantitatively more important than
‘deliverability’ for French bonds (in both sub-samples).
4.3 Determinants of quoted bid-ask spreads
Table 5 shows the results for quoted bid-ask spreads. The results for the pre-crisis
period are somewhat puzzling: three of deliverability dummies are significant, but
have the wrong sign. On-the-run status, on the other hand, has the right negative
sign (i.e. spreads are tighter for on-the-run issues), although not strongly significant.
One possible explanation is that in the pre-crisis sample, market makers had quoting
obligations (i.e. they had to post bid and ask prices which complied with a certain
maximum spread). Our results suggests that these spreads were to a very large extent
determined by bond characteristics such as time to maturity, seasonedness and issue
sizes. Note also that R2 is as high as 0.93 in this case.19
During the crisis sample, where market-maker obligations were suspended most of
the time, the picture changed somewhat. Two of the deliverability dummies become
significant, and they also have the expected negative sign. Quantitatively, the estimated
effects on spreads remain rather small, though. This may indicate that for smaller
trade sizes, the distinction between deliverable and non-deliverable bonds may not be
particularly important. Market-makers may be willing to provide liquidity in the form
of relatively tight bid-ask spreads for small amounts also in non-deliverable bonds. It
seems plausible, on the other hand, that if market makers are to provide substantially
liquidity in the form of tight bid-ask spreads for large amounts, the ability to hedge
19Table 16 in Appendix A shows the comparable results for France, which are broadly similar.
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Table 4: Determinants of quoted depth for German government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily cumulated (log) depth. Asterisks
*, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values significantly different
from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 4.00 (1.97)** 9.20 (4.60)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.32 (6.51)*** 0.34 (7.89)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.04 (0.68) 0.38 (7.90)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.16 (2.18)** 0.47 (10.10)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future -0.06 (-0.97) -0.06 (-0.94)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.09 (2.67)*** 0.05 (0.67)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.07 (0.94) -0.05 (-1.18)
On-the-run status 0.20 (3.26)*** 0.09 (1.25)
Seasonedness (in years) -0.04 (-4.51)*** -0.05 (-5.24)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.05 (-13.88)*** -0.03 (-10.46)***
Log issue size 0.58 (6.75)*** 0.35 (4.18)***
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 75 75
Number of month-bond obs. 902 748
Adjusted-R2 0.78 0.71
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with futures likely becomes more important. To better capture both the depth and
spread dimensions of liquidity simultaneously, we finally consider a ‘liquidity index’
defined as the quoted depth divided by the bid-ask spread.
4.4 Determinants of the liquidity index
The liquidity index is intended to capture the possibility that despite tightly quoted
bid-ask spreads, a market may not necessarily be liquid with respect to execution of
larger trades. Similarly, although quoted depth is a quite informative measure, it does
not take into account the tightness of the market: there may large depth, but if bid
and ask prices are far apart, such a situation would not necessarily correspond to a
liquid market. To ensure the robustness of our findings against such short-comings of
the one-dimensional liquidity measures, we present in Table 6 the results of the same
regressions as above, but now using the liquidity index as the dependent variable. On
this alternative measure of liquidity, the importance of deliverability clearly rose in the
crisis sample for the 5 and 10-year maturities. In the pre-crisis samples, the liquidity
index could be explained almost most exclusively by time to maturity, seasonedness
and issue size.
Overall, this section has provided three main results. First, the liquidity of German
bonds which were deliverable into the nearest-to-expiry futures contracts were found to
be superior to non-deliverable bonds, when controlling for relevant bond characteristics
such as time to maturity, seasonedness and issue size. Second, the positive impact on
liquidity of belonging to the deliverable maturity intervals was consistently found to be
higher for German bonds than for the control (French bonds), and - consistent with the
more diffuse benchmark notion in the German market - the importance of ’on-the-run’
status was found to be correspondingly lower for German bonds. Third, with respect
to the comparison across market regimes, i.e. the pre-crisis versus crisis samples, we
found that the importance of deliverability generally increased in the crisis sample. We
now turn to the question, whether deliverability is also priced into German bond yields,
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Table 5: Determinants of quoted bid-ask spreads for German government
bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) bid-ask spreads. Asterisks *,
**, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values significantly different from
zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 10.25 (4.42)*** 12.42 (7.41)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.03 (0.55) -0.10 (-2.11)**
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.36 (4.89)*** 0.03 (0.37)
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.25 (3.38)*** -0.12 (-1.66)*
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.26 (2.62)*** 0.41 (2.57)**
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future -0.02 (-0.55) 0.05 (0.43)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future -0.09 (-1.40) -0.12 (-0.66)
On-the-run status -0.25 (-2.36)** -0.25 (-2.31)**
Seasonedness (in years) 0.03 (3.33)*** 0.04 (5.95)***
Time to maturity (in years) 0.09 (16.13)*** 0.09 (18.61)***
Log issue size -0.43 (-4.37)*** -0.52 (-7.32)***
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 75 75
Number of month-bond obs. 846 736
Adjusted-R2 0.93 0.91
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Table 6: Determinants of liquidity index for German government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) depth divided by bid-ask
spread. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signif-
icantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 5.83 (2.83)*** 13.11 (5.71)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.15 (2.79)*** 0.20 (2.87)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.08 (1.06) 0.46 (5.97)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.10 (1.05) 0.57 (6.31)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future -0.33 (-2.94)*** -0.42 (-2.20)**
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.01 (0.34) -0.06 (-0.59)
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.09 (1.06) 0.12 (0.83)
On-the-run status 0.30 (2.88)*** 0.25 (1.58)
Seasonedness (in years) -0.05 (-5.43)*** -0.07 (-6.54)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.13 (-21.83)*** -0.13 (-18.33)***
Log issue size 0.84 (9.53)*** 0.52 (5.33)***
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 75 75
Number of month-bond obs. 902 748
Adjusted-R2 0.94 0.91
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either directly or indirectly through enhanced liquidity.
5 Price effects of liquidity and deliverability
Having established the positive relation between deliverability and a range of liquid-
ity measures for German government securities, we now examine whether liquidity
in general and deliverability in particular are priced. We refrain from using German
non-deliverable bonds as pricing benchmarks since their future deliverability may affect
current prices in the form of liquidity or convenience premium. Instead, we compare the
yields on deliverable and non-deliverable German securities to those of France. Besides
having monetary policy in common, France is, as mentioned above, a natural choice
as a benchmark since the amount of outstanding French debt corresponds to that of
Germany in both absolute and relative (% of GDP) terms. Partly as a consequence, the
difference in the credit quality are small, which allows us to pin down more precisely
the marginal valuation of liquidity. In addition, France does not have a bond futures
market, and this allows us to identify the impact of deliverability on German bond
yields.
5.1 Variable construction
In order to obtain and easily compare French and German bond yields at different
maturities, we estimate continuous zero-coupon yield curves for both countries using
smoothed cubic spline interpolation. Cubic splines have been widely used in the liter-
ature, and this functional form provides enough flexibility to capture local yield effects
that may arise from market segmentation. Once the two curves are estimated from the
cross-section of French and German bond prices, we compute the yield spread between
the two curves at maturities m = {1.0, 1.5, ..., 10.0}, with additional observations at
1.75 and 2.25 year maturities.20 These maturities cover the most relevant part of the
20To ensure that the set of securities used in the estimation procedure is homogenous, the following
types of securities are excluded: securities with floating rate coupons, securities with remaining maturity
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yield curve, and the following maturity subsets 1.75−2.25, 4.5−5.5, and 8.5−10.0 that
correspond to the baskets of EUREX German government securities deliverable for 2-,
5-, and 10-year futures contracts, respectively. We calculate these yield differentials for
each trading day from January 2006 through September 2008.21
We attempt to explain the yield spread across maturities and over time with the
difference between French and German bond market liquidity and the deliverability
of German securities. To accomplish this, we use the MTS data on French bonds to
compute daily liquidity measures similar to those described in Section 3. Once we have
the necessary liquidity measures for both French and German bonds, we average them
across non-overlapping maturity brackets centered on each maturity m. That is, we use
group averages instead of individual values in order to mitigate individual bond effects
and non-synchronous maturities. The valuation effects of deliverability are captured
by a set of dummy variables that correspond to the ranges of deliverable maturities
specified in EUREX futures contracts.
In addition to liquidity and deliverability, several recent studies find that perceived
differences in the credit quality of euro-area sovereign issuers have effects on the relative
pricing of their bonds.22 Although we minimize this effect by comparing two sovereign
issuers with similar fiscal fundamentals, a market-based measure that is available on
daily basis is nevertheless desirable to capture additional aspects of governments’ per-
ceived credit quality. For this reason, we augment our empirical model of the interest
rate spread with data on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS). 23
less than one year, securities with issue size less than EUR 5 billion, securities issued in non-euro
currencies, securities originating from a coupon-stripping program, securities issued by government
special fund, and inflation- or index-linked securities. Moreover, to disentangle the hypothesized price
effect of on-the-run status, the most recently issued securities are excluded as well.
21The fit of the spline function is good for both countries, with the mean absolute fitting error being
less than one basis point.
22See, for instance, Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003); Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht
(2004); Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009); Schuknecht, von Hagen, and Wolswijk (2008)
23A sovereign CDS is contract that allows the investor to hedge against the event that a particular
government defaults on its debt. In exchange for this ‘credit protection’, the investor agrees to make
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A convenient property of CDS premiums is that they provide more direct reflections
of the market’s assessment of sovereign credit risk. This allows us to compute the
credit risk premium on a five-year German government bond simply by subtracting
the premium paid on a five-year CDS contract from bond’s par yield. In the case of
non-integer maturities for which the CDS contracts are not traded, we use observed
premiums on nearby contracts to linearly interpolate the missing intermediate ones.
Once the credit risk premium is netted out, we can decompose the residual par yield
into elements associated with risk-free rate, liquidity, and deliverability. Consequently,
French and German spot rates obtained from the spline estimation are transformed
into par yields.
Finally, motivated by the results of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007),
we control for a potential negative relationship between aggregate supply and pricing
of government debt. In particular, we calculate the average sizes of outstanding French
and German bond issues on a daily basis and use their logarithmic difference to gauge
changes in the relative supply of national debt. We also include year dummies and
time-to-maturity as additional control variables to capture any unobserved factors that
might affect the relative valuation.
Table 7 presents the summary statistics for yield, liquidity, quality, and issue size
differentials between France and Germany. To facilitate comparison across maturities,
the statistics are categorized by maturity segments that correspond to permanently non-
deliverable maturities as well as 2-, 5-, and 10-year delivery baskets. As shown in Table
7, the differentials of par yields, bid-ask spreads, and credit risk are consistently positive
across maturities, whereas log issue size differentials are negative. Taken together, this
imply that investors perceive liquidity and credit quality of French bonds to be slightly
inferior to their German counterparts, and this may explain that the French securities
periodic payments, known as premiums, to the seller of the contract over its life or until the government
defaults. Compiled by Credit Market Analysis Ltd. and provided by Thomson Datastream, our CDS
data is based on daily indicative bid premiums quoted by thirty key market participants for contracts
on French and German government bonds with average residual maturities from one to ten years.
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command higher yields across the yield curve. Several other results should be noted
from Table 7. In our sample, the average size of French issues is approximately six per
cent smaller than that of German bonds, and the size differential varies from -12% to
zero. Yet despite the larger stock of debt, German bonds seem to trade at yield levels
that are economically and statistically lower than those required on French securities,
which suggests that the positive liquidity effects associated with larger float outweigh
the direct supply effects. In addition, the variables in Table 7 exhibit substantial
variation both in the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions, which motivates the
use of panel estimation techniques.
5.2 Empirical results
To empirically test the conjectured relation between the French-German yield spread
and the factors associated with relative liquidity, quality, and deliverability, we pool our
data in a panel that includes a time series of daily observations from 2 January 2006
to 30 September 2008 for each maturity m. We split the panel into two sub-samples,
using 1 July 2007 as the break to investigate whether the economic importance of our
valuation factors change after the onset of the financial crisis. To this end, we estimate
the following econometric model both for the pre-crisis period and the crisis period
using panel least squares regression:
R
F
t,m −R
G
t,m = α+ β1(LIQ
F
t,m − LIQ
G
t,m) + β2(CDS
F
t,m − CDS
G
t,m)
+ β3[log(AIS
F
t /AIS
G
t )] + δ(DELm) + λ(Xt,m) + εt,m (1)
where
DELm = {NONDEL<1.75,DEL1.75−2.25,DEL4.5−5.5,DEL8.5−10.5}
Xt,m = {m, year dummies}
andR
i
t,m denotes the estimated par yield for country i and maturitym at day t. CDS
i
t,m
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and LIQ
i
t,m, and AIS
i
t are the credit default swap premium, liquidity measure, and
average issue size, respectively. The liquidity measures are percentage bid-ask spread,
log depth, or the log ratio of depth and spread. We adopt log specifications in order to be
able to interpret the corresponding regression coefficients as semi-elasticities of the yield
spread. DELm is a vector of dummy variables that represent different deliverability
conditions and δ is the corresponding vector of coefficients. In particular, DELm
takes the value of one if maturity m is deliverable for a German futures contract,
that is, it satisfies the maturity condition shown in the subscript. NONDEL<1.75 is
one for maturities less than 1.75 years that are permanently non-deliverable. Xt,m
includes other control variables, namely time-to-maturity and year dummies. In all the
regressions, we adjust for both cross-sectional and time effects in residuals εt,m using
the variance estimators suggested by Thompson (2005).24
The estimation results for Equation 1 appear in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 reports the
determinants of the yield spread before the onset the financial crisis. The coefficients
for different liquidity measures are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that
liquidity was not a key concern for the marginal investors in the pre-crisis period. This
result, however, holds only for measures of “artificial liquidity” (i.e. liquidity provided
by market makers as opposed to endogenously emerging liquidity): the log ratio of
average issue sizes, a measure of relative float, loads negatively on the yield spread and
is statistically significant. This means that the indirect liquidity benefits arising from
larger issues more than offset the direct supply effects.25
24Thompson (2005) suggests the following variance estimator V̂ ar(β̂) for an OLS estimator β̂ that
is robust to heteroscedasticity and correlation across both distinct maturities m and time t:
V̂ ar(β̂) = V̂m + V̂t − V̂White
where V̂m and V̂t are the estimate variances that cluster by maturity and time [Huber (1967); Rogers
(1983)], respectively, and V̂White is the usual heteroskedasticity robust OLS variance matrix [White
(1984)].
25Although it has to be emphasized that the economic importance of increased float is marginal:
coefficient -0.22 implies that a one standard deviation decrease (-0.04) in the issue size ratio increases
the yield spread by approximately one basis point.
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Table 8: The determinants of sovereign yield spread: Pre-crisis period
This table contains the results contains the results of least squares regression of Equa-
tion 1. The dependent variable is R
F
t,m − R
G
t,m, the difference between French(F ) and
German(G) par yield for maturity m at day t, measured in basis points. CDS
i
t,m,
LIQ
i
t,m, and AIS
i
t are the credit default swap premium, liquidity measure (bid-ask
spread, log depth, or the log ratio of depth and spread), and average issue size, re-
spectively. NONDELm and DELm are dummy variables that take the value of one if
maturity m satisfies the limits shown in the subscripts. Asterisks *, ** and *** after
robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values significantly different from zero at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Daily observations from January 2nd 2006 to
June 29th 2007.
Spread log Depth log DepthSpread
Slope t-value Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -0.86 (-1.53) -0.87 (-1.55) -0.87 (-1.59)
LIQ
F
t,m − LIQ
G
t,m -0.11 (-0.99) 0.42 (1.33) 0.33 (1.51)
CDS
F
t,m −CDSGt,m 0.16 (2.24)** 0.15 (2.20)** 0.15 (2.22)**
log(AIS
F
t /AIS
G
t )
† -0.22 (-6.34)*** -0.22 (-6.44)*** -0.22 (-6.35)***
NONDEL<1.75 0.80 (2.30)** 0.97 (2.34)** 0.91 (2.45)**
DEL1.75−2.25 0.83 (5.00)*** 0.74 (4.72)*** 0.77 (5.21)***
DEL4.5−5.5 -0.60 (-1.45) -0.51 (-1.25) -0.55 (-1.41)
DEL8.5−10.5 3.56 (4.24)*** 3.57 (4.22)*** 3.51 (4.20)***
m 0.24 (1.71)* 0.25 (1.74)* 0.25 (1.81)*
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 6133 6133 6133
Adjusted-R2 0.69 0.68 0.69
†The regression coefficient is multiplied by 100.
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In addition, the deliverability of German bonds appear to be priced, with the con-
venience yield for holding deliverable bonds being the highest in the 10-year segment at
3.5 bps, and less significant for 2- and 5-year segments. Positive, albeit small, coefficient
for non-deliverable bonds indicates that deliverable bonds do not lose value once they
drop permanently out of delivery basket, which mutes the importance of deliverability
especially in the 2-year segment. The coefficients for time-to-maturity, all around 0.25,
indicate that the yield spread increases by one basis point for every four-year increment
in residual maturity.
Consistent with economic intuition, we also find that the difference in perceived
credit quality is positively related to the sovereign yield spread.
Table 9 the results based on the crisis period. All statistically significant coefficients
have the expected sign and are larger in magnitude than for the pre-crisis sample. This
points to an increased importance of liquidity, quality, and deliverability associated
in times of market stress. For example, positive and negative coefficients for bid-ask
and liquidity index differentials, respectively, indicate that increased demand for the
relatively more liquid German securities depresses the entire yield curve compared to
the French one. In particular, a positive coefficient of 0.19 for the bid-ask spread
differential implies that a two standard deviation (7.2 in the crisis sample) increase
in the relative bid-ask spread is associated with 1.4 bps increase in the yield spread
across maturities. Also, the liquidity index, which incorporates both spread and depth
information, is higher for German securities and thereby loads negatively on the yield
spread.
In addition to relative liquidity, the economic importance of relative credit quality
increases in the times of market disturbance. Specifically, we find that the coefficients
for credit risk differential triple in the crisis sample, ranging from 0.35 to 0.42. There-
fore, a ten basis point increase in the CDS spread is associated with approximately four
basis point increase in the yield spread.
Consistent with the results in Table 8, the relative issue size is negatively related
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Table 9: The determinants of French-German yield spread: Post-crisis
period
This table contains the results of the Panel OLS regression of Equation 1. The de-
pendent variable is R
F
t,m−R
G
t,m, the difference between French(F ) and German(G) par
yield for maturity m at day t, measured in basis points. CDS
i
t,m, LIQ
i
t,m, and AIS
i
t
are the credit default swap premium, liquidity measure (bid-ask spread, log depth, or
the log ratio of depth and spread), and average issue size, respectively. NONDELm
and DELm are dummy variables that take the value of one if maturity m lies in the
maturity range shown in the subscripts. Asterisks *, ** and *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Daily observations from 1 July 2007 to 30 September 2008.
Spread log Depth log DepthSpread
Slope t-value Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -1.58 (-1.14) -0.30 (-0.23) -1.34 (-0.91)
LIQ
F
t,m − LIQ
G
t,m 0.19 (6.33)*** 0.37 (0.82) -0.52 (-1.77)*
CDS
F
t,m −CDS
G
t,m 0.42 (3.82)*** 0.35 (2.92)*** 0.36 (2.98)***
log(AIS
F
t /AIS
G
t )
† -0.65 (-7.22)*** -0.61 (-6.1)*** -0.69 (-6.88)***
NONDEL<1.75 -2.15 (-3.36)*** -2.19 (-3.91)*** -2.29 (-3.49)***
DEL1.75−2.25 1.67 (3.88)*** 1.56 (3.39)*** 1.75 (3.88)***
DEL4.5−5.5 1.37 (2.91)*** 1.87 (4.45)*** 1.41 (3.43)***
DEL8.5−10.5 6.03 (4.25)*** 5.36 (4.79)*** 5.39 (4.36)***
m 0.39 (1.95)** 0.58 (4.14)*** 0.52 (2.88)***
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 5511 5511 5511
Adjusted-R2 0.75 0.71 0.71
†The regression coefficient is multiplied by 100.
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to the yield spread in the crisis time as well. However, coefficients from -0.61 to -0.69
are three times larger and suggest that in times of stress, a large float (which makes
bonds easier to locate in an OTC market) becomes especially important.
Finally, the deliverability indicators have explanatory power for the yield spread
even after controlling for the liquidity differential, which suggests that the value of
holding deliverable bonds cannot be completely explained with their superior liquidity
as measured by our liquidity indicators. Again, the convenience yield is largest for the
10-year segment, 5.4 to 6.0 bps depending on the model specification. Furthermore, it
should be emphasized that these figures are over and above the future deliverability
premium, which varies from 2.2 to 2.3 bps, so that the total convenience yield for
10-year deliverables could well be as high as 8.2 bps. For short- and medium-term
deliverable bonds the convenience yields are smaller, but still economically significant
at around four basis points. We conjecture that wider and deeper delivery baskets in
the 2- and 5-year segments reduce the convenience yield attached to individual bonds.
The coefficient for time-to-maturity implies that the yield spread in the 10-year segment
is ranges from 4 to 6 bps, ceteris paribus, depending on the liquidity measure used.
In a recent article, Kuipers (2008) finds similar albeit much smaller deliverability
effects for U.S. Treasury bonds deliverable for 30-year futures contract. Kuipers (2008)
reports a price premium of less than one basis point on a yield basis, which is in gross
terms since the effect of liquidity is not controlled for.
We perform two robustness checks. First, we re-estimate both samples using quan-
tile regression which is less sensitive to distributional assumptions and outliers. In
particular, maximum yield and bid-ask spreads presented in Table 7 are quite high
compared to their sample averages, which raises concerns that the above results are
driven by a few influential outliers. To address this concern, we model the conditional
median of the independent variables instead of the conditional mean reported in Tables
8 and 9. For brevity, we do not report these results in detail but note that they are
qualitative similar to those presented in the above tables. Therefore, we conclude that
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extreme observations do not drive our findings. Second, we address the potential simul-
taneity bias arising from the joint determination of sovereign yield and CDS spreads
by excluding the latter from the regressions. Leaving the CDS differential out of the
regressions does not change the subsequent results in any significant way, suggesting
that out conclusions from Tables 8 and 9 are robust also in that respect.
5.3 Value of on-the-run status
Having established the negative relation between German bond yields and deliverability,
we turn our attention to the most recently issued securities and ask whether the on-the-
run status has pricing relevance beyond deliverability. Our approach is straightforward
and familiar from the work of Elton and Green (1998) and others. We use the spot
curve estimated from the daily prices of German off-the-run bonds to value a synthetic
bond with a cash flow schedule similar to that of the on-the-run bond. The reference
price is then converted to a yield and subtracted from the actual market yield of the
on-the-run bond. If the resulting yield spread is negative, it means that investors are
willing to accept lower yields for on-the-run securities relative to similar, off-the-run
securities. Table 10 provides summary statistics on yield spreads for German 2-, 5-,
and 10-year on-the-run securities.
The yield discount attached to the on-the-run status is surprisingly small for Ger-
man government bonds. The mean yield concessions that investors are willing to pay
in order to own on-the-run securities varies from 1.8 bps in the 2-year segment to -1.7
bps in the 10-year segment, where the latter value is not statistically different for zero.
Since the reference yields in the 10-year segment are based on the prices of deliver-
able bonds, it can be concluded that investors do not attach additional value to newly
issued 10-year bonds over seasoned 10-year bonds which remain deliverable for the 10-
year futures contracts. In the 2- and 5-year segments, the on-the-run bonds trade at
yields that are 1-2 bps below the off-the-run curve, but it should be emphasized that
the economic significance of on-the-run status appears trivial compared to Japanese or
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Table 10: Summary statistics on yield discounts associated with German
on-the-run issues
This table reports summary statistics on yield spreads between actual German on-the-
run bonds of various types and reference securities with similar maturity and coupon
rate. Reference yields are estimated from the term structure using cubic splines. All
values are in basis points. Asterisks *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote
values significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Daily observations from 2
January 2006 to 30 September 2008.
Mean t-value Min Max SD
2-year -1.75 (-2.72)*** -15.77 3.84 2.81
5-year -0.67 (-3.25)*** -4.90 4.48 1.36
10-year 1.74 -1.48 -9.54 13.98 3.96
U.S. government bond markets, where yield discounts often are found to be at least an
order of magnitude larger.
6 Conclusion
We find no evidence of a significant ‘on-the-run liquidity phenomenon’ in the German
government bond market. Once deliverability into futures contracts and other liquid-
ity determinants are properly controlled for, German on-the-run bonds neither enjoy
substantially better liquidity nor trade at an economically significant price premium.
In the light of the evidence from the U.S. Treasury market, which documents large
liquidity and pricing effects associated with on-the-run status, this is surprising.
Instead, we find clear evidence that the cross-sectional variation in liquidity mea-
sures as well as yields across German government bonds is closely related to their
eligibility for the two, five and ten-year futures contracts. The yield discounts on de-
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liverable bonds cannot, however, be fully explained by standard liquidity measures and
may thus be partly related to a premium for liquidity risk.
Our findings suggests that on-the-run securities play very different roles in the Ger-
man and U.S. Treasury market, in particular with respect to hedging and speculation.
In the U.S. market, the benchmark status of the on-the-run securities is indisputable,
whereas this status - and the related superior liquidity - appear to be shared among
multiple bonds in the Germany market. More generally, our empirical findings high-
lights the role of a liquid futures markets in supporting the liquidity of the underlying
cash market.
Exploiting that our sample covers part of the recent turbulent period in financial
markets, we find that the economic importance of liquidity and deliverability increased
considerably under severe market stress. Furthermore, our results suggest that the
large price premium observed on German bonds during the crisis (relative to other
large euro area issuers) may partly be explained by significant liquidity spillovers from
the very liquid German futures market. The presence of these effects have implications
for studies of euro-area sovereign spreads, which typically are computed relative to
German yields.
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Appendix
A Summary statistics and additional tables
Table 11 provides summary statistics for the number bonds, their outstanding amounts,
trading volume, and liquidity measures. As for the number of bonds, our sample
includes more on-the-run and off-the-run bonds in the two-year segment than in other
segments. This reflects the tighter issuance cycle in the short end of the yield curve,
as German Finance Agency issues two-year bonds four times a year while five- and
ten-year bonds are issued semiannually. Nonetheless, the coverage across maturity
and seasonedness ranges is overall quite good, as there are at least five bonds in each
category.
Yield spreads between off-the-run and on-the-run bonds appear quite modest, even
at the long end of the yield curve. Indeed, the yields for the most recently issued bonds
and their immediate predecessors deviate on average less than two basis points. Bid-ask
spreads generally get wider with remaining time-to-maturity. For instance, the mean
percentage bid-ask spread for the most recently issued 2-year bond is little over two basis
points, compared to 3.4 basis points for the 10-year on-the-run bond. This is consistent
with market-making models based on inventory management, in which competitive
dealers charge wider spreads for securities that have higher price volatility. For bonds
with different original but similar residual time-to-maturity, however, the spreads are
roughly the same. For example, the bid-ask spreads for original five- and ten-year
bonds with approximately three and half years to maturity are virtually identical. The
bid-ask spreads between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds do not seem to differ in
an economically important way either. This contrasts with the U.S. Treasury market
evidence, where Fleming (2002) reports five times wider bid-ask spread for off-the-run
bills and Pasquariello and Vega (2009) two times wider spread for off-the-run Treasury
bonds. Market depth, while being similar between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds,
appears to decline with seasonedness.
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Table 12: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French
bonds: Panel regression without time dummies
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jan. 2002 through Feb. 2009 (T=86).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -11.26 (-2.54)** -13.85 (-2.38)**
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.57 (8.42)*** 0.38 (5.16)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.70 (8.86)*** 0.32 (3.60)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.06 (7.91)*** 0.51 (5.19)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.34 (2.77)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.58 (7.05)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.15 (1.14)
On-the-run status 0.65 (5.15)*** 0.58 (5.70)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.09 (-5.58)*** -0.13 (-7.35)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.02 (-1.72)* 0.01 (1.21)
Log issue size 1.31 (7.00)*** 1.39 (5.66)***
Month-fixed effects No No
Sample Jan 02-Feb 09 Jan 02-Feb 09
Number of months 86 86
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 4427 3024
Adjusted-R2 0.70 0.60
 Acta Wasaensia 115 
53
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1081
August 2009
Table 13: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French
bonds (pre-Crisis sample)
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jan. 2002 through Jun. 2007 (T=66).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -16.16 (-2.88)*** -11.40 (-1.55)
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.55 (7.50)*** 0.43 (4.33)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.64 (7.02)*** 0.34 (3.29)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.01 (6.70)*** 0.51 (4.98)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.37 (2.60)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.66 (7.85)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.17 (1.32)
On-the-run status 0.67 (4.34)*** 0.54 (5.00)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.06 (-2.88)*** -0.14 (-6.30)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.02 (-1.95)* 0.01 (1.31)
Log issue size 1.55 (6.47)*** 1.29 (4.17)***
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 02-Jun 07 Jan 02-Jun 07
Number of months 66 66
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 3426 2294
Adjusted-R2 0.74 0.61
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Table 14: Determinants of trading volumes for German and French
bonds (Crisis sample)
The dependent variable is log trading volume. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values
(in parentheses) denote values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Monthly observations from Jul. 2007 through Feb. 2009 (T=20).
Germany France
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept -5.81 (-1.29) -20.27 (-3.45)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.60 (5.61)*** 0.22 (2.28)**
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.74 (8.43)*** 0.28 (1.94)*
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 1.07 (8.27)*** 0.45 (3.37)***
Cheapest-to-deliver for 2-year future 0.36 (1.69)*
Cheapest-to-deliver for 5-year future 0.27 (1.74)*
Cheapest-to-deliver for 10-year future 0.05 (0.43)
On-the-run status 0.69 (3.49)*** 0.73 (5.20)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.11 (-7.40)*** -0.10 (-5.69)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.01 (-0.94) 0.00 (0.25)
Log issue size 1.08 (5.68)*** 1.66 (6.69)***
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jul 07-Feb 09 Jul 07-Feb 09
Number of months 20 20
Number of bonds 109 66
Number of month-bond obs. 1001 730
Adjusted-R2 0.73 0.74
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Table 15: Determinants of quoted depth for French government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily cumulated (log) depth. Asterisks
*, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values significantly different
from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 9.86 (3.85)*** 17.00 (2.98)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.17 (2.73)*** 0.27 (3.35)***
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 -0.09 (-1.50) -0.07 (-0.63)
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.16 (3.86)*** 0.27 (3.05)***
On-the-run status 0.49 (6.71)*** 0.50 (3.95)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.05 (-7.71)*** -0.05 (-4.38)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.04 (-13.57)*** -0.02 (-4.04)***
Log issue size 0.33 (3.05)*** 0.01 (0.06)
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 51 51
Number of month-bond obs. 668 555
Adjusted-R2 0.81 0.65
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Table 16: Determinants of quoted bid-ask spreads for French govern-
ment bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) bid-ask spreads. Asterisks *,
**, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values significantly different from
zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 7.50 (2.25)** 6.52 (2.47)**
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.09 (1.70)* -0.08 (-1.22)
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 0.12 (2.47)** 0.22 (3.93)***
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.06 (0.98) -0.04 (-0.75)
On-the-run status -0.23 (-3.35)*** -0.44 (-5.72)***
Seasonedness (in years) 0.01 (1.54) 0.01 (1.39)
Time to maturity (in years) 0.08 (14.84)*** 0.08 (15.77)***
Log issue size -0.30 (-2.16)** -0.25 (-2.22)**
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 51 51
Number of month-bond obs. 634 553
Adjusted-R2 0.91 0.89
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Table 17: Determinants of liquidity index for French government bonds
The dependent variable is monthly averages of daily (log) depth divided by bid-ask
spread. Asterisks *, **, *** after robust t-values (in parentheses) denote values signif-
icantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
pre-crisis crisis
Slope t-value Slope t-value
Intercept 10.53 (4.10)*** 17.57 (3.79)***
1.75 ≤ maturity < 2.25 0.13 (2.54)** 0.21 (2.23)**
4.50 ≤ maturity < 5.50 -0.09 (-1.37) -0.31 (-2.54)**
8.50 ≤ maturity < 10.50 0.01 (0.29) 0.20 (2.25)**
On-the-run status 0.48 (8.09)*** 0.74 (5.74)***
Seasonedness (in years) -0.07 (-7.67)*** -0.06 (-4.30)***
Time to maturity (in years) -0.12 (-29.79)*** -0.11 (-15.25)***
Log issue size 0.63 (5.77)*** 0.31 (1.59)
Month-fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample Jan 06-Jun 07 Jul 07-Sep 08
Number of months 18 15
Number of bonds 51 51
Number of month-bond obs. 668 555
Adjusted-R2 0.96 0.88
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The Cheapest-to-Deliver Premium: Theory and 
Evidence 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the impact of 
bond futures trading on the price of the underlying bond. Using data from 
German government bond and futures markets, it is found that cheapest-to-
deliver bonds trade on a premium that decreases towards zero as the bonds 
become ineligible for delivery. Based on this observation, an equilibrium 
model is developed that describes the theoretical underpinnings of the 
premium. Consistent with the model, the premium is found to be positively 
related to bond’s relative cheapness in delivery, value as collateral, the amount 
of physical deliveries, and time to delivery. 
 
JEL classification: G12, G14, G15 
 
Keywords: German government bonds, cheapest-to-deliver, futures markets
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The markets for bond futures have experienced a decade of rapid growth, and many 
of the single contracts are nowadays amongst the most actively traded derivatives in 
the world. Since most of these contracts are designed to be settled with a delivery of 
an actual bond, it is important to understand how trading in large and active futures 
markets may affect the functionality of the cash markets. Previous literature has 
concentrated mostly on the volatility effects arising from speculative futures trading 
[e.g. Bortz (1984), Hegde (1994), Mayhew (2000) for a review], or on the price 
effects in instances of futures market manipulation [Merrick, Yaid, and Yadav 
(2005), Järvinen and Käppi (2004), Jeanneau and Scott (2002, 2001)]. This paper 
provides a theoretical and empirical assessment of the cash price effects under 
normal, competitive market conditions. 
Typically, a futures contract that is settled by physical delivery specifies a standard 
par-delivery grade on which the contract is written, but allows several non-par grades 
to be used to settle the contract.1 Bond futures are usually written on a notional bond 
with given maturity and coupon, and the bonds that are eligible for delivery have to 
meet certain criteria concerning the issuer, residual maturity, or issue size. A deep 
and uniform basket of deliverable bonds is important for any bond futures market, 
since it enables a well-functioning and frictionless settlement process. If the size 
imbalance between the two markets is large, the supply for deliverable bonds may 
not meet the demand of the futures sellers preparing to make a physical delivery, 
except at sharply higher cash prices. Moreover, if deliverable bonds are qualitatively 
different, which is usually the case, the quality option implicit in the futures contract 
allows the futures sellers to choose the optimal bond for delivery. Under such 
circumstances, the sellers’ demand concentrates on the bond that is cheapest to 
deliver, making it a natural vehicle for the examination of the cash price effects that 
futures trading may induce. 
This paper examines the effects of the futures trading on the price of the cheapest-to-
deliver bond. The focus is on the ten-year German government bonds, which are 
deliverable for one of the most heavily traded derivative, the Bund futures contract. 
                                                          
1 The seller of the futures contract has a right to choose the delivered bond. Recent work concerning 
the quality option include e.g. Nunes and de Oliveira (2007), Henrard (2006), Lin, Chen and Chou 
(1999), Ritchken and Sankarasubramanian (1995). Chance and Hemler (1993) consider the valuation 
of the option, and Grieves and Marcus (2005), Chen, Kang, and Yang (2005), and Rendleman (2004) 
examine its effects on hedging. 
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These two separate but interrelated markets provide an interesting setting for the 
analysis, since the total size of open positions in the futures markets is typically much 
greater than the size of the cash markets.2 In addition, the cheapest-to-deliver bond 
for Bund futures is typically very predictable, since the costs of delivering the 
second-best bond are high. Using daily prices from January 2001 to March 2007, 
convergence trade tests show that German ten-year cheapest-to-deliver bonds trade 
on a premium, which decreases with the remaining time that the bond is expected to 
be cheapest-to-deliver. In other words, the premium is highest (lowest) for current 
cheapest-to-deliver bonds that are expected to remain cheapest (become non-
deliverable) in subsequent futures settlements.  
Based on the empirical observations, a general equilibrium model is developed to 
describe the dynamics of the price premium. The comparative statics of the model 
yield four testable predictions: first, the price premium is positively related with 
bond’s relative cheapness in delivery, as it becomes increasingly suboptimal to 
deliver the second-cheapest bond. Second, the premium increases with the expected 
amount of physical deliveries to be made as a direct result from expected futures-
market demand. Third, the premium increases with the relative rental value of the 
cheapest-to-deliver bond, as the bond becomes “special” collateral in the repurchase 
markets. Fourth, the premium is positively related with the number of periods that the 
bond is expected to be cheapest-to-deliver, since the rental value of the “special” 
collateral accumulates with the rental time. Using a panel dataset on German 
government bond and bond futures markets from January 2001 to March 2007, the 
model predictions are empirically tested and supported. 
Futures exchanges may find the results useful in designing a new futures contract or 
an optimal settlement process. The design of the quality option plays an important 
part in the success of a futures contract, as the value of the option is effectively the 
upper limit for bias in the futures price. Johnston and McConnell (1989) report that 
the quality option embedded in the GNMA bond futures contract became so valuable 
that the hedging effectiveness of the contract was severely hampered. The results 
reported in this paper show that the quality option is related to a bias in cash prices as 
well. The reported futures market effect may have practical relevance also for bond 
                                                          
2 For example, in 2005 the average open interest was equivalent to €153 billion worth of underlying 
bonds. Yet, the amount of outstanding deliverable bonds was only around €80 billion, and the 
average stock for the cheapest-to-deliver issue was only €25 billion. From 2001 to 2007, on average 
16 percent of the outstanding cheapest-to-deliver bonds were delivered at every futures contracts 
expiry. 
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investors, who consider forward rates for the assets inside and outside the delivery 
basket. 
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. In Section 2 the German Bund 
futures contract and the concept of the cheapest-to-deliver bond are introduced, and 
some particular features of cheapest-to-deliver bonds are discussed. The existence of 
cheapest-to-deliver premium is tested using a convergence trade test. In Section 3 an 
equilibrium model for the cheapest-to-deliver premium is developed and discussed, 
and in Section 4 the predictions of the theoretical model are tested with empirical 
data. Section 5 presents the summary and conclusions drawn from the findings of the 
study.  
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2 CHEAPEST-TO-DELIVER BOND  
The Bund futures contract is written on a notional ten-year German government bond 
with a face value of €100.000 and an annual coupon of six percent. The Bund 
contract is traded in Eurex derivatives exchange and, like all major bond futures 
contracts, is settled by physical delivery. On the delivery date, the contract allows a 
government bond with residual maturity from 8½ to 10½ years and minimum issued 
amount of five billion euro to be used for delivery. Since the German government 
bonds are issued semiannually, there are typically four deliverable bonds with total 
issue size close to €80 billion. However, both the number of bonds and the depth of 
the Bund delivery basket fall short of those for the ten-year U.S. Treasury Note 
futures. The Treasury Note contract, which is approximately equal to Bund in volume 
of traded contracts, has typically 8 – 12 deliverable bonds with total issue size of 
$150 – $300 billion. 
Since deliverable bonds for Bund futures usually have different maturities and 
coupons, thus cash prices, the exchange provides bond-specific conversion factors 
that are used to calculate the actual delivery prices.3 In essence, the delivery price is 
the price at which bond would trade if its yield-to-maturity was equal to the notional 
six percent coupon. The conversion factor is supposed to make all eligible bonds 
equally attractive for delivery, though the conditions under which this objective is 
met are very rare. Namely, it requires that market yields are at the level of the 
notional coupon. Since a flat, six-percent yield curve is unlikely, bias in the 
conversion factor tends to make a bond with suitable cash flow characteristics 
cheaper to deliver than the others [e.g. Benninga and Wiener (1999), Oviedo (2006)]. 
Nonetheless, the closer the market yields are to the notional six percent level, the 
lesser is the price discrimination between deliverable bonds.  
The actual cheapest-to-deliver bond is not known with certainty until on the delivery 
date. A shift in the level or slope of the yield curve may change the cheapest-to-
deliver bond, especially if the yields are in the vicinity of notional coupon and the 
deliverable bonds are qualitatively similar. One effective measure of such uncertainty 
is the difference between bond delivery prices. If the initial delivery prices of the 
cheapest and the second cheapest bond are close to each other, only a small change in 
yields may cause a rotation in the cheapest grade. Figure 1 plots the difference in 
                                                          
3 Eurex (2007) provides the formula for the conversion factor.  
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delivery prices between the cheapest and the second-cheapest bond for every Bund 
contract from March 2001 to March 2007. As can be seen from the figure, the 
relative price advantage (ΔP) in favor of the cheapest grade is typically quite 
significant, varying from €0.20 to €1.25 per €100. This implies that the cheapest-to-
deliver bond for the expiring Bund futures is very predictable, since the probability of 
a rotation to any other deliverable bond is small. Even a relatively large, half 
percentage point parallel shift in the market yields (ΔP* bounds in Figure 1), does not 
seem to be enough to change the cheapest-to-deliver bond.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Marginal cost for delivering the second-cheapest bond (ΔP), and 
alternative costs after a half percentage point shift in market yields (ΔP*). ΔDΔr plots 
the joint effect of the difference in modified durations between the cheapest and the 
second-cheapest bond (ΔD), and the difference between actual yield and notional 
yield (Δr). 
 
There are two features in economic environment of the Bund contract that explain the 
price advantage, thus predictability, of the cheapest-to-deliver bond. First, euro-area 
interest rates after the 1990s have been considerably lower than the notional six 
percent level, which increases the bias in the conversion factor pricing in favor of the 
cheapest-to-deliver bond. Second, the difference in interest rate sensitivities between 
the cheapest-to-deliver bond and the second-best alternative is typically large enough 
to prevent the cheapest grade to change when market yields change. The joint effect 
of these two attributes is illustrated by ΔDΔr variable in Figure 1. ΔDΔr is the 
product of ΔD, the difference between interest rate sensitivities measured by 
modified duration, and Δr, the difference between the actual and the notional yield. 
As can be observed from Figure 1, the (inverted) ΔDΔr variable moves hand in hand 
with the relative price advantage ΔP. 
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The predictability of the cheapest-to-deliver bond is evidenced in the delivery records 
held by Eurex. The records show that for given Bund futures settlement, the sets of 
delivered bonds comprise solely of the actual cheapest grade (on average, one-sixth 
of the total outstanding issue), which is contradictory if the cheapest-to-deliver bond 
changed very frequently. Under the latter circumstances, the lack of predictability 
would result in a variety of delivered bonds, which are projected as cheapest and 
purchased in advance by the precautionary shorts.4 
2.1 Convergence Trading Strategy  
Based on the examination of Bund delivery environment above, the following issues 
arise: first, the lack of cost-effective alternatives makes the cheapest-to-deliver bond 
for the Bund futures contract predictable. Second, Eurex records show that the 
futures-induced demand concentrates solely on the cheapest grade. Third, the size 
difference between the cash and the futures markets for Bund bonds is exceptionally 
great. The central question of this paper is: how do these three issues affect the cash 
price of the cheapest grade? 
Intuitively and economically, it makes sense that the markets appreciate the 
possession of the cheapest-to-deliver bond due to its importance in the delivery 
process. Accordingly, this generates a premium on the spot price against the future 
delivery, insofar as the advantage in delivery costs remains. On the other hand, 
futures-market initiated trading should not have any impact on the price of a bond 
that is not deliverable, since it cannot be used in the settlement process. Therefore, 
the price relationship between cheapest-to-deliver and non-deliverable bond should 
reveal information concerning the price premium. 
In order to extract the premium from the cash price of the cheapest-to-deliver bond, 
an approach similar to Krishnamurthy (2002) is chosen. Krishnamurthy (2002) tested 
the effect of liquidity on the prices of U.S. Treasury bonds by short-selling more 
liquid on-the-run bond against less-liquid off-the-run bond. Continued on a daily 
basis until the on-the-run bond becomes off-the-run as well, Krishnamurthy (2002) 
reports an average annualized profit of $0.33 per $100 bond, which could be 
                                                          
4The delivery records are available at http://www.eurexchange.com. 
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associated with the markets’ appreciation for the superior liquidity of the on-the-run 
bond.5   
The on-the-run/off-the-run continuum in Krishnamurthy’s (2002) analysis closely 
resembles the one in question. First, the cyclical nature of bond issuances makes the 
remaining lifetime of the on-the-run bond perfectly predictable, allowing the markets 
to price the liquidity accordingly. Second, the similarity between the on-the-run and 
off-the-run bonds gives little fundamental reason for the bonds to be priced 
differently. The same type of convergence strategy is may be applied on the 
relationship between the current and preceding cheapest-to-deliver bond. If the 
futures markets value the current cheapest-to-deliver bond for its special status in 
futures delivery, it trades on higher price than the “old” cheapest-to-deliver bond.  
The convergence strategy is expected to generate profit once the current cheapest-to-
deliver bond becomes “old” as well and the price premium disappears. Thereby, the 
strategy it is “reversed” in the way that the profits do not stem from the relative 
appreciation itself, but from the discontinuation of it. In addition, it takes advantage 
of the predictability, discussed above, by assuming that the projected cheapest-to-
deliver remains cheapest until the delivery day. The following notation is similar to 
Krishnamurthy (2002): 
 Let   , n  = {0, …, N} correspond to subsequent business days on which bonds 
are traded.    is the first business day following the delivery day of the preceding 
futures contract;  or, equivalently, the first trading day of the near-month futures 
contract. N is either 66 or 132, depending on whether the constituents in the 
convergence strategy change after the futures contract matures. If the 
constituents remain the same, the strategy is rolled into the next quarter as such. 
 
 Let       correspond to the price of a non-deliverable bond that was deliverable 
at      
 
 Let       correspond to the number of units of non-deliverable bond at time   . 
Trades are settled two business days later (n + 2 settlement), which means that 
any cash flow, negative or positive, is received two business days after the trade. 
 
                                                          
5 It should be emphasized that the main result of Krishnamurthy’s (2002) convergence trades is that 
the profit from the price convergence is mitigated by the differences in financing costs. However, the 
concern here is not the actual profits but the relative prices and hence the financing rates are 
assumed to be equal. 
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 Let    
 
  be time     general repo rate for a (reverse) repo agreement with 
duration of           . The repo agreement is settled on the same business day.  
 
 Let    
   
  be the possible interim coupon payment paid at     . The coupon is 
compensated automatically to the current bond holder. 
 
 The variables above are analogous for the cheapest-to-deliver bond, which is 
distinguished with a hat (^). 
The data for the convergence trades extend from January 2001 to March 2007, for 
total 1534 trading days. It comprises end-of-day prices and general repurchase rates 
for German government ten-year Bundesanleihen (“Bund”) bonds, both from ICMA, 
and end-of-day prices for near-month Eurex-Bund futures contracts from Thomson 
Datastream. The cheapest-to-deliver bond is identified by calculating the implied 
repurchase rate on all deliverable bonds: 
 
           
 
    
        
                            
                               
                                
where 
   Index for a set of deliverable bonds 
      Time index for interim coupon payment, 
          
   Futures delivery date 
   
 
     Futures price maturing at   
    Eurex conversion factor 
      
 
   Accrued  interest 
 
A single convergence trade involves entering into two repurchase agreements; in the 
first and standard one,       units of the projected cheapest-to-deliver bonds are 
delivered to the security borrower at time   . The security borrower pays cash amount 
of    
 
  per unit in exchange, which is received at      and reinvested at the general 
repo rate for           days. At     , the bonds are bought back for         per unit. 
In the second one, which is a reverse repo agreement on non-deliverable bonds, the 
exact opposite holds;    units of non-deliverable bonds are bought at time t, and the 
purchase is financed at the repo rate. At     , the non-deliverable bonds are sold back 
for       per unit. The corresponding mathematical representation becomes: 
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where    
   
  is the profit from a single convergence trade and    is the time–series 
difference operator. The weights       and       are set so that the profit is 
unaffected by parallel shifts in the bond yields, which makes the strategy essentially 
market-neutral; Pérignon and Smith (2007) show that 85% of the variance in German 
government bond yields is due to parallel changes in the term structure. The weights 
are obtained by solving 
 
                                                                                  
where        is the modified duration of the non-deliverable bond at time t. The 
product             is held equal to seven, so that the exposure of the profit  to 
changes in the yield spread is similar every time the strategy is established. The scale 
factor is chosen to be seven according to the average modified duration of the related 
bonds; this leads to weights that correspond approximately to €100 face value of 
bonds. 
The convergence strategy consists of a continuum of similar trades, which are 
repeated until the bond ceases to be cheapest-to-deliver, or becomes non-deliverable. 
The profit from the complete strategy k,       consists of cumulative profits from 
individual convergence trades: 
 
              
 
 
                                                                 
 
For analytical purposes, the daily proceeds are not reinvested. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all 17 convergence strategies. The number 
of strategies is low compared to the number of matured futures contracts, since most 
bonds that become cheapest-to-deliver against a Bund futures contract remain 
cheapest for two consecutive contracts. Consequently, the average duration for a 
single strategy is closer to two quarter years than one. The cheapest-to-deliver bonds 
have an average time-to-maturity of 8.82 years, ranging from 8.56 to 9.06 years. 
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Given that deliverability requires time-to-maturity between eight and half and ten and 
half years, the summary statistics suggest the following: first, the cheapest-to-deliver 
bonds are amongst the ones with least time-to-maturity in the delivery basket. This, 
and the result that the bonds examined remain cheapest-to-deliver for two contracts, 
imply that bonds cease to be cheapest-to-deliver due to the lower time-to-maturity 
bound rather than losing the advantage in delivery costs.  
 
 
Table 1. The summary statistics for the convergence strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Number of matured futures contracts 32 
Number of convergence strategies 17 
Average duration (trading days) 119 
Average profit, per €100 (range) €0.21 (-0.26 to 1.06) 
Total profit from all strategies, per €100 €3.53 
   
The average profit from a convergence strategy is €0.21 per 100 euro, but actual 
profits fluctuate from €0.26 loss to €1.06 profit per €100. The cumulative outcome of 
all 17 convergence strategies yields a profit of €3.53 per €100.6 
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration on the accumulation of profits; the average 
cumulative profit on y-axis, as a function of remaining time on x-axis. According to 
Figure 2, the cumulative profits are on average positively sloped, which indicates the 
convergence effect discussed above. The strategy, however, could be separated into 
two periods on the basis of profit-making ability: Figure 2 shows that the strategy is 
not particularly profitable on the cheapest-to-deliver period ending to the first 
delivery day (“DD I”). In fact, all statistically significant profits are made on the 
period ending to the second delivery day (“DD II”). 
This finding may reflect markets’ expectations concerning the retention of the 
cheapest-to-deliver status; as the cheapest-to-deliver bond usually remains unchanged 
after DD I, the hypothesized cheapest-to-deliver premium remains unchanged on the 
first period as well. However, after the second delivery day the cheapest-to-deliver 
bond is inevitably to change due to the maturity bounds. As a consequence, the 
                                                          
6 It should be emphasized noted that the results from Cornell and Shapiro (1989) and Krishnamurthy 
(2002) suggest that allowing for market-driven, individual financing rates would probably zero out 
the convergence profits. However, the concern here is not the actual profits but the relative prices 
and hence the financing rates are assumed to be equal. 
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cheapest-to-deliver premium diminishes towards DD II and the convergence strategy 
becomes profitable. 
 
 Figure 2. Average cumulative profit from convergence strategies. 
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3 A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE PRICE PREMIUM 
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates that the short-selling strategy 
generates profits that are on average positive and statistically significant, and 
upward-sloping until the bond ceases to be the cheapest-to-deliver. The results 
suggest that the cheapest-to-deliver bond trades on a premium that decreases 
gradually before, rather than suddenly after, the last possible delivery date. Based on 
the results of Cornell and Shapiro (1989) and Krishnamurthy (2002), it is likely that 
the cheapest-to-deliver bond trades on a special financing rate as well.7 
Next, a simple model is developed in order to reconcile these results and analytically 
investigate the dynamics of the price premium. Based on the general equilibrium 
theory, the model introduces futures sellers who, preparing for physical delivery, 
express price-inelastic demand for the value-maximizing deliverable bond. Futures 
market participants inflate the price of the cheapest bond, given that at least some 
bonds are actually delivered, a marginal cost of delivering another grade exists, and 
the shorts’ aggregate demand dictates the general demand. Adopted from 
Krishnamurthy (2002), the no-arbitrage violations indicated by the convergence 
profits are accounted for by allowing the cheapest bond to trade on a special 
financing rate. By this augmentation, the multi-period version of the model generates 
a gradually decreasing price premium suggested by the convergence strategy.  
3.1 Economy 
Consider a two-period economy, where            defines the trading periods. There 
are two types of agents in the economy: the investor (“ ”) and the arbitrageur (“ ”). 
The agents in the economy face three competitive markets: the cash market, the 
futures market, and the financing market.  
Two similar bonds           trade at the cash markets, namely the “cheap” bond and 
the “dear” bond. Let          and          denote the cash prices of these bonds and 
                         . Concerning the prices, assume the following: 
                                                          
7 Even though improbable, the results do not rule out the possibility that the non-deliverable bond 
trades on a gradually disappearing discount, which is unrelated to the futures markets. For now, 
however, the cheapest-to-deliver premium is assumed, and the authenticity of this assumption is 
addressed later on. 
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Assumption A.1: Bond prices                  converge so that          
       ,       . Thus the cash prices may differ on the first period, but not 
afterward. 
The only traded asset in the bond futures markets is a standard contract, which is an 
agreement on a future delivery of an eligible bond. Let    be the delivery date and 
both bonds to be deliverable. In exchange for every bond the futures seller delivers, 
the contract obligates the buyer of the contract to pay the futures price      , 
multiplied by bond-specific conversion factors         . Not all futures contracts, 
however, are settled by physical delivery. At the futures expiration, some the futures 
positions are closed by making an offsetting transaction (“liquidation”) instead of 
delivering a bond. Table 2 illustrates the cash flows generated by the alternative ways 
from the futures seller’s perspective:  
Table 2. Futures seller’s alternative transactions. 
 Settlement Cash flows 
  
Delivery          
         
 Liquidation      
  
where                . Note that the cash flows are similar in the case of 
liquidation, but different if the contract is settled by physical delivery. In the latter 
case, short’s delivery proceeds depend on the cash price and the conversion factor of 
the delivered bond.  
Finally, the financing markets consist of two varieties of collateralized loans. A 
general repurchase agreement is used to finance a long bond position. It is a single 
transaction involving a cash market sale and a forward repurchase of the bond. The 
proceeds of the cash sale are thus collateralized by the bond itself. The difference 
between the cash and repurchase prices implies a general repurchase rate      for the 
bond. Table 3 illustrates the general repurchase agreement. 
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Table 3. The transactions generated by a general repurchase agreement on bond i. 
 
Time Borrower (bond owner) Lender (cash owner) 
      Delivers bond   Pays         
 
   Pays                  Returns bond   
  
A special repurchase agreement is similar to the general one with the exception that 
the bond acting as collateral is considered “special” by the lender. For this reason, the 
lender is willing to accept a lower, special repurchase rate                    on the 
proceeds of the cash market sale. The monetary benefit for the borrower is then 
                   in financing costs. 
3.2. Agents 
The investor is assumed to smooth her consumption by transferring wealth from 
period    to the next period    by purchasing    units of either deliverable bond. The 
  –wealth is hedged against interest rate risk by selling the corresponding amount of 
standard futures contracts. At    , a proportion of bonds equal to   is delivered against 
the bond-adjusted futures contract price      
 
 . The remaining     bonds (futures) 
are sold (bought). Concerning  , assume the following:  
 
Assumption A.2 A positive proportion of futures contracts are settled by 
physical delivery;      . 
 
The investor has an initial endowment    , and the general rate for one-period 
financing is     . Supposing that the  -th bond is chosen as the investment asset, 
investor’s expected cash flows become:  
 
 
                                    
                                          
 
136 Acta Wasaensia
 
 
 
where    corresponds to the expectations made at   . In the above expression, the first 
term inside the braces denotes the purchasing and financing costs; the second term 
stands for the expected delivery proceeds; and the third term is the expected proceeds 
from the capitalization of remaining futures and bonds. The investor’s problem of 
choice could be pinned down to the difference in cash flows that bonds       generate: 
 
                                                                               
 
where          , and the   –bond prices offset each other by Assumption A.1.  
Expression (7) states that the investor’s choice depends on the difference between the 
initial purchasing prices and on the expected difference in delivery proceeds. Even 
though the deliverable bonds and thus the delivery proceeds ought to be similar, let 
us assume that the conversion factor system fails to characterize the bonds perfectly, 
and the delivery prices differ:  
 
Assumption A.3 The functional form of conversion factor fails to characterize 
the deliverable bonds, and       .  
 
By A.2 and A.3, the latter term in expression (7) is strictly positive, and hence the 
investor is expected to profit from using the cheap bond in delivery instead of the 
dear. Henceforth, let these proceeds to be called “marginal delivery profit”. 
Consequentially, the utility-maximizing investor expresses excess demand for the 
cheap bond, which changes the initial cash prices so that they solve 
 
        
              
         
                                                               
 
where strictly increasing function      defines investor’s utility for expected marginal 
delivery profit. Then, Eq. (8) states that the equilibrium difference between         
and        equals investor’s utility from the expected marginal delivery profit, 
discounted to   . 
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The arbitrageur trades on relative prices, and has no wealth constraints, 
commitments, or transaction costs. The arbitrageur establishes one-period, self-
financing strategy, by a (reverse) repo agreement and an outright purchase (sell) of 
the dear (cheap) bond. On the next period, the bond positions are reversed and the 
repo commitments are fulfilled. Valued at    , the strategy is expected to generate the 
following cash flows to the arbitrageur: 
 
                                                                                   
 
which, in order to prevent arbitrage, must sum up to zero. Assuming A.1 holds, 
setting the arbitrage profits to zero, and combining with Eq. (8), yields 
 
                                                                             
 
which, under A.2 and A.3, is contradictory. 
3.3 Economy with Special Repo Rates 
Because investor’s excess demand for the cheap bond results in contradictory Eq. 
(10), the cheap bond is allowed to trade on a special financing rate       . Then, Exp. 
(6) is restated for bond c : 
 
    
 
 
                                 
   
                         
 
 
 
 
              
                    
 
where the last term represents the adjustment for lower financing cost: 
 
 
 corresponds to the amount of cheap bonds supplied onto the financing markets as 
special collateral,        is the spread between general and special financing rates, 
and                           is the search cost for borrowing against special 
collateral.  
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Assumption A.4 The investor supplies at least some, but not all, cheap bonds 
onto the financing markets as special collateral:        . 
 
The different financing rates restates investor’s problem of choice [Exp. (7)] into the 
following form: 
 
                                           
             
                     
 
The arbitrageur’s strategy in Exp. (9) is restated as well:  
 
                                                                                 
 
where        is the arbitrageur’s demand for collateral, and the second term inside 
the braces is the adjustment for different financing rates. Remark that due to search 
costs associated with collateralized borrowing, the investor’s optimal financing ratio 
is may be less than 1; that is, the amount of special collateral supplied onto the 
financing markets may be less than the amount of bonds purchased by the investor, 
implying               .  
3.4 Equilibrium  
Expressions (12) and (13) describe a joint equilibrium of two interrelated markets 
and two agents. First, from investor’s point of view, the cash market equilibrium is 
defined by 
 
        
                                         
       
                             
 
Then again, from the arbitrageur’s point of view the cash market equilibrium solves 
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Therefore, solving for the equilibrium price spread         requires the definition of 
agents’ utilities. Investor’s preferences and choices are based on the maximization of 
the following utility function: 
 
      
     
                                                                       
where 
     
                    
             
            
                    
                      
 
     implies that the investor is risk-averse with respect to future outcome. The 
arbitrageur maximizes  
 
      
  
                                                                             
where 
                                            
 
Thus the arbitrageur is risk-neutral with respect to future outcome. Investor’s first-
order conditions with respect to choices         are: 
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and the first-order condition concerning the arbitrageur’s choice    is  
 
   
   
                                                                          
 
Remark that the partial derivatives in F.O.C.’s (19) and (20) are both taken with 
respect to . Therefore, F.O.C. (18) is combined with (20) in order to find a common 
criterion upon which the agents maximize utility: 
 
       
           
        
                                                              
 
where the right-hand side of the equation is positive by A.2 and A.3, and strictly 
increasing with       . Rearranging F.O.C. (19) gives  
 
       
              
        
                                                             
  
where the right-hand side of the equation is positive and strictly increasing with 
      . Given that           and          , and clearing condition for financing 
markets       satisfied, Equations (21) and (22) define equilibrium for interest rate 
spread       .  
Figure 3 illustrates the situation where supply and demand for special collateral reach 
an equilibrium level   , defining the equilibrium repurchase rate spread       . Then, 
by Walras’ Law, the cash market clears as well, and F.O.C. (20) gives the 
equilibrium price spread: 
 
               
        
       
                                                            
 
where the equilibrium price and repurchase rate spreads are positively related by a 
scale factor. 
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Figure 3. Equilibrium repurchase rate spread. 
 
In a three-period framework, where the same bond remains cheapest-to-deliver and 
thus special for two consecutive deliveries, the arbitrageur is able to reestablish the 
strategy two times until the prices converge at    . In order to prevent arbitrage, the 
equilibrium price spread widens accordingly to counterbalance the arbitrageur’s 
increased profits: 
 
        
        
  
       
       
   
       
       
                                                    
 
Eq. (24) is a rearranged, three-period form of Eq. (23). Generalizing to   periods, Eq. 
(24) becomes 
  
        
        
  
       
       
 
   
                                                              
 
Taking logarithms and rearranging gives 
 
   
        
        
                               
   
   
                                   
and 
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where the current equilibrium (log) price spread increases according to the sum of 
(future) equilibrium repo spreads over        , and a time trend effect in          
results. 
3.5 Discussion of the Model 
The model developed here is a simplified one in order to focus attention on the 
dynamics, and generate empirically testable predictions, of the cheapest-to-deliver 
premium. Four simplifying assumptions are made: first, it is assumed that the prices 
converge, which is a common assumption in periodical models such as the Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) model for liquidity and the Duffie (1996) model for 
repurchase rates. It ensures that the contemporaneous equilibrium spread does not 
reflect any structural differences between bonds. Second, the model assumes that at 
least some futures buyers have positive marginal utility for accepting physical 
delivery, implying    . This assumption corresponds to Fackler (1993) and Pirrong 
(1993) equilibrium models for futures markets, and is supported by empirical 
evidence. Assumption A.3 is based on the well-known bias of conversion factor 
method, discussed for example by Oviedo (2006), and assumption A.4 with search 
cost       defines the natural equilibrium discussed in Duffie (1996). 
The model provides several testable hypotheses concerning the equilibrium price 
spread, which are briefly discussed next. The positive relationship shown in Eq. (23) 
enables to write Equations (21) and (22) in terms of equilibrium price spread         . 
Then, Eq. (21) states that the equilibrium price spread increases with the marginal 
delivery profits; that is, as product of the amount of physical deliveries and the 
relative cheapness in delivery. The arguments for this result are straightforward. 
First, if none of the bonds were to be delivered, then     and there would be no 
excess demand for the cheap bond. Second, if the conversion factor equalized the 
delivery prices completely, then       and there would be no cheap bond. Evidently, 
either of the two arguments is sufficient to take the marginal delivery profits and thus 
the equilibrium spread to zero. Eq. (22) states that the equilibrium price spread 
increases with the costs of borrowing against special collateral,      . This is the 
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equilibrium effect of decreased collateral supply   , and not directly futures markets 
initiated. Equations (23) and (27) relate to the no-arbitrage relationship between the 
cash and the financing markets á la Duffie (1996). The former equation states that the 
equilibrium price spread increases with the repurchase rate spread. Thus, the cash 
market price of the cheapest-to-deliver bond rises to offset the monetary benefit for 
borrowing with lower interest rate, indicated by the right-hand side of Eq. (23). If the 
bond owner is able to borrow with special rates for multiple periods as in Eq. (27), 
the contemporaneous price spread widens accordingly.   
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4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
The comparative statics discussed in Section 3.5 provide several testable hypotheses 
concerning the equilibrium spread. For instance, the model implies that the investor 
affects the equilibrium price spread directly by choosing to purchase the cheapest-to-
deliver bond for future delivery, and indirectly through financing markets by 
borrowing against the cheapest-to-deliver bond with special rates.  
Unfortunately, not all implications are directly testable due to data restrictions. First, 
the equilibrium price spread is not observable as such; in order to quantify the spread, 
the benchmark bond price          is estimated from the term structure of interest 
rates. Likewise, the repurchase agreements on special collateral are usually traded 
over-the-counter, which effectively limits the availability of data on equilibrium repo 
spread        and demand-supply flows indicated by          . Instead, the implied 
values of        are used, as well as the qualitative features of repurchase rate spread 
like the trend effect in Eq. (27). 
In the next subsections, the data and the methodology for empirical tests are 
described more comprehensively. The empirical variables are defined, and the 
reduced-form model of Equations (21) and (27) is presented and its parameters are 
empirically estimated using fixed-effect least squares regression. 
4.1 Data and Methodology 
The data used in empirical testing is similar to Section 2, augmented with data on 
physical deliveries from Eurex and bond trading volumes and bid-ask-spreads from 
ICMA. The data comprises the period from January 2001 to March 2007.  
The model in Section 3 specifies the equilibrium price spread being the difference 
between the price of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and a similar bond that is not 
deliverable. Since such bond does not usually exist nor is it traded, one is created and 
priced according to the term structure of interest rates. The approach is similar to the 
one used in studies analyzing tax effects [e.g. Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984); Green 
and Odegaard (1997)], liquidity [e.g. Elton and Green (1998); Jankowitsch, 
Mosenbacher, and Pichler (2006); Díaz, Merrick, and Navarro (2006)], and corporate 
bond pricing [e.g. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2004)].  
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Suppose that the market price for the cheapest-to-deliver bond is  
 
                                                                                   
 
where    is a     vector of discount factors derived from the term structure of risk-
free interest rates, and    is a     vector of coupon payments paid in   years   
   . The residual term   includes all idiosyncratic elements, such as the cheapest-
to-deliver premium, included in        . However, the vector    is not directly 
observable, but has to be replaced with estimated values     . For further description 
of the estimation process, see Appendix 1. Then, the price of a similar, synthetic 
bond with no idiosyncratic price elements is  
 
                                                                                              
 
Replacing      in Eq. (27) by        gives the estimated equilibrium spread  
 
                                                                                    
 
The theoretical model implies that the equilibrium spread is governed by the 
marginal delivery profits, the equilibrium spread between general and special 
repurchase rates, and the remaining time as special collateral. First, the marginal 
delivery profits comprise two components: the amount of delivered cheapest-to-
deliver bonds   and the relative cost advantage    . The former is defined as     , the 
utilization rate of cheapest-to-deliver bonds in near-month delivery at   :  
 
     
      
      
                                                                 
 
where        is futures market open interest on the delivery date,        is the 
outstanding amount of cheapest-to-deliver bonds, and           is the futures 
contract size times the bond conversion factor. The relative cost advantage     is 
derived from difference between the implied repurchase rates, Eq. (1) of the cheapest 
and second-cheapest bonds: 
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where          is the actual futures price, and           is an artificially inflated 
futures price that equalizes the two IRR’s. Then, the projected benefit in delivery 
costs is defined as: 
  
                                                                               
 
The equilibrium repurchase rate spread        is related to the equilibrium price 
spread by the no-arbitrage condition stated for example in Eq. (23). General 
repurchase rates are directly observable from the markets, but unfortunately the data 
sources for bond-specific special repurchase rates are scarce. Instead, the implied 
repurchase rate spread is used, which is calculated from well-known no-arbitrage 
relationship between the prices of the cheapest-to-deliver bond and the bond futures 
contract: 
 
          
           
                                                             
 
where is the   is the coupon rate. Formula (34) could be written in the following way: 
 
          
           
                                                                     
 
Rearranging and taking logarithms yields 
 
               
          
 
        
            
                                  
 
where        is the empirical equivalent of        and corresponds to Brennan’s 
(1986) implied convenience yield. 
Furthermore, Eq. (27) shows that the equilibrium price spread is positively related 
with the remaining time that the bond is special collateral. Because the empirical 
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results in Section 2 and the theoretical results in Section 3 both imply that the 
cheapest-to-deliver bonds trade on a special financing rate, the equilibrium spread 
should then decrease with the remaining time that the bond is cheapest-to-deliver. 
The remaining time is measured by       in the empirical analysis, where    is the 
last possible delivery date. An alternative specification       is included as well to 
test whether the equilibrium spread decreases with respect to the next delivery, rather 
than the last possible delivery indicated by the cumulative profits in Section 2.  
Since the cheapest-to-deliver bond may have different liquidity than the benchmark 
bond, the estimated equilibrium spread                    may be contaminated by the 
liquidity factors not accounted for in the theoretical model. Therefore, the effect of 
liquidity differences in the estimated spread are controlled with two well-known 
indicators: the bid-ask spread,         and logarithm of daily trading volume,        . 
The summary for all variables is provided in Table 4. 
4.2 Empirical Model 
In order to empirically test the how the variables specified in the previous section 
affect the estimated equilibrium spread, the following reduced-form equation is 
estimated: 
 
                                                                                 
                                                          
 
where 
                                   
 
and          and         are binary variables for different years and bonds, 
respectively.  
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Table 4. Summary of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Model 
variable 
Empirical 
variable Explanation 
Predicted 
sign Motivation 
                     Market price at time    
for cheapest-to-deliver 
bond   
  
                 Sum of discounted cash 
flows at time    for bond 
  
  
     
 Independent  variables   
       Percentage of cheapest-
to-deliver bonds utilized 
in physical delivery 
Positive Marginal delivery 
profit, Eq. (22) 
              Implied repurchase rate  
spread  
Positive Benefit from 
reduced fin. costs, 
Eq. (24) 
            Time to last possible 
delivery (years) 
Positive Cumulative benefit 
from reduced fin. 
costs, Eq. (25) 
           Cheapest-to-deliver 
margin 
Positive Marginal delivery 
profit, Eq. (22) 
     
 Control variables   
       Time to next delivery 
(yrs.) 
 Alternative for 
                    Bid-ask spread  Liquidity effects 
              Log of trading volume  Liquidity effects 
          Year dummy  Fixed year 
differences           Bond dummy  F x d bond 
differences      
 
An alternative specification is estimated as well: 
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Both equations are estimated by panel least squares regression. Preliminary Lagrange 
multiplier test and Wooldridge (2001) test for serial correlation detect 
heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in the regression error term. 
Therefore,         is modeled as an AR(1) process, and the standard errors for 
regression coefficients are corrected for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and correlation 
by using Thompson (2005) method.  
In addition to Equations (37.1) and (37.2), which concern only cheapest-to-deliver 
bonds, another two equations are estimated comprising any ten-year German 
government bond                    : 
 
                                                                                    
                                                                                     
                                                                                      
                                                        
 
 
                                                                                    
                                                                                     
                                                                                      
                                                        
 
 
where         is the market price for bond  , and                      and 
             are binary variables that distinguish on-the-run, cheapest-to-deliver, 
and non-deliverable bonds, respectively. The time-slope variables for cheapest-to-
deliver bonds,     , are dropped from Equations (38.1) and (38.2) in order to 
maintain the comparability between the level variables                      and 
            . 
4.3 Results 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis.  The second column in Table 5 indicates that the estimated equilibrium 
spread      is on average positive, and ranges from 10.3 cents to 15.5 cents (15.2 to 
21.4) per €100 for cheapest-to-deliver bonds (all bonds), depending on the estimation 
method. Out of all bond–day observations in the sample, cheapest-to-deliver bonds 
cover 24.5 percent, on-the-run bonds 24 percent, and non-deliverable bonds 29 
percent of the observations.  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 Mean Median Max. Min. S.D. Skew. Kurt. Sum Obs. 
          Cheapest-to-deliver bonds, Eq. (36.x) 
             0.155 0.149 0.871 –0.367 0.147 0.415 3.498 237.507 1534 
       0.103 0.104 0.910 –0.525 0.166 0.268 4.818 158.327 1534 
      0.114 0.120 0.908 –0.578 0.173 –0.052 4.616 174.415 1534 
UTIL 0.159 0.164 0.476 0.039 0.083 1.764 7.751 244.156 1534 
MARGIN 0.457 0.384 1.241 0.000 0.277 0.751 2.678 700.357 1534 
SPREAD –0.027 –0.025 0.812 –1.132 0.156 –0.460 10.874 –41.852 1534 
      0.250 0.255 0.499 0.000 0.143 –0.041 1.821 384.499 1534 
          All bonds, Eq. (37.x) 
               0.214 0.143 1.287 –0.563 0.251 1.092 3.706 1335.072 6227 
       0.152 0.113 1.244 –0.546 0.237 0.904 4.516 951.771 6227 
      0.169 0.137 1.337 –0.710 0.247 0.728 4.373 1055.066 6227 
OTR 0.240 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.427 1.215 2.477 1503.000 6227 
CTD 0.245 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.430 1.183 2.399 1534.000 6227 
NONDEL 0.290 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.454 0.924 1.854 1815.000 6227 
          Control variables 
              0.123 0.123 0.249 0.000 0.072 0.033 1.831 188.322 1534 
VOL (M€) 1630 1450 4860 106 1030 1.052 3.691 9880000 6227 
BIDASK 0.025 0.020 0.240 0.000 0.027 3.239 17.619 153.280 6227 
          In Table 5,      is the equilibrium spread, estimated with VRP, NSS, and FB methods 
described in Appendix I. Other variables are UTIL (%-tage of bonds utilized in 
delivery); MARGIN (relative cheapness in delivery); SPREAD (implied repurchase 
rate spread);       (years to last possible delivery); OTR (a dummy variable for on-
the-run bonds); CTD (a dummy variable for cheapest-to-deliver bonds); NONDEL (a 
dummy variable for non-deliverable bonds). The control variables are       (years 
to next delivery); BIDASK (bid-ask spread); and VOL is the daily trading volume (in 
millions).  
 
Table 6 categorizes the estimated equilibrium spreads by the status of the bond. The 
first column describes the status: on-the-run, cheapest-to-deliver, or non-deliverable 
bond. According to the results, the on-the-run bond trades on an average premium 
ranging from 32.3 cents to 41.9 cents per €100, depending on the estimation method.8 
                                                          
8 These estimates are over twice the size of Jankowitsch et al. (2006), but may be explained by the 
different estimation period (Jankowitsch et al. used the period from January 1999 to March 2001) or 
estimation procedure (estimating         , Jankowitsch et al. did not exclude on-the-run bonds). 
Especially the latter issue is may be decisive, because including on-the-run bonds in the term 
structure estimation results downward-biased estimates of on-the-run premium. 
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The second line in Table 6 provides the average estimates for cheapest-to-deliver 
premium, and the third line presents the estimates for non-deliverable bonds. Note 
that the former ranges from 10.3 cents to 15.5 cents per €100 and differs statistically 
from zero, whereas the latter varies from 0.1 cents to 3.3 cents per €100 and does not 
generally statistically deviate from zero. 
Here, the cheapest-to-deliver premium could be approximated in two different ways: 
by the second line in Table 6 alone, or by adjusting the values on the second line with 
the ones on the third line. Either way, these results provide unequivocal support for 
the existence of the cheapest-to-deliver premium, and validate the convergence 
assumption A.I in the theoretical model. Albeit the estimated cheapest-to-deliver 
premiums in Table 6 are on average half the size indicated by the convergence 
strategy in Section 2, it should be noted that the values in Table 6 are averages and 
presumably larger at the time the convergence strategy is initiated.  
 
Table 6. The estimates of equilibrium spread, categorized by bond status. 
Status                        N 
        OTR  0.419  0.323  0.357 
1503   [65.94] 
(0.00) 
 
 [55.12] 
(0.00) 
 
 [58.52] 
(0.00) 
 CTD  0.154  0.103  0.112 
1534   [24.46] 
(0.00) 
 
 [17.82] 
(0.00) 
 
 [18.63] 
(0.00) 
 NONDEL  0.033  0.001  0.003 
1815   [5.76] 
(0.00) 
 
 [0.22] 
(0.83) 
 
 [0.49] 
(0.62) 
         
N  6227  6227  6227  
        
The categories are OTR (on-the-run bonds), CTD (cheapest-to-deliver bonds), and 
NONDEL (non-deliverable bonds).              , and        are the estimates of the 
equilibrium spread. Student’s t-values (p-values) in brackets (parentheses) report the 
statistical significance from zero mean. Bolded values indicate statistical significance 
on at least 5% level. 
 
Table 7 provides the results for multivariate analysis specified by Equations (37.1) 
and (37.2). In general, the coefficients for the futures–market related variables are 
statistically significant and consistent with the theoretical model; as predicted by the 
model, increases in delivered amounts (UTIL), relative cheapness (MARGIN), and 
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implied repurchase spread (SPREAD) are all positively related to the price premium. 
In addition, the coefficient for the remaining time to last delivery        appears 
positive and statistically significant in all regressions, confirming the cyclical pattern 
of cheapest-to-deliver premium. In contrast, the coefficient for time to next delivery 
       is generally small and insignificant, confirming that the premium decreases 
towards the last, instead of the next, delivery. All relevant coefficients are somewhat 
unchanged over different estimation methods and the measures of liquidity, which 
indicates that the results are robust to model misspecification. The model fits are 
good as well; adjusted R2 ranges from 38 to 73 percent.  
Table 8 reports the estimation results for Equations (38.1) and (38.2). Since the 
estimation concerns the complete sample, the bonds having a special status are 
allowed for an individual constant term: “OTR” for on-the-run bonds, “CTD” for 
cheapest-to-deliver bonds, and “NONDEL” for non-deliverable bonds. This sort of 
classification is strongly supported by the results: according to first four rows in 
Table 8, the coefficients for OTR, CTD, and NONDEL appear statistically significant 
in all regressions. The differences between the status coefficients are analogous to the 
values reported in Table 6, indicating that the cheapest-to-deliver bonds are on 
average €0.25 cheaper than on-the-run bonds, but trade on a €0.10 premium to non-
deliverable bonds. 
The results for the futures-markets related variables UTIL, MARGIN, and SPREAD 
are little changed from Table 7. The signs of the regression coefficients are consistent 
with model predictions, and appear statistically significant in most regressions. 
According to additional tests not reported here, the log-likelihood ratio tests for 
restricted model   
 
  
 
  
 
    reject the null hypothesis in all regressions with ratios 
ranging from 81.87 to 329.51. This indicates that the futures-market related variables 
have explanatory power beyond the bond status and liquidity coefficients, thus 
providing further support for the model developed in Section 3. 
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Table 7. The effect of model-specified variables on the estimated equilibrium spread, 
cheapest-to-deliver subsample. 
 
 
                       
Variable Prediction 1 2  1 2  1 2 
          Constant  0.173 0.519 
 
 0.152 –0.235 
–0.154 
 
 0.246 0.199 
 
 
 
[4.41] 
(0.00) 
 
[1.73] 
(0.08) 
 [2.46] 
(0.01) 
 
[-0.48] 
(0.64) 
 [3.63] 
(0.00) 
 
[0.37] 
(0.72) 
UTIL ( + ) 0.354 0.376 
 
 –0.156 –0.154 
 
 0.286 0.371 
 
 
 
[6.64] 
(0.00) 
 
[6.42] 
(0.00) 
 [-1.47] 
(0.14) 
 
[-1.38] 
(0.17) 
 [2.85] 
(0.00) 
 
[3.57] 
(0.00) 
MARGIN ( + ) 0.237 0.248 
 
 0.355 0.346 
 
 0.297 0.309 
 
 
 
[7.50] 
(0.00) 
 
[7.49] 
(0.00) 
 [8.34] 
(0.00) 
 
[7.80] 
(0.00) 
 [6.30] 
(0.00) 
 
[6.23] 
(0.00) 
SPREAD ( + ) 0.221 0.209 
 
 0.178 0.162 
 
 0.205 0.185 
 
 
 
[5.47] 
(0.00) 
 
[5.13] 
(0.00) 
 [4.86] 
(0.00) 
 
[4.68] 
(0.00) 
 [4.47] 
(0.00) 
 
[4.03] 
(0.00) 
      ( + ) 0.360 0.372 
 
 0.229 0.253 
 
 0.301 0.327 
 
 
 
[15.47] 
(0.00) 
 
[15.58] 
(0.00) 
 [2.79] 
(0.00) 
 
[5.78] 
(0.00) 
 [7.12] 
(0.00) 
 
[7.36] 
(0.00) 
       0.006 –0.006 
 
 –0.054 –0.075 
 
 –0.037 -0.079 
 
 
 
[0.10] 
(0.92) 
 
[0.10] 
(0.92) 
 [-0.69] 
(0.49) 
 
[-0.90] 
(0.36) 
 [4.89] 
(0.00) 
 
[0.89] 
(0.37) 
BIDASK  0.456   0.544   0.457  
 
 
[3.93] 
(0.00) 
 
  [2.69] 
(0.00) 
 
  [2.09] 
(0.04) 
 
 
Log(Vol)   –0.016 
 
  0.017 
 
  -0.004 
 
 
 
 [-1.18] 
(0.24) 
  [0.78] 
(0.44) 
  [-0.18] 
(0.85) 
AR(1)  0.273 0.277 
 
 0.322 0.342 
 
 0.315 0.337 
 
 
 
[6.25] 
(0.00) 
 
[6.12] 
(0.00) 
 [9.60] 
(0.00) 
 
[9.95] 
(0.00) 
 [8.54] 
(0.00) 
 
[8.83] 
(0.00) 
Year ID  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Bond ID  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R 2  0.73 0.71  0.39 0.38  0.42 0.43 
N  1534  1534  1534 
The dependent variable in all regressions is     , the daily spread between the market 
price and the sum of discounted cash flows.      is estimated by VRP, NSS, and FB 
methods described in Appendix I. The independent variables are UTIL (%-tage of 
bonds utilized in delivery); MARGIN (relative cheapness in delivery); SPREAD 
(implied repurchase rate spread);       (years to last possible delivery). The control 
variables are       (years to next delivery); BIDASK (bid-ask spread); and VOL 
(daily trading volume). Bond ID and year ID are dummy variables that specify 
individual bonds and years, respectively. The regression residual term is assumed to 
follow an AR(1) process. Thompson (2005) robust standard errors are used to correct 
for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and correlation. Adjusted t-values (p-values) are in 
brackets (parentheses). Bolded values indicate statistical significance on at least 5% 
level. 
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Table 8. The effect of model-specified variables on the estimated equilibrium spread, 
all bonds. 
 
 
                       
Variable Prediction       1       2        1       2        1       2 
          Constant  0.477 0.531 
 
 0.517 –0.331 
 
 0.608 0.081 
 
 
 
[3.10] 
(0.00) 
[1.42] 
(0.15) 
 [3.63] 
(0.00) 
[-0.85] 
(0.39) 
 [3.50] 
(0.00) 
[0.18] 
(0.86) 
OTR  0.134 0.130 
 
 0.124 0.099 
 
 0.146 0.125 
 
 
 
[3.65] 
(0.00) 
[3.60] 
(0.00) 
 [-3.29] 
(0.00) 
[2.57] 
(0.01) 
 [3.14] 
(0.00) 
[2.54] 
(0.01) 
CTD  –0.141 –0.145 
 
 –0.134 –0.138 
 
 –0.149 –0.153 
 
 
 
[-4.40] 
(0.00) 
[-5.25] 
(0.00) 
 [-4.80] 
(0.00) 
[-5.13] 
(0.00) 
 [-4.03] 
(0.00) 
[-4.23] 
(0.00) 
NONDEL  –0.254 –0.253 
 
 –0.238 –0.213 
 
 –0.273 –0.257 
 
 
 
[2.65] 
(0.01) 
[-4.68] 
(0.00) 
 [-4.52] 
(0.00) 
[-4.42] 
(0.00) 
 [-4.27] 
(0.00) 
[-4.41] 
(0.00) 
UTIL*CTD ( + ) 0.450 0.347 
 
 0.131 0.048 
 
 0.438 0.372 
 
 
 
[1.85] 
(0.06) 
[0.46] 
(0.65) 
 [1.28] 
(0.20) 
[0.41] 
(0.51) 
 [4.95] 
(0.00) 
[3.15] 
(0.00) 
MARGIN*CTD ( + ) 0.147 0.155 
 
 0.147 0.142 
 
 0.163 0.169 
 
 
 
[2.66] 
(0.01) 
[3.05] 
(0.00) 
 [2.82] 
(0.00) 
[3.02] 
(0.00) 
 [2.25] 
(0.02) 
[2.47] 
(0.01) 
SPREAD*CTD ( + ) 0.238 0.1224 
 
 0.181 0.164 
 
 0.210 0.189 
 
 
 
[4.78] 
(0.00) 
[3.13] 
(0.00) 
 [3.52] 
(0.00) 
[3.30] 
(0.00) 
 [3.60] 
(0.02) 
[3.21] 
(0.00) 
BIDASK  0.364   0.514   0.342  
 
 
[3.70] 
(0.00) 
  [4.03] 
(0.00) 
  [3.00] 
(0.02) 
 
LogVol   –0.003   0.040 
 
  0.025 
 
   [-0.18] 
(0.86) 
  [1.98] 
(0.05) 
  [1.07] 
(0.28) 
AR(1)  0.533 0.532  0.427 0.439 
 
 0.478 0.492 
 
  [15.70] 
(0.00) 
[13.61] 
(0.00) 
 [14.33] 
(0.00) 
[14.20] 
(0.00) 
 [13.90] 
(0.00) 
[14.52] 
(0.00) 
Year ID          
Bond ID          
Adj. R 2  0.85 0.83  0.59 0.56  0.61 0.59 
N  6227  6227  6227 
The dependent variable in all regressions is     , the daily spread between the market price and the 
sum of discounted cash flows.      is estimated by VRP, NSS, and FB methods described in Appendix 
I. The independent variables are OTR (a dummy variable for on-the-run bonds); CTD (a dummy 
variable for cheapest-to-deliver bonds); NONDEL (a dummy variable for non-deliverable bonds); 
UTIL (%-tage of cheapest-to-deliver bonds utilized in delivery); MARGIN (relative cheapness in 
delivery); SPREAD (implied repurchase rate spread). The control variables are BIDASK (bid-ask 
spread) and VOL (daily trading volume). Bond ID and year ID are dummy variables that specify 
individual bonds and years, respectively. The regression residual term is assumed to follow an AR(1) 
process. Thompson (2005) robust standard errors are used to correct for arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and correlation. Adjusted t-values (p-values) are in brackets (parentheses). Bolded values indicate 
statistical significance on at least 5% level.  
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The theory of portfolio choice states that the demand for bonds is governed by four 
factors: the wealth of the marginal investor, and the expected return, risk, and 
liquidity of bonds relative to alternative assets. Besides these four factors, the present 
study argues that investor’s contractual liability regarding bond-futures settlement 
process increases the demand, and thus the equilibrium price, for certain types of 
bonds. These bonds are cheapest-to-deliver against bond futures contracts, and play a 
central part in bond-futures settlement process known as physical delivery. In case of 
the physical delivery, the futures seller is obligated to deliver an eligible bond to the 
futures buyer. The futures seller incurs losses if any other than the cheapest bond is 
delivered.   
As a consequence, the futures-market initiated demand concentrates on that particular 
bond. Section 2 of this paper reports on a test of the effects that futures-market 
initiated demand causes on the prices of the cheapest-to-deliver bonds. The test 
comprises an arbitrage strategy that generates profits if the cheapest-to-deliver bond 
trades on a premium. Using end-of-day price data from German government ten-year 
Bund markets, systematic profits from the trading strategy imply that a premium 
exists, and that it decreases gradually until the cheapest-to-deliver bond becomes 
ineligible for delivery. Based on no-arbitrage arguments, it is also deduced that the 
cheapest-to-deliver bonds trade on special financing rates. Next, a general 
equilibrium model is developed to analyze the underlying factors governing the 
cheapest-to-deliver premium in Section 3. The model implies that the premium 
increases as a function of the delivered amount and the relative cheapness of the 
cheapest-to-deliver bond. The cumulative benefit from a special financing rate results 
in the characteristic time trend effect indicated by the arbitrage profits. The 
implications of the theoretical model are empirically tested in Section 4. Throughout 
the tests, the results consistently support and corroborate the theoretical model. The 
estimated equilibrium spread between the cheapest-to-deliver and a non-deliverable 
bond is approximately €0.10 per every €100 and robust to the various specifications 
of the empirical model. As hypothesized, the premium increased as a function of the 
amount of delivered bonds, the relative cheapness, and the (cumulative) benefit from 
reduced financing costs. 
In conclusion, the results of this paper strongly suggest that the futures-market 
initiated demand inflates the price of the bond that is cheapest-to-deliver for the Bund 
156 Acta Wasaensia
 
 
 
futures contract. The results are of importance for futures exchanges, bond market 
researchers and investors alike. The welfare effects of the price premium, and 
reversed-causality effects to the price of the futures contract, are possible issues for 
future research.  
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APPENDIX 1 TERM STRUCTURES MODELS 
A term structure model refers to a statistical method to extract discount factors, spot, 
or forward rates from the prices of coupon bonds. In general, the term structure has to 
be estimated, because a continuous set of default-free zero-coupon bonds is not 
traded on the actual markets. The German government bond market is no exception: 
the continuous term structure has to be estimated from a discrete series of coupon 
bond prices. The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate the term structure 
models and estimation techniques used in the study.  
A.1 Extracting Term Structure from Coupon Bond Prices 
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing implies that the price of a default-free bond 
in frictionless markets is a linear function of time m cash flows    and unique 
discount factors   : 
 
      
 
    
                                                                         
 
Basically,    is the current price of a zero-coupon bond that at maturity M pays one 
dollar with certainty. Absence of arbitrage and consumer impatience imply that the 
discount factor strictly positive, but decreasing with respect to time to maturity. The 
discount factor could be also expressed in terms of spot      or forward      interest 
rate using following relations:  
 
               
                 
 
 
  
 
These relations allow to extract discount factors from the term structure of interest 
rates, or correspondingly from prices of default-free zero-coupon bonds. In practice, 
however, frictions in real market lead to sets of parallel discount factors that hold 
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approximately in Equation (A1). Therefore, it is more sensible to use an inexact 
relation: 
 
        
 
    
                                                                            
 
and apply a term structure model to estimate a continuous set of unique discount 
factors that result in the smallest errors   , i = 1, ..., N, in the cross-section of coupon 
bond prices.  
In addition to choosing appropriate pricing function as in Equation (A2), the term 
structure estimation involves selection of functional form to be used and statistical 
method to obtain the parameters of the functional form. In order to minimize the 
effect of misspecification of functional form on the error term, three distinctive 
functional forms are estimated in parallel. These models are taken from the past 
literature, and are widely used in central banks and the academia [e.g. BIS (2005); 
Jordan and Mansi (2003); Subramanian (2001); Anderson and Sleath (1999); Bliss 
(1997)]. 
A.2 Term Structure Models 
Svensson’s (1994) parsimonious model uses six parameters to characterize the entire 
term structure of spot rates:  
 
                  
              
       
        
            
      
         
 
  
               
       
              
      
       
 
   
    
 
where  
 
 represents the asymptote of long-term interest rates, and  
 
 defines the 
slope. The remaining parameters define the position, magnitude, and direction of 
humps in the term structure. The parameters are estimated using non-linear 
constrained optimization procedure: 
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subject to  
 
    
         
            
 
 
The weights    are computed using the inverse of bond i Macauley duration   : 
 
   
    
     
 
 
 
 
Due to non-linearity of the function, the optimization procedure could end up in local 
minima rather than the global minimum. In order to find the global minimum, the 
procedure is repeated using various sets of starting parameters (altogether 91 sets). 
The smoothed Fama-Bliss method [Bliss (1997); Fama and Bliss (1987)] requires a 
two-step process: first, iterative extraction of forward rates to obtain spot rates     , 
and then fitting extended Nelson-Siegel [Nelson and Siegel (1987)] type of 
approximating function through them: 
 
              
             
      
     
             
      
      
 
  
                   
 
by  
   
   
             
 
 
   
 
 
where the parameters      , constraints, and the estimation procedure is are analogous 
to Equation (3) with few exceptions: the model contains only one “hump” parameter 
 
 
, and the difference between iterated and approximated spot rate is minimized 
rather than the weighted price error. 
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Finally, the smoothed spline method with variable roughness penalty [Waggoner 
(1997)] approximates forward rates as piecewise cubic polynomials, with segments 
joined at knot points. This guarantees very flexible representation of the forward 
curve, as the segments move almost independently of each other. The downside is 
that the flexibility and excessive curvature makes the outcome inappropriate for 
smooth term structure representation. To prevent this, excessive curvature of the 
forward curve is measured by the square of the second derivative and penalized 
accordingly. The objective function becomes a trade-off between (1) the cubic spline 
that minimizes the error between observed prices and prices implied by the forward 
curve, and (2) the smoothness of the forward curve 
 
    
 
  
                    
 
 
    
 
   
                                             
      
             
               
  
 
where             is the measure of curvature, and      is the variable roughness 
penalty (VRP) that controls the smoothness of the forward curve as a function of time 
to maturity. As in Waggoner (1997), the VRP used in this paper is a step function 
with increasing penalty values, but with few modifications to German data; first, due 
to exclusion of one-year or shorter bonds, it has only one step occurring at ten years 
to maturity. Second, the original VRP values were chosen to maximize the out-of-
sample fit in the U.S. Treasury market; these values, however, generate poor out-of-
sample fit in the German market. Based on Waggoner’s (1997) original criterion, the 
out-of-sample weighted mean absolute error, extensive testing suggest that much 
smaller values as in Equation (A5) are more appropriate. This result may stem from 
the differences in maturity spectrum between German and more diverse U.S. 
Treasury government bond markets; the number of knot points that separate maturity 
segments are usually placed at the maturity of every third bond, and, ceteris paribus, 
more knot points increase the flexibility of the forward curve and thus require larger 
penalty values. 
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A.3 Methodology and Data 
Following Bliss (1997) and Waggoner (1997), the available set of bonds is sorted by 
maturity and divided into two subsamples: the estimation subsample is used to 
extract the term structure on a daily basis, and compute fitted prices and errors for 
bonds in the hold-out subsample. The bond with the longest time to maturity is 
always included in the estimation sample. Then, the goodness-of-fit of estimated 
curve is analyzed using two distinctive measures: the weighted mean absolute error 
(“WMAE”), and the hit rate. WMAE indicates how much the fitted price deviates 
from the midpoint of bid and ask prices. Each price error is weighted by the inverse 
of Macauley duration; this feature enables to combine the price errors across 
maturities, irrespective of the asymmetric relationship between interest rate and price 
changes. The second performance measure, hit rate, is the percentage of “perfectly” 
priced bonds; in other words, it describes how many bonds have the estimated price 
inside the bid and ask quotes of the total number of available bonds. Only the hold-
out sample is used to calculate the goodness-of-fit statistics; optimization procedure 
guarantees that any method will produce a good in-sample fit.   
The data consist of ICMA end-of-day price quotes for German government long-term 
Bundesanleihen (“Bund”) and medium-term Bundesobligationen (“Bobl”) bonds, and 
Bundesschatzanweisungen (“Schatz”) notes. The data extends from January 2001 to 
March 2007, for a total of 1578 trading days. Based on the past studies [Bliss (1997); 
Schich (1997); Fisher (1996)], the following types of filters are imposed to ensure 
that the securities used in term structure extraction are largely homogenous:  
 Bonds with special terms or option features  
 Bonds or notes that have could have abnormal liquidity: 
- less than one year to maturity 
- outstanding amount less than 5 billion 
- bonds issued by government special funds 
- depending on the number of bonds in each maturity segment, one or 
two most recently issued securities 
 Bonds or notes that are cheapest-to-deliver against the near-month futures 
contract 
- In order to avoid any conceptual problems in the empirical analysis of 
the study 
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A.4 Results 
The goodness-of-fit results for tested models are presented in Table A1. Overall, both 
performance measures indicate that all three methods and the associated estimation 
procedures do well in pricing hold-out sample bonds. Although the estimation 
method proposed by Svensson performs best and the Smoothed Fama-Bliss does 
worst by both measures, the differences are very small. For example, Table A1 shows 
that the WMAE of the best method is 6.1 cents per €100, but the marginal to the 
worst method is only 1.3 cents per €100. The hit rate confirms that the good fits: 
approximately 38 percent of the price estimates hit inside the actual bid-ask prices. 
The unit root tests indicate that the residual terms of all models follow stationary 
processes. 
 
Table A1. The goodness-of-fit results for estimated term structure models. 
Criterion NSS FB VPR 
 Weighted Mean Absolute Error (“WMAE”) 
        Mean 0.06 0.07 0.07 
     Median 0.06 0.07 0.07 
     Standard deviation 0.03 0.04 0.04 
    Hit Rate 
      Mean 0.39 0.36 0.39 
     Median 0.35 0.35 0.37 
     Standard deviation 0.20 0.19 0.18 
    Tests for unit root 
        Common (LLL)† −2.92***      −9.31***    −8.77*** 
     Individual (IPS)† −10.06***   −16.46***  −15.18*** 
  Average number of daily observations (in/out) 18 / 17 
Number of business days 1578 
  † Under the null hypothesis, the residual term follows unit root process. Lag selection 
is based on Schwarz criterion. “***” denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% 
level. “LLL” and “IPS” denote panel unit root test by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), respectively. Panels are allowed to have individual 
intercepts.  
